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Traumatic events experienced in childhood, such as physical and sexual abuse, can lead to 
multiple long-term effects on later cognitive functioning. Empirical research has shown that 
specific brain regions are affected by traumatic stress, including the hippocampus and the 
prefrontal cortex. It follows that the cognitive abilities subserved by these regions, including 
spatial navigation, new learning, and executive functioning, are negatively affected. 
Furthermore, in some cases, this exposure may lead to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a 
disorder which brings with it, its own set of neural abnormalities and their corresponding 
neuropsychological deficits. However, very few studies have looked at the effects of trauma 
exposure and PTSD on adolescents’ performance on a comprehensive neuropsychological test 
battery. Furthermore, due to methodological problems in the research that has been done, 
findings have, thus far, been conflicting and thus inconclusive. The aim of the current study was 
therefore, to provide a thorough investigation of how trauma exposure and PTSD effect 
adolescents’ cognitive functioning (looking specifically at those tasks subserved by the 
hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex), correcting for the methodological flaws seen in the 
research thus far.  
 
The study compared the performance of three groups of South African adolescents, consisting of 
16 adolescents who had been exposed to a trauma and had a diagnosis of PTSD, 16 adolescents 
who had been exposed to a trauma but did not have PTSD, and 17 adolescents who served as 
matched controls. Results showed that participants in the trauma group performed significantly 
poorer in the domain of Inhibition (compared to controls), and that participants in PTSD group 
performed significantly poorer in the domain of Spatial navigation (compared to controls; this 
effect was however, only seen in females). Moreover, the results showed that number of 
symptoms experienced by trauma victims is significantly associated with performance in some 
domains (namely Processing speed and Decision-making/impulsivity). The findings of the 
current study suggest that the differences in performance reflect impaired neural functioning 
which is due to both trauma exposure as well as the individual’s posttraumatic responses. 














Adverse events during early childhood, such as physical and sexual abuse, maltreatment, and 
neglect, often have long-term effects on later functioning. These effects, the consequences of 
early adversity, can often be seen in adolescents’ performance on tests of neuropsychological 
function.  
 
For instance, Beers and De Bellis (2002) found that children and adolescents with maltreatment-
related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; n = 14, mean age = 11.38 years, SD = 2.60) 
exhibited significant deficits in two domains of neuropsychological functioning (attention, and 
problem-solving and abstract reasoning) compared to a control group who had not experienced 
any known trauma (n = 15, mean age = 12.17, SD = 1.75). Their findings also suggested relative 
deficits in the PTSD group in the cognitive domains of verbal learning and memory and of 
visual-spatial functioning (however, these results did not remain significant after statistical 
corrections). 
 
The Beers and De Bellis study is the seminal work in this field in that it is one of the very few 
investigations that reports the administration of a comprehensive battery of neuropsychological 
tests to children and adolescents with a history of early adversity, thus examining the wide-
ranging effects of childhood trauma on adolescent neuropsychological functioning. Other studies 
have provided some support for the data reported in that study. For instance, research with adult 
samples has consistently indicated that, with regard to the domains of attention, problem-solving, 
abstract reasoning, and visual-spatial functioning, individuals with PTSD perform more poorly 
on neuropsychological tests than do non-trauma controls (see, e.g., reviews by Anda et al., 2006; 
Beitchman et al., 1992; De Bellis, 2005; Pine, 2003; Teicher et al., 2003; Twamley, Allard, et al., 
2009; Watts-English, Fortson, Gibler, Hooper, & De Bellis, 2006). Furthermore, numerous 
studies show that children who have experienced abuse and neglect present with deficits on 
standardized measures of cognitive and academic abilities when compared to demographically-
matched samples (Hoffman-Plotkin & Twentyman, 1984; Holt, Finkelhor, & Kantor, 2006; 
Shonk & Cicchetti, 2001; Veltman & Browne, 2001; Wodarski, Kurtz, Gaudin, & Howing, 











Other studies in the field have, however, introduced conflicting evidence as to the specific 
neuropsychological deficits present in adolescents with a history of early childhood trauma. The 
domain of memory is particularly salient here. Beers and De Bellis (2002) found significant 
between-group differences on only one of six measures of memory, suggesting that memory 
impairments in their PTSD group were confined to a relatively circumscribed set of memory 
processes. In contrast, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Yule, and Dalgleish (1999) found that, 
relative to an age-matched control group with no history of trauma exposure and no past or 
current emotional disorder (n = 22, mean age = 14.33, SD = 1.46), children with PTSD (n = 18, 
mean age = 14.28, SD = 2.04) exhibited significant deficits in overall everyday memory 
performance, as assessed by the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson, Cockburn, & 
Baddeley, 1985).  
The discrepancies in the findings of these two studies, where one found only circumscribed 
memory deficits in their adolescent PTSD group and the other found general and wide-spread 
memory deficits in a similar group, are instructive in highlighting problematic issues in 
evaluating findings in this literature. This discrepancy could, for instance, be due to measurement 
differences (the two sets of investigators did not use common tests), relatively small sample 
sizes, trauma severity, severity of PTSD symptoms, or differences in the ages of the children in 
the two samples (those in the Beers and De Bellis  study were, on average, almost 2 full years 
younger than those in the Moradi, Neshat-Doost, et al. study, a fact that might have 
developmental significance). 
Thus, the problematic issues in evaluating research in this field centre largely around 
methodological issues. Although there are a limited number of comprehensive studies on the 
neuropsychological effects of trauma on adolescent functioning, even within this small number 
there are numerous methodological problems. These are problems that are present in almost all 
research investigating the long-term neuropsychological effects of trauma (Moore & Zoellner, 
2007). The three most important of these problems in terms of their relevance to the current 











The first problem, which is clearly illustrated by the Beers and De Bellis (2002) study, is that 
many researchers tend to simply administer a large battery of neuropsychological tests without 
any theoretical basis for their choice of test. Otherwise stated, they do not explicitly predict, 
based on psychological, neurobiological, neuropsychological, or any other theoretical 
framework, which cognitive functions will be affected by early adversity and why those functions 
will be affected. 
 
The second problem is evident in both Beers and De Bellis (2002) and in Moradi, Neshat-Doost, 
et al. (1999), and, in fact, throughout trauma research. This problem involves the absence of 
appropriate control groups. In studies that examine the effect of trauma by examining groups 
with PTSD, control groups typically consist of non-traumatized healthy controls. The absence of 
a control group with a history of trauma exposure, but without a PTSD diagnosis, leads to 
inconclusive results: This control group is needed in order to clearly differentiate between the 
effects of exposure to trauma as opposed to the effects of the post-traumatic reactions (i.e., the 
symptoms of PTSD). Without this control group, the reasons for the presented deficits are 
uncertain, at best. 
 
The third problem is that of flaws in the measurement of the potentially traumatic event. Many 
studies in this field (see, e.g., Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999; Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, 
Hyman, & Dayson, 1998; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995) assess the impact of the traumatic event 
solely by the characteristics of that event (e.g., severity, rate of occurrence, type of event). Other 
studies, however, assess the impact of the event by measuring individuals’ responses to it (see, 
e.g., Burnside, Startup, Byatt, Rollinson, & Hill, 2004; Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-
Vermeeren, 2002; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach, 2001). Moore and Zoellner 
(2007) show that, at least with regard to autobiographical memory processes, the reaction of 
individuals to a traumatic event is more important to predicting outcomes than are the actual 
characteristics of the event itself. To this point, however, very few studies in this field have 
assessed both traumatic event characteristics and post-traumatic reactions, although it seems 












Before each of these problems can be discussed in detail, a thorough examination of the 
neuropsychology of PTSD and the neurological correlates of PTSD symptomology is necessary.  
The Neuropsychology of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
A DSM-IV-TR (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000) diagnosis of PTSD necessitates that a person has been 
exposed to a significant threat, and that that exposure resulted in feelings of fear, helplessness, or 
horror. The diagnostic criteria also suggest, and empirical research confirms, that there are three 
main groups of symptoms: re-experiencing the trauma, avoidance of trauma-related external and 
internal cues, and hyperarousal/hypervigilance (Brandes et al., 2002; Nemeroff et al., 2006). 
Exposure to traumatic stress can lead to a prolonged physiological response. In some cases this 
develops into PTSD. Indeed, empirical research has also shown that PTSD is associated with the 
dysregulation of the neurobiological stress systems in the human brain. Furthermore, empirical 
research has shown that structural alterations in at least three brain regions are associated with 
PTSD. These brain regions include the amygdala and, not surprisingly, the hippocampus and the 
medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Vasterling & Brewin, 2005). In PTSD, there is a reduction in the 
size of the hippocampus, and a reduction in responsivity of the PFC. 
With regard to the hippocampus, numerous neuroimaging studies confirm that, in samples of 
adults diagnosed with PTSD, the volume of this region appears to be decreased (see, e.g., 
Bremner et al. 1995; Gurvits et al., 1996; Stein et al., 1997). Two meta-analyses on this topic 
confirmed that adult PTSD patients do exhibit smaller volumes, in both hippocampi, compared 
to adults without PTSD (Bremner, 2005; Smith, 2005). 
It logically follows that this association between PTSD and reduced hippocampal volume might 
lead to impairments in cognitive processes dependent on the integrity of the hippocampal 
formation. Much research has therefore been conducted on exploring the effects PTSD has on 
hippocampal-dependent cognition in adults. For instance, Bremner et al. (1995) found that 
combat veterans with PTSD displayed significant deficits in verbal declarative memory 











deficits were on tests of immediate and delayed recall and retention; all of these processes are 
dependent on the left hemisphere hippocampus (Bell et al., 2002). Numerous similar studies 
showing PTSD-associated deficits in verbal learning and memory have been published over the 
past two decades (see, e.g., Bremner et al., 1993; Bremner et al., 1999; Gilbertson, Gurvits, 
Lasko, Orr, & Pitman, 2001; but see Brandes et al. (2002) and Stein et al. (1999, 2002) for 
studies reporting no memory deficits in adults with PTSD). Vasterling and Brewin (2005, p. 
183) summarized this literature by saying that “initial acquisition [of verbal information] is the
most pervasively impaired aspect of memory dysfunction associated with PTSD.”
The association between a diagnosis of PTSD and impaired performance on neurocognitive tests 
dependent on the integrity of the right hemisphere hippocampus (e.g., tests of spatial navigation 
and spatial learning and memory; Baddeley, Kopelman, & Wilson, 2002; Maguire, 1999) has not 
been explored in very many investigations. Even in those few investigations, however, equivocal 
data have been reported. For instance, some researchers have found no differences between 
adults with PTSD and non-traumatized comparison samples with regard to performance on 
spatially-based tasks (see, e.g., Gilbertson et al. 2001; Gurvits, Carson, et al., 2002; Sullivan et 
al., 2003), whereas others have found clear between-group differences in performance on such 
tasks (see, e.g., Emdad & Sondergaard, 2006; Gurvits, Lasko, et al., 2002). 
Although much research has been conducted on the neuropsychological effects of PTSD on adult 
survivors of trauma, very few neuropsychological studies have focused on PTSD in children and 
adolescents. Perhaps of most interest with regard to the latter is that, unlike in adults, there is no 
pattern of hippocampal volume reduction in children with PTSD (Carrion et al., 2001; De Bellis 
et al., 1999; De Bellis, Keshavan et al., 2002). This discrepancy between the findings of adult 
and child neuroimaging studies of PTSD raises the potentially interesting question of how 
adolescent hippocampal functioning is affected by PTSD. 
Although neuroimaging research has not found a reduction in hippocampal volume in children 
with PTSD, some neuroimaging studies have found that there are profound structural alterations 
in the PFC (e.g., a reduction in volume; Vasterling & Brewin, 2005), and in other brain regions, 











expected deficits associated with such alterations in the PFC have been confirmed by empirical 
research into the matter (see, e.g., Bremner, 1999; Shin et al., 1999). For instance, Richert, 
Carrion, Karchemskiy, and Reiss (2005) showed that all regions of the PFC were significantly 
altered in children and adolescents with PTSD, that functional impairment (e.g., school 
performance and social functioning) followed specifically from these alterations, and that the 
cognitive-emotional functions dependent on the dorsolateral PFC were the most affected.  
 
Although most studies exploring executive function deficits in PTSD have found marked 
differences amongst patients compared to healthy controls (see, e.g., Beckman, Crawford, & 
Feldman, 1998; Gilbertsen et al., 2001), many studies have found no such differences (Stein, 
Hanna et al., 1999; Twamley, Hami, & Stein, 2004). The reason for these different findings 
across studies is probably due, at least in part, to the fact tha the term ‘executive function’ 
encompasses numerous distinct cognitive skills, such as response inhibition, attention, problem-
solving, impulsivity, processing speed, working memory and information-processing. Therefore, 
when considering the research done on executive functioning in adults with PTSD, it is more 
useful to consider the effects of the psychiatric disorder on specific abilities that fall under this 
umbrella term. 
 
Research has found specific deficits in the following executive abilities in PTSD populations: 
mental flexibility (Kanagaratnam & Abjorsen, 2007); working memory and attention (Brandes et 
al., 2002; Gilbertson et al., 2001; Samuelson et al., 2006; Vasterling et al., 2002); processing 
speed (Brandes et al., 2002; Twamley, Allard, et al., 2009); inhibition (Stein, Kennedy, & 
Twamley, 2002) 
 
On the other hand, research has also suggested that there are no significant differences between 
PTSD patients and control participants on executive abilities such as attention (Golier et al., 
1997; Yehuda, Keefe et al., 1995); response inhibition (Kanagaratnam & Abjorsen, 2007); 
switching within inhibition (Twamley, Allard, et al., 2009); set-shifting (Sutker, Vasterling, 












This brief review of the research done on executive functioning in PTSD highlights that there are 
notoriously mixed results in this field of study. The possible reasons for these conflicting results 
(reviewed in Danckwerts & Leathem; 2003) revolve around issues such as overgeneralizing the 
results from specific samples to more general populations, the use of markedly different 
neuropsychological tests across studies, and the use of neuropsychological tests that cannot be 
extrapolated to everyday situations (i.e do not test for the deficits that exhibit in daily life, and 
moreover that do not measure cognition in a way that the results can be applied to daily life.) 
 
Although many studies, like those of Richert et al. (2005), De Bellis et al. (2002) and Carrion et 
al. (2001), only compared a PTSD group to a non-traumatized group, the pattern of results 
showing PTSD-associated alterations in PFC structure has been replicated in a study comparing 
a group of adults with PTSD to a group of adults who had experienced trauma but who had no 
PTSD diagnoses (Woodward et al., 2006). Similarly, in a study comparing a PTSD group, a 
traumatized non-PTSD group, and a non-traumatized non-PTSD healthy control group, Leskin 
and White (2007) found that adults with PTSD showed particular executive function deficits 
over and above the deficits exhibited by the adults who had experienced trauma but had no 
PTSD diagnosis. 
 
Although the association of PTSD with reduced volume in certain brain regions and with a 
pattern of cognitive deficits consistent with damage to those regions is undeniable given the 
weight of the literature, reasons for why people with a history of trauma show reductions in brain 
volume in certain regions are not completely agreed upon. Many researchers (e.g., Bremner, 
1999; Watts-English et al., 2006) assert that exposure to traumatic levels of stress leads to a 
reduction in growth, and perhaps even neural cell loss, in certain brain regions (putative 
mechanisms for this causal chain are discussed in later sections.) These researchers usually base 
their theories on empirical work that looks at exposure to traumatic events, rather than at 
populations with PTSD diagnoses.  
 
There is, however, an alternate theory proposing to explain the link between regional reductions 
in brain volume and a history of childhood trauma and/or a PTSD diagnosis. Proponents of this 











exposure (and therefore also, of course, precedes any PTSD diagnosis), and indeed is a marker 
for vulnerability to psychopathological post-traumatic reactions. Empirical support for this 
theoretical proposition emerges from studies such as that of Gilbertson et al. (2002), who found 
that individuals with reduced hippocampal volume were more prone to developing PTSD (i.e., a 
smaller hippocampus appeared to constitute a vulnerability for the disorder among those exposed 
to trauma). In this study, Gilbertson et al. (2002) compared monozygotic twins with discordant 
histories of trauma exposure, and found that disorder severity in PTSD patients was negatively 
correlated with the hippocampal volume of both the patient and the patient’s trauma-unexposed 
identical co-twin. Furthermore, severe PTSD twin pairs (both trauma-exposed and non-exposed) 
had significantly smaller hippocampi than non-PTSD twin pairs. Similar findings on 
vulnerability have been found in Holocaust survivors (Yehuda, Schmeidler, Wainberg, Binder-
Brynes, & Duvdevani, 1998) and in children and adolescents (Silva, Alpert, Munoz, Singh, 
Matzner, & Dummit, 2000). 
Silva et al. (2000) examined the interactions between factors such as demographic 
characteristics, such as age and gender, and clinical antecedents (other diagnoses) and the 
development of PTSD. They found that, not surprisingly, pre-existing levels of anxiety is a 
precipitating factor in the development of PTSD, as well as having a lower IQ. 
Low IQ as a Risk Factor for PTSD  
An area of particular importance in understanding vulnerability to PTSD is the research done on 
the relationship between IQ and PTSD. As suggested by the findings of Silva et al. (2000), 
numerous research studies, from independent laboratories, have reported that lower IQ is a 
significant risk factor for developing PTSD (Leskin & White, 2007; McNally, 2003); this is true 
both in adults (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2002; Macklin et al., 1998), and 
in children and adolescents (Koenen et al.,2006; Saltzman et al, 2006; Silva et al., 2000). In 
particular, longitudinal prospective studies have found that trauma victims who develop a PTSD 
diagnosis had lower IQ scores prior to the traumatic event compared to those victims who did not 











In the longitudinal study by Koenen et al. (2006), a community sample of 1037 adults (from a 
birth cohort) were assessed for PTSD and the effects that previous childhood factors (including 
antisocial behaviour, poverty and IQ) have on the development of this disorder were examined. 
The participants were assessed at age 26 and at age 32 again. Using this data and childhood data 
from the cohort study, the researchers found that low IQ in childhood (assessed by IQ tests 
administered at age 5) significantly predicted PTSD in adulthood.  
 
Conversely, some research has suggested that trauma and PTSD may in fact lead to deficits in 
performance on IQ tests, both in adults (Brandes et al., 2002; Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, 
Borges, & Sutker, 1997), and in children and adolescents (Jenkins, Langlais, Delis, & Cohen, 
2000; Saigh, Yasik, Oberfield, Halamandaris, & Bremner, 2006). Based on the literature 
discussed on the neuropsychological effects of stress, trauma, and PTSD, it is not far-fetched to 
suggest that performance on IQ tests should also be negatively affected. This argument is 
plausible because IQ tests rely, at least to some degree, on intact hippocampal and PFC 
functioning (including intact memory and attentional capacities; Mills-Schumann et al., 2007). 
These results are, however, not conclusive, and therefore, in this study, IQ will act as an 
independent variable/covariate, and is not assessed as an outcome measure. 
 
Although the foundation of this study, based on sound theory and substantial empirical research, 
identifies the neuroanatomical abnormalities of the prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus as the 
reason for the neuropsychological deficits exhibited associated with PTSD, many researchers 
have suggested that it is the symptoms of PTSD which are responsible. Along with other 
researchers, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, et al., (1999) suggest that the presence of the PTSD 
symptoms of intrusion, avoidance and hyperarousal may interfere with a child’s ability to 
perform. This is possibly due to these symptoms disrupting their ability to maintain attention. 
 
This theory however, is not contradictory to the theory set out in this study. Explorations of the 
neurological correlates of PTSD are thus explored in order to explain how these theories may 













Neurological Correlates of PTSD Symptoms. 
The prolonged physiological response to traumatic stress, described in more detail later, leads to 
prolonged hyperarousal in multiple structures, including the hippocampus, the PFC, and the 
amygdala. This hyperarousal (and the resulting brain structure alterations) is suggested by some 
to be the basis of the way in which PTSD symptoms manifest at a behavioural level (Weber & 
Reynolds, 2004). The potential role of each of the three structures mentioned above in the 
development of PTSD symptoms is detailed below. 
 
As discussed more thoroughly later, exposure to stress increases the release of dopamine, which 
affects PFC structural integrity and functionality. These stress-related alterations in dopamine 
release and the consequent brain structure changes are thought to be associated with the 
manifestation of the hypervigilance- and paranoia-related symptoms of PTSD (Weber & 
Reynolds, 2004).  It has been suggested that the influx of dopamine, initially over-stimulating the 
PFC, leads to a non-responsiveness in the PFC, and this hypoactivity is associated with PTSD 
symptoms severity. Indeed in a meta-analysis on the structural brain abnormalities exhibited in 
PTSD Etkin & Wager, (2007) found that the ventromedial PFC, a structure linked to the 
experience and regulation of emotion, is consistently hypoactive in PTSD patients, and that this 
hypoacitvation is a significant predictor of symptom severity 
 
Furthermore, this excessive hyperarousal following traumatic stress has been shown to effect 
elements of executive functioning subserved by the PFC, such as attention (Kanagaratnam & 
Asbjormsen, 2007). This breakdown in functioning leads to a decrease in the ability to suppress 
involuntary thoughts and direct attention. It is this inability which researchers have suggested 
lead to the intrusive symptoms of PTSD (Kanagaratnam & Asbjormsen, 2007). 
 
In terms of the hippocampus, along with the cognitive impairments resulting from excessive 
stress related alterations to this region, research has suggested that PTSD symptoms are 
associated with damage to the hippocampus. More specifically, neuroimaging research has found 
that hippocampal volume is inversely related to dissociative and depressive symptoms in PTSD 
(Bremner, Vythilingam, et al., 2003) reexperiencing symptoms in PTSD (Lindauer, et al., 2004) 











hippocampus in regulating the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis response is 
responsible, at least in part, for the some symptoms experienced (such as dissociation; Etkin and 
Wager, 2007).  
 
Along with the PFC and the hippocampus, the amygdala is also affected by traumatic stress 
(Etkin and Wager, 2007; Shin, Rauch & Pitman, 2006). Although the functioning of this 
structure is not assessed in this study, the effects of amygdala dysfunction are of interest in terms 
of understanding the symptoms of PTSD. 
 
Although no reduction in size of the amygdala has been found in neuroimaging studies, 
hyperresponsiveness of the amygdala in PTSD patients has been found (Pissiota, Frans, 
Fernandez, von Knorring, Fischer, and Fredrikson, 2002; Protopopescu, Pan, Tuescher, Cloitre, 
Goldstein, Engelien et al., 2005; Shin, Orr, Carson, Rauch, Macklin, Lasko, et al., 2004).  
 
As part of the limbic system, the amygdala is involved in the expression of emotion, particularly 
fear, emotional memory, and it is involved in autonomic reactions (such as increased blood 
pressure, increased heart rate, and the startle response). Theoretically dysfunction of this 
structure should lead to deregulation in these processes.  
 
Indeed, empirical research has shown that a positive correlation exists between amygdala 
activation and PTSD symptom severity (Protopopescu et al., 2005; Shin, Orr, et al., 2004) and 
self reported anxiety (Fredrikson and Furmark, 2003; Pissiota, et al., 2002), suggesting that the 
hyperactivity of this structure plays a significant role in the symptoms of PTSD (particularly 
hyperarousal, and emotional intrusive thoughts). 
 
It is suggested that it is a combination of both the biological alterations in these structures and 
the resulting affective and behavioral symptoms which are responsible for these deficits. 
 
Now that an understanding of the neuropsychology of PTSD has been established, the reasoning 
behind the urgent need to address the three methodological problems mentioned earlier (namely, 











groups, and the assessment of both traumatic event characteristics and post-trauma reactions) in 
the design of studies in this field is separately detailed below. 
Problem 1: Not Using Theory as a Basis for Choice of Tests 
In attempting to examine the overall cognitive deficits due to trauma exposure and PTSD, many 
studies merely test as many cognitive domains as possible. With no theoretical basis for test 
choice, the areas of that are responsible for the functional impairments remain unclear. 
Conversely, basing test choice on neurobiological and neuropsychological theory allows for the 
clear examination of cognitive functioning, with direct indications to the brain regions that are 
responsible for these deficits. The following section attempts to outline the theory used in the 
current study, thereby addressing this need. 
Long-Term Neurobiological Effects of Childhood Trauma
Research into the neurological effects of early adversity has shown that childhood exposure to 
traumatic events, such as sexual abuse, maltreatment, and neglect, leads to significant changes in 
brain functioning and development (Adamec, Blundell, & Burton, 2005). For the sake of clarity, 
the neurostructural and neurochemical effects of early adversity will be discussed separately 
from the cognitive impairments that might result from these brain abnormalities.
Childhood and adolescence are periods of significant development in the brain. This 
development includes selective elimination of neurons (Sowell, Trauner, Gamst, & Jernigan, 
2002) and formation of discrete brain structures (Paus, Collins, Evans, Leonard, Pike, & 
Zijdenbos, 2001). These stages are thus critical to the development of the adult brain, and are 
subsequently particularly sensitive to insult. Any physical or psychological trauma experienced 
during these stages therefore has significant potential to disrupt typical neurodevelopment 
processes, thus leading to long-term negative outcomes (Watts-English et al., 2006). 
The Physiological Stress Response. Trauma results in the human brain being subjected to high 
and unusually prolonged levels of stress hormones (glucocorticoids, the adrenal steroids secreted 
during times of stress; in humans, the major mediator of the physiological effects of stress is the 











epinephrine, norepinephrine, metanephrine, and dopamine). Studies investigating the effects of 
stress hormones on specific brain structures have suggested that damage to these regions is 
associated with direct exposure to glucocorticoids (Sapolsky, Uno, Rebert, & Finch, 1990). 
 
The physiological stress response largely centres around the release of glucocorticoids, which is 
regulated by the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. This is a closed-loop neurocircuit 
controlled by a regulatory set of afferents, mostly the neurons in the paraventricular region of the 
hypothalamus. When the brain recognizes a stressful event or stimulus, these neurons secrete 
corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRF). CRF stimulates the anterior pituitary gland to release 
adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH), which then stimulates the adrenal gland to secrete 
glucocorticoids. The secretion of glucocorticoids regulates the entire HPA axis by providing 
negative feedback to stop further CRF and ACTH release (Bowman, 2005). Under traumatic 
levels of stress, this negative feedback is halted, meaning that glucocorticoids continue to be 
released unchecked.  
 
Research into the neurophysiology of the stress response has accurately described the impact of 
stress hormones (such as cortisol) on particular parts of the brain. Researchers have identified 
three brain structures that are most affected by stress: the hippocampus, the PFC, and the 
amygdala (Kudielka & Kirschbaum, 2005). These regions show particular tendencies toward 
plasticity (i.e. they are particularly vulnerable to alterations; Teicher, Ito, Glod, Schiffer, & 
Gelbard, 1996), and so any adverse effects on them during key neurodevelopmental stages may 
have grave long-term consequences. 
 
The human response to stress is, however, not confined to one system; it involves multiple 
networks. Along with the HPA-axis system, researchers have also identified some other 
neurotransmitter systems that play an important role in physiological responses to stressful 
events, including: the noradrenergic system, the serotonergic system, and the dopaminergic 
system (Vasterling & Brewin, 2005). 
 
The noradrenergic system is involved in attention to selected stimuli, vigilance, alertness, and the 











Aston-Jones, Raikowski, Kubiak, & Alexinsksy, 1994). This system is responsible for creating a 
fear response, and for increasing the release of norepinephrine when a stressor is encountered. 
This neurotransmitter is released in the hypothalamus, and has effects on the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, and the PFC (Zigmond, Finlay, & Sved, 1995). Under traumatic stress, too much 
norepinephrine is produced, causing dysfunction in these regions. 
 
Serotonergic systems are present in multiple brain regions, including the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, and the PFC (Nestler, Hyman, & Malenka, 2001). Under traumatic stress, there is 
excessive release of serotonin, once again causing dysfunction in these regions (Bremner et al., 
2003). 
 
The dopaminergic system is involved in selecting information to be processed, and is involved in 
general emotional responses. It’s function also includes mediating basic behaviours such as 
locomotor activity, sexual activity, and appetite (Pani, Porcella & Gessa, 2000). This system is 
responsible in increasing the release of dopamine when a stressor is encountered. It has been 
suggested that this system attempts to protect against stress, as it is released in the Medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and this activity in the MPFC suppresses further dopamine release in 
the limbic system (Pani, Porcella & Gessa, 2000). However, under traumatic stress, too much 
dopamine is produced, causing dysfunction in these PFC specifically (Weber & Reynolds, 2004). 
 
When traumatic stress occurs during childhood, neural development is highly likely to be 
adversely affected (Watts-English et al., 2006). For instance, traumatic levels of stress 
experienced due to child maltreatment have been associated with dysfunction in the 
neurobiological systems that are directly involved with brain maturation and associated cognitive 
and emotional/behavioral regulation (De Bellis, 2005). 
 
In terms of the current study, only the cognitive effects of stress on the hippocampus and the 
PFC is of interest, and therefore only the hippocampus and the PFC will be discussed in terms of 












The Hippocampus. High levels of cortisol release, such as those seen under conditions of 
traumatic stress, disrupt the functioning of the hippocampus, a structure in the brain necessary 
for spatial navigation, new learning, the formation of new memories, and the memory processes 
of consolidation and retrieval (Payne & Nadel, 2004; Squire, 1992).  
 
The reason for this specific disruption is because the hippocampus contains a high concentration 
of corticosteroid receptors, and, as mentioned above, is a major influence on the HPA axis by 
way of negative feedback (Ruel & de Kloet, 1995; Wright, 2006). When these receptor sites are 
filled due to unchecked cortisol release, hippocampal functioning is impaired. Empirical studies 
have confirmed that even acute stressful experiences increase cortisol levels and consequently 
are associated with impaired performance on hippocampal-dependent cognitive tasks 
(Kirschbaum, Wolf, May, Wippich, & Hellhammer, 1996; Payne, Nadel, Allen, Thomas, & 
Jacobs, 2002). 
 
The Prefrontal Cortex. As mentioned in the discussions on the noradrenergic and the 
serotonergic systems, functioning in the PFC has been found to be significantly affected by the 
flooding of both norepinephrine and serotonin as a consequence of stress. Furthermore, in terms 
of the HPA-axis system, an increase in the release of glucocorticoids has been shown to have 
specific effects on the functionality of the PFC (Roozendaal, Jayme, & McGaugh, 2004). 
 
The PFC is thus particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of stress. It has been suggested 
that the reason for this vulnerability is due to the fact that this region is not fully myelinated until 
almost 30 years of age (Teicher et al, 1997; until the neurons are completely myelinated the brain 
remains particularly plastic). Another reason suggested for this specific disruption is because the 
PFC contains a disproportionately high concentration of dopamine receptors (Donnelly et al., 
1999). When these receptor sites are filled due to excess dopamine release, PFC functioning is 
impaired (Weber & Reynolds, 2004). 
 
From Neurobiology and Neurophysiology to Neuropsychology 
The brief review above makes it clear that exposure to traumatic events and consequent 











impairments in brain development, and discrete effects on various brain regions. Research done 
on stress in rodents, non-human primates, and humans suggests that early exposure to traumatic 
stress leads to long-term changes in many brain circuits and systems, including the amygdala, the 
cerebellum, and, most pertinently for the current study, the hippocampus and the PFC (Anderson 
et al, 2002; Gilbertson et al., 2002; Ito et al., 1993; Pine, 2003; Roche, Mangaoang, Commins, & 
O’Mara, 2005; Sapolsky et al., 1990; Stein, Koverola, Hanna, Tochia, & McClarty, 1997; 
Teicher et al., 1993). 
 
The PFC is said to be generally involved in what neuropsychologists term the executive 
functions (Anda et al., 2006). More precise theoretical perspectives suggest, however, that three 
anatomically separate regions underlie their own set of cognitive functions: the dorsolateral 
regions subserve the maintenance of information and attention, the ventral regions are involved 
in response inhibition, and the medial regions are implicated in motivation, affect regulation, and 
the monitoring of performance or affective state (Pine, 2003). Interestingly in terms of the 
population studied in the current research, the dorsolateral region of the PFC appears to remain 
underdeveloped well into adolescence (Nelson et al.. 2002; Lewis, 1997; McGlashan & 
Hoffman, 2000). 
 
As noted above, increased levels of stress hormones damage the hippocampus. Stress-related 
damage to hippocampal neurons results in impaired learning and memory for both verbal and 
spatial information (Edwards, Harkins, Wright, & Menn, 1990; Sapolsky, 2000; Sapolsky et al., 
1990; Simantov et al., 1996; Smythies, 1997). 
 
Problem 1: Summary and Conclusion 
The combined data from neurobiological, neurophysiological, neurochemical, and 
neuropsychological research on the long-term effects of early adversity show, quite conclusively, 
that discrete brain regions are affected. Those brain regions include the hippocampus and the 
prefrontal cortex. Cognitive functioning dependent on the latter includes impulse control and 
risk-taking in decision making, working memory capacity, strategy use in problem-solving, 











impulsivity and decision-making, response inhibition, and judgement. Cognitive functioning 
dependent on the former involves new learning, spatial cognition, and episodic memory. 
Therefore, in order overcome the problem of not using theory in the choice of test batteries, 
studies in this field should employ neuropsychological tests that tap into those cognitive 
processes subserved by the discrete brain regions identified above. Furthermore, 
neuropsychological data focused on those brain regions are required for populations, such as 
adolescents with a history of trauma exposure, that have been relatively understudied by 
researchers. 
Problem 2: Lack of Appropriate Control Groups 
As noted earlier, this methodological problem, although simply remedied, is one that if not taken 
into account leads to major problems in arriving at easily interpretable and possibly conclusive 
results. It also raises the very important issue of differentiating between the neuropsychological 
effects of trauma exposure and the neuropsychological effects of psychopathological post-
traumatic reactions, such as occur in PTSD. 
As discussed, not all victims of trauma develop PTSD; mere exposure to trauma is, therefore not 
the same as actually having a PTSD diagnosis. A diagnosis of PTSD brings with it a range of 
behavioural, emotional, and, as highlighted earlier, significant neuropsychological and 
neurological abnormalities (Beckman et al.,, 1998; Bell et al., 2002; Bremner et al., 2005; 
Maguire, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 1999). It is thus of most importance that researchers attempting to 
explore the effects of PTSD on cognitive functioning, include three groups in their studies. These 
are, namely: a trauma-exposed non-PTSD group, a trauma-exposed PTSD-present group, and 
lastly, a healthy control group. In so doing, researchers can clearly differentiate between the 
effects of exposure to trauma as opposed to the effects of the post-traumatic reactions (i.e., the 
symptoms of PTSD). If these three groups are not included, the results of the studies cannot say 
whether it is the trauma itself which is responsible for significant deficits in performance, or 











In order to illustrate this point more clearly, a brief discussion of two studies that did not include 
these groups is looked at. One study (by Moradi, Taghavi Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 
1999) assessed performance on the Stroop colour-naming task in 23 children and adolescents 
with PTSD, and compared their performance to a group of 23 demographically-matched healthy 
controls. These controls had no history of trauma exposure. The results showed that performance 
on this task was significantly contingent on having a PTSD diagnosis. The fact that there was no 
trauma-exposed non-PTSD group means that the deficits seen could have been due to the 
exposure to trauma, and not PTSD. Similarly, in an adult study on the effects of PTSD on 
cognitive functioning, Twamley, Allard, et al. (2009) assessed 75 women on comprehensive 
neuropsychological test battery. Of these women, 55 had a diagnosis of PTSD (related in to 
intimate partner violence), and their performance was compared to a group of 20 
demographically-matched healthy women, none of whom had experienced a traumatic event. 
The results showed that the PTSD group performed significantly worse on speeded tasks 
compared to the controls. Once again, the fact that there was no trauma-exposed non-PTSD 
group means that the poor performance exhibited on these tasks could have been due to the 
exposure to trauma, and not a diagnosis of PTSD. 
 
Problem 2: Summary and Conclusion. Research on PTSD has shown that this disorder brings 
with it its own set of neurological and neuropsychological consequences. Thus, in order to assess 
the effects of trauma on functioning, studies need to incorporate three groups (trauma-exposed 
PTSD, trauma-exposed non-PTSD, non-traumatized non-PTSD controls). If this is done the 
cognitive effects due to trauma exposure itself and those due solely to a PTSD diagnosis can be 
clearly assessed. 
 
Problem 3: Not Assessing both Traumatic Event Characteristics and Post-traumatic 
Reactions 
As noted earlier, this methodological problem, although easy to remedy, is vital in the 
understanding of how factors in the experience of trauma, impact on the individual, and on their 
cognitive abilities. Most studies in the field of trauma tend to look solely at the one group of 
factors in the assessment of a traumatic event, either they look at the characteristics of the trauma 











occurance), or they look at the trauma victims’ reactions to the trauma (such as the amount of 
PTSD symptoms they experience, the severity of the symptoms they experience, etc.). Most 
studies in this field fail to look at both groups of factors in their assessment of the effects of 
trauma.  
The few studies that have assessed both groups of factors in their assessment have shown that 
both the trauma characteristics and the post-traumatic responses provide important information, 
and both make for significant predictors of future outcomes.  
Moore and Zoellner (2007) clearly showed, in their review of 24 studies looking at the effects of 
trauma on autobiographical memory, that many studies in this field found that the characteristics 
of the trauma were significant predictors of outcome measures (Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory 
& Williams, 2002; Nilsson-Ihrfelt, et al., 2004; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Eelen, 2005). 
Similarly many of the studies that assessed post-traumatic responses found that it was these 
responses that were most significant in predicting cognitive deficits (Stokes, Dritschel, & 
Bekerain, 2004).  
Problem 3: Summary and Conclusion 
This review highlights that it necessary to include both the characteristics of the trauma as well 
as post-traumatic responses in any study on the effects of trauma. In so doing a thorough 
understanding of all possible factors in the effects of trauma and PTSD is thoroughly examined. 
Other Specific Areas of Interest in the Current Study 
The following section attempts to highlight the nuances present in particular areas of research, 
areas which are specifically assessed in the current study. This includes a brief exploration into 
the fields of spatial navigation and information-processing biases (and the effects stress, trauma 
and PTSD have on these cognitive domains), and is followed by a brief look at sex differences in 
various cognitive abilities. Furthermore the review of sex differences attempts to highlight how 
males and females respond to stress differently, and what impact this may have on the cognitive 












One of the cognitive abilities of particular interest in the current study is spatial navigation. 
Although spatial navigation has traditionally been considered to be a hippocampus-dependent 
ability, there are in fact at least two kinds of navigation, and only one of these is dependent on 
optimal functioning of the hippocampal formation. Researchers have distinguished these two 
forms of navigation empirically; one involves following a route, almost unconsciously, by using 
landmarks and knowing the routes that connect them. This form of navigation is typically known 
as route following or landmark-guided navigation (Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). The second 
kind of navigation involves a more conscious process of constructing a cognitive map of the 
environment using knowledge of the spatial relationships between locations in an environment. 
This form of navigation is typically known as wayfinding or cognitive map-guided navigation 
(Maguire, Burgess, & O'Keefe, 1999; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). 
 
Empirical research has demonstrated that these two forms of spatial navigation are facilitated by 
different areas of the brain (Bohbot, Iaria, & Petrides, 2004; Etchamendy & Bohbot 2007; 
O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Rosenbaum, Ziegler, Winocur, Grady, & Moscovitch, 2004). Multiple 
neuroimaging studies have shown that it is in fact only wayfinding, or cognitive map-guided 
navigation, that is hippocampus-dependent (Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 2003; Maguire 
et al., 1999). For instance, Kumaran and Maguire (2005) compared brain activation patterns 
while healthy adults completed two different navigation-type tasks in a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm. One task involved navigating through a spatial domain (the 
city in which they lived), whereas the other task involved navigating through a non-spatial 
domain (their social network). The results showed that the right hemisphere hippocampus was 
only activated and engaged for spatial domain navigation.  
 
Similarly, Bohbot et al (2004) compared brain activation while healthy adults completed two 
tasks each requiring the use of a different navigation strategy. These navigation strategies each 
depended on a different memory system. The spatial strategy involved using multiple  landmarks 
that were available in the virtual environment. The response strategy involved responding to left 











showed that the response strategy was associated with sustained activity in the caudate nucleus, 
whereas the spatial strategy was associated with sustained activity in the hippocampus. 
 
In a neuroimaging study particularly relevant to the current concerns, Astur et al. (2006) used an 
fMRI paradigm to compare the performance of individuals with and without PTSD on a spatial 
navigation task. Results showed that the hippocampus was indeed activated in this task (Astur et 
al., 2006). Although there were no significant between-group differences (i.e. the PTSD and the 
control group performed statistically similarly), it was demonstrated that degree of hippocampal 
activation on this task was a good predictor of PTSD severity. 
 
Another line of research that has established the hippocampal-dependent nature of wayfinding 
relates to studies that have induced acute psychosocial stress in normal healthy adults. Schwabe 
et al. (2007) compared the performance of 88 healthy participants on a task that involved 
learning particular kinds of strategies in order to successfully navigate in a virtual environment. 
Half the participants were exposed to an acute psychosocial stressor (the Trier Social Stress Test 
(TSST); Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) and the other half were not. The results 
showed that stressed individuals used significantly different strategies for learning; they relied 
less on spatial (hippocampal-based) strategies, and more on stimulus-response (non-
hippocampal) strategies. The authors interpreted these data as indicating that the hippocampus is 
disrupted by acute stress and therefore could not be used in order to navigate through the space 
successfully. 
 
Similarly, Thomas, Laurance, Nadel, and Jacobs (2010) compared the spatial navigation 
performance of stressed individuals (with stress once again induced using the TSST) to non-
stressed individuals. They demonstrated that acute stress disrupted cognitive map-guided 
navigation, but did not disrupt landmark-guided navigation. 
 
Information-Processing Biases 
Another area of cognition that is of interest in the current research is that of information-
processing bias. This term refers to the possible biases people exhibit when processing 











or sad far better than they remember positive or happy information, whereas another individual 
may remember positive information far better than negative information. Similarly, when 
attempting to maintain attention, one individual may be far more distracted by the face of 
someone who is angry than by someone who is happy, whereas another individual may be more 
distracted by a sad face. In this study, information-processing bias is examined specifically 
relative to emotional stimuli (such as happy or sad faces or positive or negative words). 
Emotional information-processing bias is a form of response inhibition for emotional stimuli, 
and is dependent on the functioning of the PFC.  
 
Functional MRI studies have suggested that these biases are due to the increased neural firing 
caused by certain stimuli (such as happy or positive stimuli) and not by others (such as sad or 
negative stimuli) (Leppanen, 2006). More specifically, in one study, attending to certain 
emotional stimuli was associated with enhanced neural response in two medial PFC regions: the 
subgenual cingulate (when attending to either positive or negative stimuli) and the ventral 
anterior cingulate (when attending to positive stimuli only; Elliott, Rubinsztein, Sahakian, & 
Dolan, 2000). 
 
A large body of research has shown that specific psychiatric diagnoses are associated with 
specific patterns of information-processing biases. That is to say, people with certain disorders, 
such as PTSD, show a specific bias towards certain types of information (such as threatening 
stimuli), compared to matched healthy controls (who usually show a bias towards positive 
stimuli and away from threatening stimuli; Dalgleish, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 
2001; Moradi, Taghavi, et al., 1999). The differences exhibited are seen across various cognitive 
processes (such as on tasks of memory, attention, etc.) and across multiple forms of stimuli (such 
as words, pictures, faces, etc.). Studies in this field look specifically at the effects that different 
emotional conditions (such as happy stimuli or sad stimuli) have on information processing, 
thereby assessing possible biases for emotional conditions. 
 
Specifically, empirical studies have shown that, when presented with various emotionally-laden 
stimuli, depressed children, adolescents, and adults perform significantly differently to those 











diagnosis of major depressive disorder show a greater bias in favour of negative or depression-
related stimuli (such as sad faces); that is, they show greater accuracy for remembering and 
noticing these kinds of faces compared to positive or neutral stimuli (such as happy or neutral 
faces). (For a comprehensive review of this literature see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997). Similarly, people with a diagnosis of PTSD generally show a greater bias in 
favour of threat-related stimuli (such as angry words) (Dalgleish et al.,  2001; Moradi, Taghavi, 
et al., 1999).  
In the study by Dalgleish et al. (2001), the performance of 24 children with PTSD was compared 
to that of 24 healthy controls on a task of visual attention for emotional material. The stimulus 
material consisted of 48 words, a third of which were related to physical threat (such as 
“explosion”), a third of which were related to social threat (such as “rejected”), and a third of 
which were related to depression-related words (such as “sad”). The results showed that the 
children and adolescents with PTSD exhibited a bias toward social threat words (that is, they 
took quicker to notice these words and spent longer attending to these words), as well as bias 
away from (i.e., an avoidance of) depression-related words (that is, they took longer to notice 
these words and spent less time attending to these words).
The interpretation of data from these studies is not clear-cut, however, as one has to consider the 
effects of age and co-morbidity of disorders on these biases (see, e.g., Neshat-Doost et al., 2003). 
For instance, some studies have found that age has a significant effect on biases exhibited (where 
older children exhibited a less pronounced set of biases than younger children; Dalgleish et al., 
2001). Other studies have found that comorbid disorders tend to confound findings (where biases 
presented could be due to the presence of another disorder) (Neshat-Doost et al., 2003). 
Recent studies have shown that tasks that employ emotional faces as stimuli provide more 
consistent patterns of bias, particularly with regard to the biases exhibited by children with 
anxiety disorders (Heim-Dreger, Kohlmann, Eschenbeck, & Burkhardt, 2006; Waters, Mogg, 
Bradley, & Pine, 2008). Of particular importance for the current study is that empirical research 
has shown that PTSD patients exhibit a bias for threat-related faces (e.g., those showing angry 
and fearful expressions), that is they tend to respond quicker to threat-related faces, and are more 











patients will perform worse on the task (i.e. be less accurate) than if the distractors are happy 
faces (Ladouceur et al., 2006). 
In order to understand the biases exhibited by individuals with PTSD, it is crucial to understand 
the biases exhibited by normal health controls. As mentioned earlier, empirical research has 
shown that healthy controls show a reliable and statistically significant bias for happy faces. That 
is, on tasks where individuals are asked to attend to faces, and press a key when they see a 
certain emotion, healthy controls show faster response times for happy faces (as opposed to other 
emotions) and they make more mistakes when attempting to inhibit a response to happy faces 
(Schultz et al., 2007). Furthermore, they respond slower to neutral faces when these are set 
amongst happy faces as opposed to when these neutral faces are set amongst threat-related faces 
(i.e., angry or scared faces.) 
Studies done on patients with anxiety disorders have found that these individuals respond in a 
significantly different way to controls, exhibiting a specific and different set of biases. For 
instance, Ladouceur et al. (2006) found that a clinical group of individuals who were diagnosed 
with at least one anxiety disorder were biased toward threat-related distractors. This means they 
responded more slowly, on a task that asked them to attend to neutral faces which were set 
amongst distractor faces of displaying emotions. The participants responded slower to neutral 
faces when the neutral faces were set amongst threat-related distractor faces as opposed to when 
the neutral faces were set amongst happy distractor faces. In other words, the participants 
showed a bias toward being drawn toward the threat-related distractors.
Of further interest here are findings of sex differences in these information-processing bias 
studies. Studies with children and adolescents that have included biological sex as a factor in 
their design and/or statistical analyses have shown that girls tend to be more prone to these 
biases; boys respond in a statistically similar manner to each other, regardless of diagnoses or 











Sex Differences in Cognitive Performance, Spatial Navigation, and Stress. 
There is great debate over whether there are actual, clinically significant differences in general 
cognitive performance across the sexes (see, e.g., Baenninger & Newcombe, 1995)). However, 
empirical research has generally shown that there are some marked differences in certain 
domains, with males, in general, performing better on tests of visuospatial ability and females, in 
general, performing better on tests of verbal ability (see, e.g., Hyde, Fennerma, & Lamon, 1990; 
Johnson & Bouchard, 2007).  
 
Of importance for the current research are the sex differences seen in the human response to 
stress. Both animal and human studies have shown that there are distinct differences in the way 
males and females respond to environmental stress. Even though both males and females show 
an increase in cortisol levels when they experience a stressor, Kudielka, Buske-Kirschbaum, 
Hellhammer, and Kirschbaum (2004) showed that, when exposed to a stressful task, females had 
a greater increase in heart rate than their male counterparts.  
 
The neurological mechanisms that underpin these sex differences are not understood fully. 
However, more and more empirical research has suggested that cognitive and motor skills and 
the response to stress are, at least partially, mediated by the effects of circulating sex hormones 
on the brain, particularly the organisational or activational effects of oestrogen (Hampson, 
Finestone, & Levy, 2005; Kimura, 2004; Kimura & Hampson, 1994). With regard to the sex 
differences seen in the response to stress, the effects of these sex hormones on the HPA axis is of 
most importance (Kudielka & Kirschbaum, 2005). Some recent studies have found that there are 
significant differences between the sexes in terms of the patterns of hormonal response to 
activation of the HPA axis (Kirschbaum, Kudielka, Gaab, Schommer, & Hellhammer, 1999; 
Kudielka, Buske-Kirschbaum, et al., 2004). Although there have been some contradictory 
findings, most studies have found higher cortisol responses in men than in women after acute 
real world psychological stress as well as stress induced in controlled labroratory settings (such 
as Stroud, Salovey, & Epel, 2002; for a review see Kudielka & Kirschbaum, 2005). Furthermore, 
some research has shown that this stress exposure facilitates fear conditioning in males and 












Not surprisingly, empirical studies have shown that these sex differences in neurophysiological 
and neurochemical responses to environmental stress are associated with sex differences in 
cognitive performance following stress. Wolf, Schommer, Hellhammer, McEwan, & 
Kirschbaum. (2001) showed that, although both males and females exhibited an increase in 
cortisol following exposure to the TSST, this increase in cortisol led to the recall of fewer words 
that has been previously learned only in males; no such effect was seen in females.  In other 
words, in this study females were not as vulnerable to the effects of stress on verbal learning and 
memory performance as males were. However, the effects of stress across the sexes in the field 
of spatial navigation provides evidence of the opposite pattern. 
 
Indeed, the research on sex difference in spatial navigation provides some interesting results. 
Although animal research has also shown that female rats are more resistant to stress-induced 
impairment on tests of spatial abilities than males (Bowman, 2005), human research has shown 
the opposite pattern. For instance, Thomas et al. (2010) found that, after TSST exposure, spatial 
navigation (specifically cognitive map-based navigation) was impaired by stress in females only; 
male performance on a cognitive map-guided navigation task was not affected by stress. The 
same effect was not seen in landmark-guided navigation (viz., neither male nor female 
performance was affected on that task), suggesting it was the cognitive map-building abilities 
(i.e. the hippocampus-dependent abilities) of females that were affected. 
 
Conclusion 
Although research into the neuropsychology of childhood trauma and PTSD is burdened with 
inconclusive and conflicting results, overall, the research on cognitive functioning in PTSD 
provides some interesting findings. These findings include that both hippocampus- and PFC-
dependent tasks are particularly affected by trauma and PTSD, with widespread deficits 
exhibited in domains ranging from response inhibition and information-processing bias to 
working memory and spatial navigation. Although these deficits may be subtle and thus difficult 
to detect using standard clinical neuropsychological tests, the effects of these deficits may still be 
significantly disruptive to the adolescent victim of childhood trauma (Leskin & White, 2007). 
The subtlety of these deficits adds to the rationale for careful choices in test batteries (choosing 











Furthermore, although the current study does not attempt to resolve the debate between the 
theoretical positions on vulnerability, it is hoped that the data gathered from this study might 
inform the debate, and that this study will set the stage for in-depth neuroimaging investigations 
of adolescents with a history of trauma exposure and, perhaps, for longitudinal investigations of 
children and adolescents from populations at high risk for trauma exposure. 
 
Specific Objectives and Hypotheses 
The preceding review highlights the fact that research in this field is fraught with methodological 
flaws, unanswered questions, and conflicting results. The current study attempts to remedy these 
methodological problems, thereby answering some unanswered questions, and providing clear 
information to help clarify previously conflicting results.  
 
To remedy the methodological flaws inherent in the extant literature, I used sound theory to 
inform and direct test choice; included three groups in the study (a trauma-exposed-PTSD group, 
a trauma-exposed-non-PTSD group, and a healthy control group); and measured both the 
characteristics of the trauma (e.g., how long ago the trauma occurred, the type of trauma 
experienced) as well as the individual’s response to the trauma (e.g., symptoms experienced, rate 
of occurrence of symptoms, etc.). 
 
By remedying the methodological flaws in this way, this study attempted to address the 
unanswered questions by measuring specific cognitive processes, focussing specifically on the 
effects the experience of childhood trauma, and the effects PTSD, has on these processes in 
adolescents. By answering these questions, I thereby hope to provide some clarity regarding 
previously equivocal results. In so doing, I attempted to describe (a) the neuropsychological 
deficits exhibited by adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, and (b) the 
distinction, if any, between the neuropsychological profile of adolescents with a trauma history 
but no PTSD diagnosis and those with a trauma history and a PTSD diagnosis. Furthermore, this 
study attempted to provide an indicator of test performance that can be used to classify victims of 













The following specific hypotheses, all of which emerged from the literature reviewed above, 
were tested: 
1. On the general neuropsychological test battery: 
a. adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will, regardless of whether 
they are carrying a PTSD diagnosis or not, perform more poorly than non-trauma 
controls on hippocampal-dependent and PFC-dependent cognitive tasks, and 
b. of those adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, those with a PTSD 
diagnosis will perform more poorly on the test battery than will those without 
such a diagnosis. 
2. On the specific test of Spatial navigation: 
a. adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will, regardless of whether 
they are carrying a PTSD diagnosis or not, perform more poorly than non-trauma 
controls on hippocampal-dependent cognitive tasks, and 
b. of those adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, those with a PTSD 
diagnosis will perform more poorly on the test battery than will those without 
such a diagnosis. 
3. On the specific test of information-processing bias, adolescents with a diagnosis of 
PTSD will show a bias toward threat-related stimuli (i.e., they will show faster reaction 
times on tasks where such stimuli are targets, but will show slower reaction times on 
tasks where such stimuli are distracters); participants in the control group, in contrast, 
will show a bias toward positive-valence stimuli (i.e., they will show faster reaction 
times on tasks where such stimuli are targets, but will show slower reaction times on 
tasks where such stimuli are distracters). 
4. In the group of adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, poorer 
performance on the general neuropsychological test battery will be positively correlated 
with (a) a longer time since the traumatic experience (Olff, Langeland, & Gersons, 
2005); (b) a greater number of post-traumatic symptoms (e.g., more avoidance, more 
numbing, more hyperarousal, more hypervigilance); (c) a higher level of symptom 
severity; and (d) a greater level of overall functional impairment. 
Furthermore, on many of the tests, there will be marked sex differences in the effects that 











females in the childhood trauma group (both PTSD and non-PTSD) will perform more poorly 
than both male and female controls. Further, girls in the PTSD group will show the poorest 
performance, whereas a group membership effect will not be seen in males. Otherwise stated, 
relative performance on the spatial navigation tasks might be captured as PTSD girls < trauma 











DESIGN AND METHODS 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 49 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 16 years. Thirty-two of these 
participants had been exposed to at least one traumatic event (e.g., sexual abuse, emotional, 
physical, or verbal abuse, general maltreatment, neglect, the witnessing of violence) during 
childhood (including adolescence). One of the inclusion criteria for the study was that this 
trauma could have taken place anytime during the adolescent’s life, but had to have occurred at 
least 3 months prior to testing.   
The issue of defining what constitutes exposure to traumatic events (and indeed, what constitutes 
a traumatic event) is particularly important for research studies of this kind. In this study, I define 
a “traumatic event” using the definition of a Criterion A event given in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edition, text revision (DSM-IV-TR); American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Both Criterion A1 (individual must have experienced, witnessed, 
or been confronted by the threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity, of 
oneself or others) and Criterion A2 (during the event, the individual must have experienced 
intense fear, helplessness, or horror) were assessed, although the latter is not necessary for 
categorization of the event as a trauma.  
The 32 participants with a history of traumatic exposure were recruited using two different 
strategies. The first strategy was recruitment via treatment centres. Thirteen of the participants 
were recruited from two different centres, namely, the Rape Crisis Centre and the Trauma
Centre, both based in the Western Cape. The second strategy for recruitment involved working 
with local schools (a boys school, and a co-ed school) in the Western Cape. These strategies are 
detailed in the Procedure section.
My recruitment and screening procedures ensured that, of the 32 participants with a history of 
traumatic exposure, 16 had a current diagnosis of PTSD and 16 did not. Given the base rate of 
PTSD in the South African adolescent population, I had no difficulty recruiting the 16 











Njenga, Vythilingum, & Stein, 2004). The traumatic events experienced by the participants in 
the final sample are presented in Figure 1. 
 





























































Figure 1. Traumatic events experienced by participants in final sample. 
 
I recruited a control group (n = 17) consisting of adolescents with no history of childhood trauma 
exposure. These participants were recruited from the local public schools (a boys school and a 
co-ed school. Ethics clearance for doing research in these schools was obtained from the Western 
Cape Education Department. 
 
Groups were matched, as far as possible, on the following socio-demographic variables: age, 
socio-economic status, years of education, race, sex, and home language. Multiple exclusion 
criteria were applied to all groups, including: a history, or a current diagnosis, of any psychotic 
disorders, a history or current diagnosis of major depressive disorder or dysthymia (for 
participants in the healthy control group), a history of head injury or any other neurological 
problem, and a history of alcohol and substance abuse. These exclusion criteria were employed 











& Sahakian, 2005; Smith, 2005). It is important to note that due the high co-morbidity rate of 
anxiety disorders with PTSD, co-morbid anxiety disorders were not included as exclusion 







Assessed for eligibility 
(n = 156) 
Figure 2. Flow chart of final sample 
Note. In the 105 participants excluded from enrollment in the study, 95 were excluded for ‘other reasons’. The 
reasons for these exclusions were, firstly, time constraints with regard to the amount of time each school allowed for 
testing, and secondly, the need to have approximately the same number of participants in each group, therefore some 
people could not be enrolled as they were already too many in the group they would belong to. 
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     (n = 10) 
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(n = 16)  
Assigned to control group 
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In control group 
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Materials and Apparatus 
Participants were administered a clinical interview, several paper-and-pencil questionnaires, and 
a battery of neuropsychological tests. The clinical interview was designed to assess whether the 
participant was currently experiencing, or had in the past experienced, any psychiatric disorders, 
including PTSD, depression, and substance abuse. The questionnaires were used to gather details 
regarding the childhood trauma and the participant’s response to it, as well as to assess the 
participant’s current emotional state and aspects of his/her personality. The neuropsychological 
test battery assessed general intellectual functioning and cognitive functions subserved primarily 
by either the hippocampus or the prefrontal cortex. Each of the instruments used in this study is 
detailed below.  
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
A self-report questionnaire created specifically for this study assessed demographic variables of 
interest (e.g., age, socioeconomic status (SES), and years of education). These variables were 
used in order to match the participants in the PTSD group with participants in the trauma and 
control groups. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Screening Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was also created specifically for this study. The purpose of this instrument 
was to assess potential participants for inclusion and exclusion criteria for the current study, as 
well as to ascertain which group the adolescent might be suitable for (control, trauma or PTSD). 
It therefore assessed various important demographic variables (e.g., age, sex, home-language, 
race), and asked about history of and current alcohol and drug use and abuse (as noted above, 
such use/abuse was an important exclusion criterion). Lastly, and most importantly, the 
questionnaire included an assessment of trauma exposure and symptoms experienced following 
the traumatic experience. This part of the questionnaire included all of the items from the PTSD 
section of the MINI KID 5.0 (Sheehan et al., 1998). By exploring trauma exposure and a possible 
PTSD diagnosis, this section of the screening questionnaire allowed the researcher to ascertain 
which group the potential participant might be suitable for. Further rationale for the use of this 













Psychiatric Interview. The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview For Children 
and Adolescents, Version 5 (MINI KID 5.0; Sheehan et al., 1998) is a comprehensive, 
abbreviated structured psychiatric interview that takes approximately 25 minutes to administer. It 
assesses the major DSM-IV-TR Axis I disorders including depression, substance abuse, and 
PTSD. This is based on the adult version of the MINI (Sheehan et al., 1998). Numerous 
psychometric studies have established that this interview is a reliable and sensitive as a measure 
of psychopathology, with good predictive value. For instance, a large-scale study conducted by 
Sheehan et al. (1998) found that the MINI produced the same diagnoses as the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) 85-95% of 
the time. Similarly, Sheehan, Sheehan et al. (2010) found that the MINI KID 5.0 was a reliable 
and valid clinical interview in the diagnosing of disorders in children and adolescents. The MINI 
has been used extensively in psychological research in South African (see, e.g., Kaminer, Stein, 
Mbanga, & Zungu-Dirwayi, 2001; Van der Ryst, Strysom, Scott, Boshoff, Joubert, & Els, 2002). 
 
Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS). The PDS (Foa, 1995) is a comprehensive 
questionnaire that assesses PTSD symptomatology in detail. This 48-item questionnaire not only 
assesses which symptoms are experienced, but also assesses how often these symptoms are 
experienced. The questionnaire is divided into 4 parts. The first part assesses what traumatic 
events the participant has experienced. The second part assesses which of these experienced 
events bothers the participant the most, and asks when that event occurred. It also asks whether 
the participant was injured as a result of the event, felt helpless or terrified during the event, and 
whether he/she thought someone’s life  was in danger during the event. The third part assesses 
17 symptoms, each of which is rated on 4-point Likert-type scale ( ‘not at all or only one time’, 
‘once a week or less/once in a while’, ‘2 to 4 times a week/half the time’, and ‘5 or more times a 
week/almost all the time’). This part of the instrument also assesses the amount of time the 
symptoms have been occurring, as well as how long after the event the symptoms began 
occurring. Lastly, the fourth part of the questionnaire assesses which areas of the participant’s 
life are affected by these symptoms (e.g., work, relationships with friends and family, fun and 











information about PTSD-related level of impairment, number of symptoms, and symptom 
severity. 
Childhood Trauma Questionnaire – Short Form (CTQ-SF). The CTQ-SF was developed 
and validated as a screening measure for histories of maltreatment for both clinical and 
nonclinical groups (Bernstein et al., 2003). It is a 28-item of the version of the original 70-item
CTQ, which assesses childhood abuse and neglect (Bernstein et al., 1994). Items on the CTQ-SF 
are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale. The responses range from ‘never true’ to ‘very often 
true’. Five types of maltreatment (factors) are measured, each represented by 5 items. The five 
factors are physical abuse, sexual abuse (sexual contact or conduct between a child and an older 
adult), emotional abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect. The CTQ-SF is scored by 
adding the raw scores for each factor, thus producing an index of trauma severity ranging from 5 
to 25. The questionnaire also includes a 3-item minimization/denial scale that detects 
underreporting. The CTQ-SF is frequently used in trauma research in South Africa (see, e.g., 
Lochner et al., 2004). 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson, Clarke, & 
Tellegen, 1988) is a short questionnaire that measures the participant’s tendencies to experience 
negative or positive emotions. It involves two 10-item mood scales, one each for positive and 
negative affect. The PANAS has demonstrated high internal consistency and stability over a 2-
month time period (Watson et al., 1988). In the current study, this instrument was used to 
provide a measure of the approach avoidance/withdrawal tendencies of the participant. The 
PANAS is widely accepted as a good measure of positive and negative affect, and thus is used 
internationally and in South African research (see, e.g., Strümpfer, Viviers, & Gouws, 1998; 
Voogt et al., 2004). 
Connor-Davidson Resiliency Scale (CD-RISC). The CD-RISC (Connor & Davidson, 
2003) was developed in order to provide a measure of stress-coping ability and an individual’s 
ability to thrive in the face of adversity (Campbell-Sills & Stein, 2007). It is a 25-item self-report 
measure, with each item rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Each item provides a statement, 











life’; responses range from ‘not true at all’ to ‘true nearly all the time’. With good internal 
consistency and construct validity, this scale is widely-used internationally as an efficient 
measurement of resilience. For instance, a recent study used the CD-RISC to collect resiliency 
data from individuals in 12 countries, including South Africa (Davidson et al., 2006). 
 
Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ). The LEQ (originally developed by Masten, Neemann, 
& Andenas, 1994) gives a measure of the perceived everyday stress the participant may be 
facing. It does not assess traumatic events, but rather assesses minor changes in one’s life, or 
minor events that can lead to a build up of stress experienced by the participant. The original 
version of the LEQ has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of perceived everyday 
stress (Masten, Miliotis, Graham-Bermann, Ramirez, & Neemann, 1993), used both in South 
Africa and abroad (Masten, Neemann, & Andenas, 1994). In the versi n of the LEQ used in this 
study, there were 23 items, each of which the participant had to indicate whether he/she had ever 
experienced. The participant then had to indicate whether the event occurred in the last 6 months 
or before that. Furthermore, for each item, the participant had to indicate what impact the event 
had on them (‘no impact’, ‘some impact’, or ‘significant impact’). This version of the LEQ is 
presented in Appendix D. 
 
 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). This questionnaire (developed by Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, and Jacobs, 1983) is an anxiety scale and assesses the participants’ 
generalized anxiety at the present moment and in general. This does not refer to the anxiety felt 
over a specific traumatic event or events, but the general anxiety the participant may feel day to 
day about their life as a whole. The STAI consists of two separate parts. The STAI Form Y-1 
(STAI 1) measures the individual’s anxiety in the specific moment (state anxiety), whereas STAI 
Form Y-2 (STAI 2) gives a measure of general levels of anxiety (trait anxiety).  Each form 
includes 20 statements, each of which are measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from “not at 
all” or “almost never” to “very much so” or “almost always”. Items are included that are reverse 
scored so as to reduce response sets. This questionnaire has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties, with high levels of reliability, internal consistency, and validity 













Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). The WASI (The Psychological 
Corporation, 1999) is a short, four-subtest version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS). Using the Vocabulary, Similarities, Block Design and Matrix Reasoning subtests, this 
instrument provides a reliable and valid estimate of WAIS Verbal, Performance and Full Scale 
IQ scores. The WASI takes approximately 30 minutes to complete and can be used with subjects 
from 6-89 years. It is used extensively in research that requires an overall IQ measure (see, e.g., 
Saltzman, Weems, & Carrion, 2006), and is currently being used in South Africa to test local 
adolescents with traumatic brain injuries (Schrieff & Thomas, 2008). 
 
NEPSY-II Inhibition Subtest. The NEPSY-II (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) is a valid 
and reliable test battery, shown to be particularly sensitive to subtle deficits in children’s 
neuropsychological performances, and appropriate for children aged 5 to 16 years. The Inhibition 
subtest assesses the ability to inhibit automatic responses in favour of new responses, as well as 
the ability to switch between different response types. The subtest is separated into 3 sections, 
with each section using 2 worksheets: the squares and circles sheet (the shape sheet) and the 
arrows sheet. In the first section, called ‘Naming’, the examinee has to look at the shape sheet 
and simply state whether each shape is a circle or a square. Then, looking at the arrows sheet, the 
examinee must simply state whether each arrow is pointing up or down. In the second section of 
the subtest, called ‘Inhibition’, the examinee must look at the shape sheet and each time he/she 
sees a circle say “square” and vice-versa.. Then, looking at the arrows sheet, the examinee must 
look at each arrow and say “up” if the arrow is pointing down, and must say “down” if the arrow 
is pointing up (i.e. say the opposite direction of the arrow). In the third section of the subtest, 
called ‘Switching’, the examinee has to look at the shape sheet and must say the correct name for 
the shape when its colour is black, but must say the wrong name (i.e. “square” if it is a circle, 
“circle” if it is a square) if its colour is white. Then, looking at the arrows sheet, the examinee 
must say the correct direction of the arrow when it is coloured black, but must say the opposite 
direction when it is white.  
 
Children’s Memory Scale (CMS). The CMS (Cohen, 1997) is an extensive 











aged 5 to 16 years. It is currently being successfully used in a study testing local children and 
adolescents with traumatic brain injuries (Schrieff & Thomas, 2008). In the current study, only 
the Word Pairs and Digit Span subtests were used. Each of which is detailed below. 
 
Word Pairs measures immediate and delayed recall and recognition for verbal information 
(cognitive processes subserved by the hippocampus). In this subtest the administrator reads a list 
of fourteen word pairs, (for e.g. “football, pencil”; “nurse, fire”; “leaf, school”) to the examinee. 
The administrator then says one word from each pair, and the examinee is required to say which 
word went in that word pair. If the examinee gives the wrong answer, the administrator repeats 
the correct word pair. This procedure is done three times. The examinee is then asked to recall as 
many of the fourteen word pairs as they can without the administrator giving the first word.  
After a 30 minute delay, the examinee is asked once again to recall as many of the fourteen word 
pairs as they can without the administrator giving the first word. This is followed with the 
administrator reading a list of forty-two word pairs, and after each pair the examinee must say if 
they recognize this pair as one of the original fourteen or not. 
 
Digit Span measures working memory (a cognitive process subserved by the prefrontal cortex). 
In the Forward subtest the administrator reads a series of numbers to the examinee and they must 
in turn say the series back to the administrator. The series starts with two numbers and 
systematically increases to nine numbers, with two trials for each series. The task is discontinued 
if they examinee gets both trials wrong for a series. In the Backward subtest the procedure is 
exactly the same, except the examinee has to repeat the series in the reverse order to what the 
administrator read. 
 
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB). The computerized 
neuropsychological tests in the CANTAB (Fray, Robbins, & Sahakian, 1996) are currently used 
in more than 50 countries, with a bibliography of over 500 peer-reviewed journal papers. These 
extensively validated tests allow for quick and accurate assessment of many cognitive domains, 
with excellent sensitivity. Furthermore, as no reading ability or verbal responses are required, the 
CANTAB tests are well suited for cross-cultural administration and for the assessment of young 











computer, and are presented in the form of games that the examinee must complete. Most 
importantly, the battery was developed with the aid of functional neuroimaging techniques; 
therefore, the neuroanatomical regions associated with performance on each subtest within the 
battery have been well defined. 
 
The CANTAB battery used in the current study consisted of six tests assessing prefrontal cortex 
functioning: the Spatial Span (SSP) test (both forwards and backwards), the Stockings of 
Cambridge (SOC) test, the Information Sampling Task (IST), the Intra/Extradimensional Set 
Shift (IED) test, and the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT). Details for each of these tests is 
presented below. 
 
The Spatial Span (SSP) subtest, a measure of working memory capacity, is essentially a 
visual/spatial digit span test. The computer screen displays 9 white blocks, and these change 
colour in a random order. In the forwards SSP test, the participant must remember this sequence 
and then, after a signal (a beep), must touch the blocks in the same order. The testing starts with 
a 2-block sequence; with every correct trial, the sequence increases in length by 1 block, up to a 
9-block sequence. For each sequence length, the examinee is allowed three trials to produce the 
correct sequence right; if he/she cannot do so within those three trials, , the test is discontinued. 
The backwards SSP test follows the same procedure, except that the examinee must touch the 
blocks in the reverse order from that presented on the screen. Figure 3 represents a screen shot 
from the SSP task. 
 












The Stockings of Cambridge (SOC) subtest, a measure of problem solving, is essentially similar 
to the classic Tower of London test (Shallice, 1982). In the SOC, the computer screen is divided 
into two, with a picture at the top and the bottom of the screen of colourful balls in three 
stockings hanging from a bar. The examinee has to make the bottom half of the computer screen 
match the top half of the screen by moving the balls from one stocking to another. In order to 
move a ball the examinee simply touches the ball they want to move, and then touches the 
stocking they want to move the ball to. Each of the 20 problems within this subtest can be solved 
in a particular minimum number of moves; the closer the examinee gets to this number on each 
problem, the more successful his/her performance is judged to be. Figure 4 represents a screen 
shot from the SOC task 
Figure 4. Screen shot of the SOC task 
In the Information Sampling Task (IST), a measure of impulsivity and decision making, the 
examinee is presented with 25 grey boxes on the computer screen. When a box is touched it 
opens up to show which colour it is (1 of 2 colours, for e.g. pink or blue). Once the examinee has 
opened as many boxes as he/she wants to, he/she must decide which colour there are more of, 
out of all the 25 boxes. The examinee is given 100 credits to start with. In the fixed-winnings 
condition, a correct guess yields 100 credits, regardless of how many boxes have been opened; 
an incorrect guess, in contrast, loses 100 credits. In the decreasing-winnings condition, the more 
boxes the examinee opens the fewer credits he/she can win. A wrong guess, however, still leads 
to a loss of 100 points, no matter how many boxes have been opened. Each condition consists of 












Figure 5. Screen shot of the IST task 
 
In the Intra-Extra Dimensional Set Shift (IED)subtest, a measure of rule acquisition and 
attentional set-shifting, the computer screen displays 4 boxes. Two of these boxes have one of 
two purple patterns in them. The examinee must learn a rule in order to guess which pattern is 
correct (for example, the square is correct). In the very first trial the participant can only guess, 
but once he/she has made a decision (by touching a pattern) the software indicates whether the 
decision was right or wrong. From this information, the examinee can eventually acquire the 
rule. The rule is changed 8 times, therefore this task involves 9 stages. During stage 3, white 
lines are introduced into the patterns without warning. The first 7 stages (pre-set-shift stages) are 
quite simple, as the rule involves changing from the one purple pattern to other. In the last 2 
stages (set-shift stages), the rule involves changing from the purple patterns to the white lines, 
and changing from the one white line to the other. Figure 6 represents a screen shot from the IED 
task 
 












In the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT), a measure of impulse control and risk-taking in 
decision-making, the computer displays a row of 10 boxes at the top of the screen. Some of these 
boxes are red and some are blue. The examinee must guess which colour box a yellow token 
would be in. Once he/she has chosen red or blue (by touching the name of the colour at the 
bottom of the screen), a series of bets is offered by the computer software. The examinee starts 
off with a pot of 100 credits ; in the ascending condition the series of bets starts small and then 
increases (from 5% to 25% to 50 % to 75% to 95% of their pot). The examinee simply touches 
the number he/she wants to bet. In the descending condition, the series of bets starts large and 
then decreases (from 95% to 75% to 50% to 25% to 5% of their pot). If the participant loses so 
much credit that the pot is 1 or less, the stage is stopped and the next stage commences. Each 
condition has 4 stages, and each stage includes 9 trials. Figure 7 represents a screen shot from the 
CGT task 
 
Figure 7. Screen shot of the CGT task. 
 
The current CANTAB battery also included two tests assessing hippocampal-dependent memory 
and learning: the Paired Associates Learning (PAL) subtest and the Spatial Recognition Memory 
(SRM) subtest. Details of these tests are presented below.  
 
In the Paired Associates Learning (PAL) subtest, a measure of episodic memory and learning, 
six blocks are immediately presented to the examinee on the computer screen. These then open 
up one at a time, in a random order, to reveal a pattern inside the box. After all 6 boxes have 











then touch the box that contained the target pattern. Testing involves 8 stages: the first two 
feature one target pattern, the third and fourth feature two target patterns, the fifth and sixth 
feature three target patterns, the seventh features six target patterns, and the last stage features 8 
boxes and 8 target patterns. The participant must complete each stage successfully, no matter 
how many trials it takes. Figure 8 represents a screen shot from the PAL task 
 
Figure 8. Screen shot of the PAL task 
 
In the Spatial Recognition Memory (SRM) task, a measure of spatial recognition memory, the 
computer screen displays a blank screen, which is followed by the presentation of five blocks, 
one at a time. After the presentation, a series of two block pairs appears and the examinee must 
touch the block that is in the same place as one of the five blocks previously shown (five pairs 
are shown). This task involves four stages; each stage involves the viewing of five blocks which 
must be remembered, followed by fives pairs of blocks The examinee must recognize which of 













Figure 9. Screen shot of the SRM task 
Computer-Generated Arena. The CG Arena is a desktop-based, non-immersive, virtual 
environment (VE) spatial navigation task (Jacobs, Laurance, & Thomas, 1997; Jacobs, Thomas, 
Laurance, & Nadel, 1998). Numerous studies have shown the CG Arena tasks to be reliable and 
valid measures of spatial navigation (see, e.g., Thomas, Hsu, Laurance, Nadel, & Jacobs, 2001). 
Furthermore, optimal performance on the CG Arena, which requires a wayfinding/cognitive 
map-guided form of navigation, has been demonstrated to be heavily dependent upon 
hippocampal functioning (Frakey et al., 2005). 
The CG Arena task that the participants performed in the current study involved them viewing, 
from a first-person perspective, a computer screen that displayed a square room, inside of which 
was a circular arena. On the walls of the room was a set of pictures that the participant needed to
use as landmarks or distal cues for navigation. The participant was instructed to navigate through 
the room, using a joystick, in order to search for a target located on the arena floor. 
Representations of the room can be seen in Figures 9, 10, and 11. 
This task was performed under two conditions. In the first series of 5 trials, the target was visible 
and the participant could find it simply by scanning the environment. In the subsequent series of 
8 trials, the target was invisible until the participant found its location and stepped on it. In this 
condition, the target was always in the same place in the room, meaning that the participant 











a cognitive map of the environment to successfully locate and re-locate the target across trials 
(Roche, Managaoang, Commins, & O’Mara, 2005; Thomas et al., 2001). 
 
Following this series of invisible target trials, the participants were administered a “probe trial,” 
where they were instructed to once again search for the invisible target; unbeknownst to them, 
however, the target was removed from the room on this trial. This trial assessed persistence of 
search and cognitive mapping ability; those individuals who successfully created a mental map 
of the environment should persist longer in their search of the target’s former location (Morris, 
1984). Figure 10, 11 and 12 represent screen shot of the CG Arena.  
 
 














Figure 11. Facing the corner of the East wall and the South wall. 
 
 
Figure 12. Facing the corner of the West wall and the South wall. 
 
Finally, the participant was administered two tasks that are addenda to the CG Arena: the Object 
Recognition Test (ORT) and the Arena Reconstitution Task (ART). 
 
Object Recognition Task (ORT). The ORT is a forced-choice test assessing recognition 











walls of the room in which the invisible target was located. This test is also a computer-based 
test (developed with E-Prime version 1.0; Psychology Software Tools, 2007). The participant is 
given the instructions, told to look at the screen, and indicate readiness to proceed by pressing 
the space bar. A series of eight screens are then displayed. Each screen has two pictures on it. 
One of these pictures was on the wall in the invisible-target room, and one is a distractor. Each 
photograph is numbered (as “1” or “2”). The participant must then indicate, by pressing the 
appropriate number key, which picture is recognized as being one of the landmarks from the 
invisible-target room. The eight screens that were displayed are shown in Figure 13. 
               
  
 
Figure 13. ORT target and distractor pictures (displayed separately as 8 screens) 
 
Arena Reconstitution Task (ART). The ART is a visuoconstructional task that assesses 
memory for the layout of the distal cues in the CG experimental rooms; it thus measures the 
quality of the participant’s cognitive map of the CG virtual room. The task thus gives a measure 











Figure 14) and is given eight small laminated pictures. He/she is then instructed to recreate the 
layout of the room. When this task is completed, the participant is instructed to mark (by writing 
an X on the sheet) in which square the invisible target was located, in relation to the pictures 
he/she placed in the room. 
 
 
Figure 14. ART Stimulus Sheet 
 
Affective Go/No-go (AGNG) test. The AGNG test used in this study (developed by Ipser, 
2008) is a computer-based test, designed to assess response inhibition and affective bias, where 
the participant is instructed to watch a series of faces, each showing either a happy, fearful, or 
neutral (where the face shows no emotion) expression. There test consists of three blocks of 64 
trials each (with the presentation of one face constituting a trial). Each face is shown for 500 
milliseconds, with an interval of 500 milliseconds. At the beginning of each block, the 
participant is told to look for a particular emotion (the ‘target’ emotion; this differs from block to 
block), and to hit the ‘g’ key on the computer keyboard when it is presented. Participants are also 
instructed to not hit the key when any of the other emotions (distractor emotions) are presented. 











first block’s target emotion was ‘fearful’ and the distractors were ‘neutral’. In the second block, 
the target emotion was ‘neutral’ and the distractors were ‘fearful’. In the third block, the target 
emotion was ‘fearful’ and the distractors were ‘happy’. AGNG tasks such as this one have been 
shown to be valid tests of the constructs of response inhibition and affective bias (Schulz et al., 
2007; Water & Valvoi, 2009). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the specific neurocognitive functions assessed by each test in the 
neuropsychological test battery employed here.  
Table 1 
Neuropsychological Test Battery used in the Study 
Brain Region/Test Cognitive Domain  
Assessed by Test 
Example of Study in Which 
Test is Used 
Prefrontal cortex 
Intra/Extradimensional Set Shift 
(IES) 
Rule acquisition and attentional 
set-shifting 
Randall et al. (2004) 
Spatial Span (SSP) Working memory capacity Sweeney et al. (2000) 
Stockings of Cambridge (SOC) Spatial planning and motor control Bedard et al. (2004) 
Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT) Impulse control & 
risk-taking in decision making
Whitlow et al. (2004) 
Information Sampling Task (IST) Impulsivity and decision making De Luca et al. (2003) 
Affective Go/No Go (AGNG) Information processing biases &  
inhibitory control
Murphy et al. (2004) 
NEPSY-II: Inhibition subtest Response inhibition Lehto et al. (2003) 
CMS: Digit Span Working memory Schrieff & Thomas (2008) 
Hippocampus 
Paired Associates Learning (PAL) Episodic memory and learning Coull et al. (2006) 
Spatial Recognition Memory (SRM) Spatial recognition memory Luciana & Nelson (2002) 
CG Arena Spatial navigation Thomas et al. (2001) 
CMS: Word Pairs Verbal memory Schrieff & Thomas (2008) 
Procedure 
As stated earlier, two recruitment strategies were employed. Each strategy involved quite 
different processes, which insured that all the participants could volunteer for this study in as 
informed a way as possible, and thus each will be discussed separately. 
The first strategy involved recruitment through treatment centres. This recruitment involved 
working with the counsellors at the clinics to find individuals who would be suitable participants 
in terms of age, when the traumatic event occurred, emotional stability, etc. The counsellors then 











individual would feel comfortable with a researcher telephoning to discuss the study. The 
researcher then contacted all the individuals who agreed to accept this telephone call. At the 
outset of the call, both the adolescent and their parent or guardian were given an explanation of 
the study procedures. For those who continued to be interested in participation, the researcher 
arranged with the individual’s parent or guardian to meet at a suitable time at the treatment 
centre where the adolescent had received treatment.  
 
At this meeting, the parent/guardian read through and signed the parent consent form (Appendix 
E). These consent forms included the primary researcher’s contact details, in case the parent or 
guardian wanted to make contact at a later point. The adolescent was then given the assent form 
(Appendix F). Once the adolescent had received written informed consent from their 
parents/guardians, and had signed the assent form, he/she was enrolled in the study. The study 
protocols were then administered at the treatment centre. 
 
The second strategy for recruitment involved working with the headmaster and class teachers of 
two schools in the Western Cape. Suitable classes (in terms of appropriate age group) were 
identified and then addressed as a group. The adolescents were told about the study and given 
parental consent forms (seen in Appendix G for the co-ed school, and Appendix E for the boys 
school). Those adolescents who brought these forms back were then administered the screening 
questionnaire. This questionnaire included an assent form (see Appendix B). From this 
questionnaire, possible participants were approached and those who assented to take part in the 
actual interviews were enrolled in the study.  
 
In the course of this initial screening process, 126 adolescents filled out screening questionnaires. 
Due to time constraints (in terms of the amount of time the schools allowed the researcher to 
conduct interviews) of these possible candidates, 21 adolescents were enrolled in the study. (The 
screening process itself provided some important results; these can be seen in Appendix C) 
 
For all participants, regardless of the manner in which they had been recruited, the actual study 
protocols were identical. The protocol consisted of two sessions: one session that included the 











neuropsychological battery. Table 2 shows the instruments administered in each session, and the 
order of administration. Each session lasted approximately 120 minutes. Both sessions included 
hippocampal-dependent and prefrontal cortex-dependent tests. 
 
Table 2 
Tests Administered in Each Session 
Session #1 Session #2 
MINI Psychiatric Interview Affective Go/No Go 
LEQ CG Arena 
STAI CANTAB Spatial Span Test (forwards) 
CTQ-SF  CANTAB Spatial Span Test (reverse) 
CD-RISC CANTAB Spatial Recognition Memory 
PANAS CANTAB Paired Associates Learning 
WASI CANTAB Stockings of Cambridge 
CMS Word Pairs 1 CANTAB Information Sampling Task 
NEPSY-II:  Response Inhibition CANTAB Intra/Extradimensional Set 
Shift 
CMS Digit Span CANTAB Cambridge Gambling Task 
CMS Word Pairs 2  
Note. Abbreviation are as follows: MINI KID 5.0 (MINI); Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ); 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI); Childhood Trauma Questionnaire- Short Form (CTQ-SF); 
Connor-Davidson Resiliency Scale (CD-RISC); Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS); Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI); and Children’s Memory Scale 
(CMS). 
 
The testing was spread over two sessions (on two separate days) so as to avoid participants 
suffering from fatigue or boredom, which could have affected their  performance. Both sessions 
were administered within a maximum of 3 weeks of each other. This was done so that the 
information from the interview session was still valid in terms of drawing conclusions about 
correlations with this information and performance on the neuropsychological tests. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
It is important to note that in order to administer the MINIKID 5.0 correctly, the primary 
researcher was trained by a clinical psychologist (the supervisor). The diagnoses obtained 
through the MINIKID 5.0 were formulated by following the structured format of this interview; 
each diagnostic section includes critical criteria which, if met, indicate the presence of that 
diagnosis. The diagnoses derived from the MINIKID 5.0 were assessed for the purpose of this 












All the participants who were interviewed at a treatment centre were reimbursed for travel 
expenses by the researchers. Furthermore, all the participants (except for those from the co-ed 
school) received a total of R100; R50 after the first session, and R50 after the last session. The 
co-ed school did not want their pupils who participated to receive monetary compensation for 
participation. Instead, these participants were entered into a raffle and the winner was drawn 
after all the interviews were conducted. 
 
It must be noted that certain further precautions were taken due to the possible vulnerability of 
those participants who had experienced a traumatic event and/or who were experiencing some 
form of psychopathology. This vulnerability might have become manifest particularly during the 
initial interview session, where participants were faced with relatively specific questions about 
previous exposure to traumatic events. Thus, all participants were verbally assured at the 
beginning of each session that they were able to withdraw from the study at any point without 
penalty, and that that they did not have to give more details than they were comfortable with. 
Furthermore, for all the participants, a registered clinical psychologist was made available to 
them if they were in any way distressed by the study procedures. For the participants tested at the 
treatment centres, counsellors were available at any time if needed. At the conclusion of the 
study procedures, participants were fully debriefed and provided with information on trauma 
counselling centres and trauma counsellors. 
 
After all the interviews and testing were complete, a feedback report was created for each 
participant. These reports consisted of information about the range of the participant’s 
performance on the cognitive processes tested. For an example of one of these reports, see 
Appendix H. 
 
All study protocols were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of UCT Faculty of Health 
Sciences, by the Research Ethics Committee of the UCT Department of Psychology, and by the 














In order to understand the nature of particular outcome variables, as well as some of the 
independent variables used in the statistical analyses that follow, a brief explanation of the 
scoring of many the tests is essential. (The tests that used standard scoring are not discussed 
here; rather, instructions for their scoring and interpretation of their scores can be found in the 
relevant test manuals.) 
 
The Life Events Questionnaire (a measure of everyday stress; see Appendix D) was scored as 
follows: No points were given to an event if the participant indicated it had not occurred or it had 
occurred but had had “no impact” on him/her; 1 point was given to an event that the participant 
indicated had occurred and which he/she indicated had had “some impact” on him/her; and, 
lastly, 2 points were given to an event if the participant indicated it had occurred and had had 
“significant impact” on him/her. 
 
In order to score the PANAS, the self-reported item scores related to positive emotions were 
added together, and the self-reported item scores related to negative emotions were added 
together. 
 
All the computer-based tasks (viz., the CG Arena tasks, the Affective Go No-Go task, and the 
tasks in the CANTAB battery) generate distinct data files for each participant.  
 
More specifically, the CG Arena software produces two distinct data files for each participant, 
one for the 5 trials of the visible target condition and one for 9 trials of the invisible target 
condition (including the probe trial). These data files include, for each individual trial, 
information on how long it took the participant to get to the target (in seconds), how long the 
path was that the participant took to get to the target, and how long (in seconds) the participant 
spent on each quadrant of the room. (To see more details on the information presented in these 
data files, see Thomas et al., 2001.)  
 
The software used in the CG Arena ORT task (E-prime version 1.0) produces a data file for each 











correctly recognized a picture (true hits), and the number of times the participant mistakenly 
picked the wrong picture (false alarms).  
These recognition rates were used to calculate a d-prime (d’) score for each participant. The d’
statistic is a measure of recognition sensitivity proposed by Signal Detection Theory (SDT). SDT 
is used to explore the decision-making process a person goes through when attempting to decide 
between various options (such as picking which picture is recognized as one that was on the 
walls in the arena). The d’ statistic is calculated by subtracting the standard score of the true hit 
rate (H) from the standard score of the false alarm rate (FA). The formula is thus d’ = z(FA) – 
z(H), where H and FA correspond to the right-tail probabilities on the normal distribution. A 
larger d’ score indicates greater accuracy, where the participant rarely guessed. A smaller d’
score (of 0 or less) indicates that the participant guessed often. The d’ statistic is a superior way 
to judge performance on recognition tasks; if one only looked at the true hit rate, for instance, it 
would be impossible to know how much of the participant’s performance was due to guessing. 
In order to score the ART, I used the method shown in the score sheet reproduced in Appendix I. 
As can be seen, on this sheet points are awarded for particular aspects of the reconstruction. For 
example, 2 points are awarded for having the correct layout of the room (i.e,, a set of 3 pictures 
on opposite walls, and 1 picture on the each of the other walls), 1 point is awarded for having the 
correct picture directly south of the target, 1 point is awarded for having the three correct 
pictures directly north of the target, and so on, resulting in a final score out of 35. 
The AGNG software (E-prime version 1.0) produces a data file for each participant that includes 
information about the number of times the participant correctly hit a target, mistakenly missed a 
target, correctly did not hit a distractor, and mistakenly hit a distractor. Information on the 
distractors can also be broken down by emotion, so that the three distractor emotions’ data (fear, 
happy, and neutral) can be analyzed separately. Lastly, the average reaction time for each time 
the participant hit a key is recorded. This information can also be broken down into key strokes 
corresponding to the two target emotions (fear and neutral). These data were used to calculate the 
d’ statistic (as discussed earlier), as well as the β statistic. The β statistic, also proposed by SDT, 











Response bias (β) is calculated independently of recognition sensitivity, and is determined by 
looking specifically at the ratio between ‘no’ responses (in this case, not hitting the target key) 
and ‘yes’ responses (in this case, hitting the target key). This statistic is calculated for correct 
target hits (true hits) and incorrect target hits (false alarms). The extent to which one response is 
more probable than the other is thus assessed. A (natural log) β score of 0 shows no bias. A β 
score of less than zero indicates a bias towards responding ‘yes’ to all trials (i.e., always hitting 
the target key). A β score of more than zero indicates a bias towards responding ‘no’ to all trials 
(i.e., always not hitting the target key). 
The CANTAB software produces a comprehensive data file for each participant that includes 
detailed information on each on the eight tests in the battery. For the Spatial Span tests (SSP 
forwards and backwards), information is included on how many trials the participant 
successfully completed, how many trials he/she made a mistake on, and how far the participant 
progressed in the test (the maximum possible span is 9). For the Spatial Recognition Memory 
(SRM) task, information is included on how many trials the participant got right (out of 20), as 
well as the reaction times for each trial. The latter were used to calculate the average reaction 
time for a correct decision and the average reaction time for an incorrect decision. For the Paired 
Associates Learning (PAL) task, information is included on how many trials the participant 
successfully completed, and on how many trials he/she made a mistake. For the Stockings of 
Cambridge (SOC) task, information is included on the time it took for the participant to complete 
each problem, and on the number of problems (out of 12) that were solved in the minimum
number of moves. For the Information Sampling Task (IST), information is included on the time
it took for the participant to choose a colour for each trial, the number of boxes opened on each 
trial, and the number of trials the participant completed successfully (out of 10 trials for the 
fixed-winnings condition and 10 trials for decreasing-winnings condition). For the Intra-Extra 
Dimensional Set Shift (IED) task, information is included on the number of stages successfully 
completed (out of a possible 9), and the total number of errors made (which could be broken 
down into two parts, seven pre set-shift stages, and two stages that involved a set-shift). Lastly, 
for the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT), information is included on the amount of time it took 











of their points staked in the chosen bet, and the number of times the participant picked the colour 
which actually had 40% or less chance of winning. 
Lastly, in terms of the NEPSY-II, along with the Naming, Inhibition, and Switching data, two 
further abilities are derived from combinations of the three sections, namely ‘Inhibitory control’ 
(made up from the ‘Naming’ and the ‘Inhibition’ data) and ‘Cognitive flexibility’ (made up from 
the ‘Inhibition’ and the ‘Switching’ data). The scores are derived from both accuracy and the 
time taken to completion. 
These outcome measures were used as the dependent variables in the statistical analyses that
follow.  
Statistical Procedures
All the statistical analyses begin with an exploration of descriptive statistics. This exploration 
gave an initial picture of the performance of all the participants, and of possible differences 
between the three groups. Furthermore, these explorations allowed for the testing of assumptions 
that must be upheld for further inferential statistical analysis. 
Between-Group Comparison of Demographic and Clinical Characteristics  
In order to determine whether the sample was properly matched on all demographic variables 
across the three groups, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on all 
continuous variables, and chi-square (χ²) analyses were conducted on all categorical variables . 
In order to explore possible differences in the clinical characteristics of the sample (i.e., disorders 
presented), chi-square (χ²) analyses were conducted. In order to explore the personal 
characteristics and trauma characteristics of the sample, a series of one-way ANOVAs, and a 
series of 1-tailed t tests were conducted. 
The series of statistical analyses that follow were performed in order to assess the differences 
between the three groups in terms of any predicted functional differences in hippocampal and 











Neuropsychological Test Battery Performance 
In order to assess the relationship between group membership and performance on the complete 
test battery, after controlling for Full Scale IQ scores and sex differences, a series of hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were conducted. In addition, these analyses attempted to ascertain 
whether group membership can be predicted by test performance (following Nolin & Ethier, 
2007). 
 
Data Sets With Repeated Measures 
In order to assess the relationship between group membership and performance on the CG Arena 
and possible AGNG information processing biases properly, repeated-measures and factorial 
ANOVAs were conducted, thereby taking into account the effects of multiple trials on 
performance. 
 
All statistical analyses used an alpha level of p = 0.05 for the threshold of statistical significance. 
Effect size estimates are reported, where appropriate, as these estimates allow for assessment of 
the real-world significance of group differences. 
 















Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
The sample (N = 49) was reasonably well matched across groups in terms of the demographic 
variables assessed. The breakdown of these variables for each group can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Current Sample. 
 Sample 
(N = 49) 
Control Group 
(n = 17) 
Trauma Group 
(n = 16) 
PTSD Group 
(n = 16) 
M (SD) ,  
% or ratio 
M (SD),  
% or ratio 
M (SD), 
% or ratio 
M (SD), 
% or ratio 
Sex     
Female:Male 30:19 10:7 10:6 10:6 
Ethnicity     
% Coloured 80 88 75 75 
% Black 20 12 25 25 
Home Language     
% Xhosa 18 6 25 25 
% Afrikaans  
& English 
20 24 6 31 
% English 61 71 69 44 
Age     
Age  
(in years) 
15.498 (1.134) 15.401 (1.050) 15.313 (1.419) 15.786 (0.888) 
Years of 
Education 
9.184 (0.993) 9.176 (1.131) 9.125 (0.683) 9.250 (0.683) 
Note. For all of the variables not presented as percentages or ratios, means are presented with 
their standard deviations in parentheses. All the participants were from low socioeconomic status 
backgrounds, and therefore this variable is not included in the table. This was determined by 
both the socio-economic data on the communities the participants were from and the school they 
















In order to assess for possible differences between the average age of the three groups, a one-
way ANOVA was performed, with group membership as the independent variable (a between-
subjects factor). The assumptions of normality of the distribution and homogeneity of variances 
(as shown by Levene’s test, F(2, 46) = 0.316, p = 0.731) were upheld. The ANOVA showed that 
the factor of group membership was not statistically significant, F(2, 46) = 0.786, p = 0.461. The 
three groups were thus successfully matched for age. 
 
Race 
In order to assess for possible differences between the distribution of participants of different 
races across the three groups, a set of chi-square analyses was performed. The analyses showed 
that there were similar numbers of participants of different races in each of the three groups 
(Coloured: χ² = 0.462, p = 0.794; black: χ² = 0.800, p = 0.670). The three groups were thus 
successfully matched for race of participants. 
 
Home Language 
In order to assess for possible differences between the distribution of participants with different 
home languages across the three groups, a set of chi-square analyses was performed. The 
analyses showed that there were similar numbers of participants with different home languages 
in each of the three groups (English: χ² = 1.400, p = 0.497; English and Afrikaans: χ² = 2.600, p = 
0.273; Xhosa: χ² = 2.000, p = 0.368). The three groups were thus successfully matched for home 
language. 
 
Years of Education 
In order to assess for possible differences between the average years of education within the 
three groups, a one-way ANOVA was performed, with group membership as the independent 
variable. The assumptions of normality of the distribution and homogeneity of variances (as 
shown by Levene’s test, F(2, 46) = 1.411, p = 0.254) were upheld. The ANOVA showed that the 
factor of group membership was not significant, F(2, 46) = 0.062, p = 0.940. The three groups 













For the sake of clarity, the data on the IQ results is presented separately, in Table 4. These IQ 
scores are an important factor in later data analysis and therefore closer inspection of these 
results is warranted. 
Table 4 
IQ Results for each Group Broken Down by Sex 
Full Scale IQ  Verbal IQ  Performance IQ  
Control group 94.59 (11.28) 99.65 (10.93) 89.71 (13.48) 
Girls (n = 10) 96.60 (10.77) 103.30 (11.60) 88.90 (10.19) 
Boys (n = 7) 91.71 (12.19) 94.43 (7.93) 90.86 (18.06) 
Trauma group 91.00 (16.49) 95.94 (18.19) 85.88 (14.90) 
Girls (n = 10) 87.80 (18.91) 93.90 (20.86) 81.50 (16.99) 
Boys (n = 6) 96.33 (10.82) 99.33 (13.68) 93.17 (6.68) 
PTSD group 82.13 (14.63) 87.38 (17.48) 79.44 (12.51) 
Girls (n = 10) 77.30 (11.73) 83.50 (16.52) 74.70 (11.13) 
Boys (n = 6) 91.50 (13.23) 95.67 (14.85) 87.33 (11.25) 
All participants 89.51 (14.59) 94.65 (15.90) 85.10 (14.04) 
Girls (n = 30) 87.23 (15.94) 93.57 (18.14) 81.70 (13.97) 
Boys (n = 19) 93.11 (11.65) 96.37 (11.78) 90.47 (12.73) 
Note. The IQ results presented are the average scores, with standard deviations in parentheses.  
A one-way ANOVA was performed on the IQ scores, with group membership being the 
between-subjects factor. The assumption of normality of the data distribution was upheld for all 
three IQ measures. Levene’s tests showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was 
also upheld for all three measures (Full Scale IQ, F(2, 46) = 1.047, p = 0.359; Verbal IQ, F(2, 
46) = 2.485, p = 0.094; Performance IQ, F(2, 46) = 0.435, p = 0.650).
The ANOVA showed that there was no significant effect of group membership on Full Scale IQ, 
F(2, 46) = 3.156, p = 0.052, Verbal IQ, F(2, 46) = 2.397, p = 0.102, or Performance IQ, F(2, 46) 
= 2.366, p = 0.105. These results therefore indicate that the three groups were successfully 












Clinical Characteristics of the Sample 
Of most interest in terms of the clinical characteristics of the sample are the disorders present in 
the current participants (co-morbid disorders in the case of the PTSD participants). Chi-square 
analysis (performed on all the disorder frequency data) showed that the prevalence of all 
disorders is contingent on group membership, Pearson χ² = 83.38, p < 0.010, Cramer’s V = 
















































Psychiatric Disorder Comparisons Across Groups  
Disorders Number of children with disorder 
Control Trauma PTSD 
Depression (current) 0 2 8 
Depression (recurrent) 0 2 6 
Suicide Risk (low) 6 5 4 
Suicide Risk (moderate) 0 0 6 
Suicide Risk (high) 0 0 2 
Dysthymia (current) 0 0 6 
Hypomania (current) 2 4 3 
Hypomania (past) 3 7 3 
Mania (current) 1 0 4 
Mania (past) 2 0 5 
Panic Disorder (current) 1 0 8 
Panic Disorder (limited symptom attacks lifetime) 1 2 0 
Panic Disorder (lifetime) 2 1 9 
Agoraphobia 3 6 8 
Separation Anxiety Disorder 4 2 12 
Social Phobia (generalized) 0 0 1 
Social Phobia (non-generalized) 0 0 1 
Specific phobia (current) 3 1 3 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (current) 0 1 10 
Tourette’s 0 0 1 
Motor Tic 1 0 0 
Vocal Tic 0 0 0 
Transient Tic Disorder (current) 0 0 0 
ADHD Combined 0 0 1 
ADHD Inattentive 0 0 1 
ADHD Hyperactivity/Impulsive 0 0 0 
Conduct Disorder (current) 1 0 1 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder 0 0 3 
Mood Disorder with Psychotic Features (current) 0 0 4 
Mood Disorders with Psychotic Features (lifetime) 0 0 3 
Anorexia Nervosa 0 0 0 
Bulimia Nervosa 0 0 1 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 0 0 0 
Adjustment Disorders 0 0 0 
Pervasive Development Disorder 0 0 0 
Note. These are the disorders as categorized by the MINI KID 5.0. Because the presence of 
alcohol abuse and dependence, substance abuse, and psychotic disorders were all exclusion 
criteria, there were no participants included in this study that met those diagnoses. 
 
The individual disorders listed in Table 3 were grouped into categories in order to test which 











disorders that had more than one participant who met the diagnosis were included in these 
groupings. The disorder groups were: Depressive Disorders (consisting of current depression, 
recurrent depression, any suicide risk, and dysthymia), Mania/Hypomania (current or past mania 
and current or past hypomania), Anxiety Disorders (any panic disorder, agoraphobia, separation 
anxiety disorder, any social phobia, and specific phobia), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders (all forms of ADHD), Social Behavioural 
Disorders (conduct disorder and oppositional defiant disorder), and Mood Disorders (consisting 
of mood disorders with psychotic features, both current and lifetime). 
 
Separate chi-square analyses were performed for each disorder group. The results showed that 
the presence of the following groups of disorders were significantly contingent on group 
membership; Depressive Disorders, χ² = 25.83, p < 0.0001; Anxiety Disorders, χ² = 24.82, p < 
0.0001; OCD, χ² = 16.55, p < 0.0001; and Mood Disorders, χ² = 14.00, p < 0.0009. In all these 
groupings, the PTSD group accounted for the most number of individuals. In Depressive 
Disorders and OCD the trauma group accounted for the next largest number of individuals. In 
Anxiety Disorders the control group accounted for the next largest number of individuals after 
the PTSD group. And lastly, in Mood Disorders, no other groups accounted for individuals in 
these disorders. The presence of Mania/Hypomania and ADHD was not significantly contingent 
on group membership, χ² = 0.68, p = 0.710, and χ² = 4.00, p = 0.135, respectively. Furthermore, 
the presence of any of the group of Social Behavioural Disorders approached statistical 
significance with regard to contingency on group membership, χ² = 5.20, p = 0.074. In this 
grouping, the PTSD group accounted for the largest number of individuals, the control group for 
only one individual, and there were no individuals from the trauma group. These grouped 




























Figure 15. Number of participants who met diagnoses of grouped disorders 
Note. Significant group differences: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
Other Characteristics of the Sample 
A set of comparisons was performed on the data collected via the paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires in order to assess differences between the three groups in terms of personal 
characteristics and attributes, as well as life events experienced. The personal characteristics and 
attributes consisted of: overall trait-like and current state anxiety (as measured by the STAI), 
perceived everyday stress (as measured by the LEQ), approach avoidance/withdrawal tendencies 
(as measures by the PANAS), and resiliency (as measured by the CD-RISC). The average scores 

















(n = 17) 
Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
LEQ     
 < 6 months 0 - 46 2.76 (3.01) 1.75 (1.98) 4.19 (3.73) 
 > 6 months 0 - 46 1.59 (1.54) 1.81 (2.40) 2.69 (3.46) 
CTQ-SF     
 Emotional abuse* 5 - 25 7.53 (2.92) 7.06 (2.54) 10.75 (6.42) 
 Physical abuse* 5 - 25 5.59 (2.43) 5.31 (0.87) 7.50 (3.54) 
 Sexual abuse 5 - 25 5.00 (0.00) 6.25 (5.00) 5.50 (2.00) 
 Emotional neglect 5 - 25 7.06 (2.49) 6.69 (2.33) 7.69 (4.36) 
 Physical neglect 5 - 25 5.35 (0.70) 6.56 (2.16) 6.44 (1.71) 
 Minimization 0 - 3 1.12 (0.78) 1.44 (1.15) 1.25 (0.93) 
STAI     
 State** 20 - 80 35.18 (9.62) 31.69 (12.11) 43.87 (9.07) 
 Trait** 20 - 80 39.65 (8.36) 36.31 (9.93) 53.00 (13.01) 
PANAS     
 Positive 0 - 50 38.29 (5.06) 40.19 (5.53) 35.00 (8.41) 
 Negative* 0 - 50 20.71 (7.74) 22.19 (6.97) 28.50 (10.60) 
CD-RISC 0 - 100 80.06 (7.54) 81.13 (20.46) 69.00 (21.47) 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001. The questionnaire measure results presented for each group are 
the average scores, with standard deviations in parentheses. The possible score ranges are the 
score ranges for each questionnaire measure. For example, in the CTQ-SF, a participant 
answering never for all questions would have a score of 5 (i.e., 5 is the minimum for this 
measure). Controls’ CTQ-SF scores could be higher than 5 as they might have experienced some 
of these events, even though further investigation revealed that the experience could not be 
classified as a DSM-IV-TR traumatic event (further details on this point are in the Participants 
sub-section of the Design and Methods section). 
 
A series of one-way ANOVAs was performed on these data, with group membership always 
being the between-subjects factor. The assumption of normality of the distribution of the data 
was upheld for all the measures. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances showed that this 
assumption was violated for many of the measures, however. Nonetheless, due to the fact that (a) 
there was an approximately equal number of participants in each group, and (b) ANOVA is 
relatively “robust with respect to to violations” (Howell, 2004, p.359), the analyses were carried 
















Levene’s Test Results for the Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaires 
Measure Levene’s F Levene’s p 
LEQ   
 < 6 months 3.435 0.041* 
 > 6 months 3.138 0.053 
CTQ-SF   
 Emotional abuse 4.171 0.022* 
 Physical abuse 2.632 0.083 




 Physical neglect 15.620 0.000** 
 Minimization 12.165 0.000** 
STAI   
 State 0.733 0.486 
 Trait 0.897 0.415 
PANAS   
 Positive 1.819 0.174 
 Negative 2.100 0.134 
CD-RISC  3.295 0.046* 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001. (df = 30) 
 
The set of ANOVAs showed that there were significant between-group differences on the 
following measures: STAI - State, F(2, 48) = 5.915, p < 0.005; STAI - Trait, F(2, 48) = 11.230, p 
< 0.0001; PANAS - Negative, F(2, 48) = 3.803, p < 0.030; CTQ-SF Emotional Abuse, F(2, 48) 
= 3.504, p < 0.038; and CTQ-SF Physical Abuse, F(2, 48) = 3.581, p < 0.036. 
 
Post-hoc analyses (using Tukey’s HSD test) indicated that the significant differences could be 
attributed to characteristics of the PTSD participants. Specifically, on the STAI -State measure, 
participants in the PTSD group scored significantly higher than those in the Trauma group (p < 
0.005); furthermore, the difference between the PTSD group and the Control group approached 
statistical significance (p = 0.0507). Similarly, on the STAI - Trait measure, participants in the 
PTSD group scored statistically significantly higher than those in both the Control group (p < 
0.002) and the Trauma group (p < 0.0003). On the PANAS - Negative measure, participants in 
the PTSD group scored statistically significantly higher than those in the Trauma group (p < 
0.032). On the CTQ-SF Emotional Abuse index, participants in the PTSD group scored 











Physical Abuse index, participants in the PTSD group scored significantly higher than those in 
the Trauma group (p < 0.047). 
 
Trauma-Related Characteristics of the Sample 
Another set of comparisons was performed on the data collected regarding the trauma-related 
characteristics of the sample. These analyses sought to assess differences between participants in 
the Trauma and the PTSD groups in terms of post-traumatic symptoms experienced (as assessed 
by the MINI KID 5.0 and the PDS) and in terms of the number of months since the trauma. The 
average scores for these measures can be seen in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Trauma-related Characteristics of the Sample as Assessed by the MINI KID 5.0 and the PDS  
  Group Levene’s Test 
Measure  Range Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
F p 
MINI KID 5.0      
 Q4 score** 0 - 7 1.81 (1.05) 5.00 (1.41) 3.387 0.076 
 Q5 score** 0 - 5 1.13 (1.09) 3.94 (1.29) 2.745 0.108 
PDS      
 Level of impairment** 0 - 9 0.13 (0.34) 6.19 (3.35) 150.497 0.0001* 
 Number of symptoms** 0 - 17 2.06 (3.40) 12.75 (3.36) 0.332 0.569 
 Symptom severity** 0 - 51 3.50 (6.31) 27.38 (10.75) 4.680 0.039* 
No. months since trauma 3 - 203 46.63 (41.02) 37.94 (47.68) 0.661 0.423 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001. The questionnaire measure results presented for each group are 
the average scores, with standard deviations in parentheses. The possible score ranges are the 
score ranges for each questionnaire measure. For the “Number of months since trauma”, as the 
trauma had to happen at least 3 months prior to participation in the study, the minimum for this 
measure is 3. The maximum number of months since trauma is based on the maximum age limit 
of the participants. The results of Levene’s tests presented are the F scores as well as their 
respective p values (df = 30).  
 
As there were only two groups in these analyses, a series of one-talied t-tests was performed on 
the data. Where the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not upheld (as seen in the 
Levene’s test results), separate estimates of variance were used. Where this assumption was 
upheld, pooled estimates of variance were used. 
 
As expected (because it was these measures that directly informed group membership), the two 
groups were statistically significantly different on all the MINI KID 5.0 and PDS outcome 











score, t(30) = 5.725, p < 0.0001; PDS level of impairment, t(15.278) = 6.661, p < 0.0001; PDS 
number of symptoms, t(30) = 7.337, p < 0.0001, PDS symptom severity, t(22.67) = 6.840, p < 
0.0001. For all these results, the PTSD group had significantly higher scores than the trauma 
group. There was no statistically significant between-group difference in terms of number of 
months since trauma, t(30) = -0.582, p = 0.565. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 1  
The following analyses tested hypothesis 1, namely: on the general neuropsychological test 
battery: (1a.) adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will, regardless of whether 
they are carrying a PTSD diagnosis or not, perform more poorly than non-trauma controls on 
hippocampal-dependent and PFC-dependent cognitive tasks, and (1b.) of those adolescents who 
have experienced childhood trauma, those with a PTSD diagnosis will perform more poorly on 
the test battery than will those without such a diagnosis. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, a set of multiple hierarchical regression analyses were carried 
out. In order to conduct these analyses domains were created from the relevant outcome 
measures. These procedures are detailed below. 
 
Due to the vast number of variables assessed in this study, a hybrid method of grouping the 
outcome measures was employed. This method (as described by Medina et al., 2007) involves 
grouping variables based on both (a) the theoretical categories of cognitive domains (Lezak et 
al., 2004) and (b) results of reliability analyses using Cronbach’s alpha (α). This method is 
employed so that each final domain category is made up of variables that are both statistically 
significantly correlated as well as theoretically associated. 
 
In order to decide which outcome measures went together in each cognitive domain, the 
measures were initially grouped together based on the theory of what each outcome measure 
assessed. These groupings were then statically assessed for internal consistency. In order to do 
this, outcome measure scores and grouped domain category scores needed to be caluculated. In 











into a Z score based on the entire sample’s scores (N = 49). These Z scores were then averaged 
for all the tests in each category to give the final composite Z score for each domain category.  
These final composite Z scores were then assessed for internal consistency by reliability analysis 
(i.e., by computing Cronbach’s α coefficients). The final composite scores were reassessed if the 
α coefficient was too low. This method resulted in nine composite domain categories: 1) 
Working Memory; 2) Verbal Memory; 3) Visual Memory; 4) Inhibition; 5) Impulsivity and 
Decision-Making; 6) Spatial Navigation Abilities; 7) Problem-Solving Abilities; 8) Rule 
Acquisition and Attentional Set-Shift Abilities; and 9) Processing Speed. These domains have 
Cronbach’s α coefficients ranging between 0.524 and 0.908. These coefficients are within the 
acceptable standard for α coefficients in reliability testing (Finchilescu, 2002). The various 
















(n = 17) 
Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Working Memory  





Forwards - RS 11.00 (2.09) 8 - 15 9.94 (2.38) 7 - 15 9.63 (1.89) 7 - 13 
 Backwards - RS 6.71 (1.83) 4 - 9 5.56 (2.16) 2 - 9 5.00 (1.59) 3 - 9 
CANTAB SSP:
Forwards - RS 6.41 (1.62) 3 - 9 5.94 (1.81) 3 - 9 5.81 (1.33) 3 - 9 
Forwards - SRate 0.74 (0.09) 0.59 - 0.90 0.71 (0.12) 0.44 - 0.92 0.71 (0.10) 0.53 - 0.90 
Backwards - RS 5.82 (1.94) 3 - 9 5.56 (1.26) 4 - 8 5.40 (1.72) 3 - 9 
Backwards - SRate 0.69 (0.11) 0.46 - 0.86 0.67 (0.09) 0.50 - 0.81 0.71 (0.11) 0.41 - 0.84 
Verbal Memory  
(domain z scores) 0.788 0.02 (0.61) -1.28 - 0.94 0.13 (0.97) -1.71 - 1.50 -0.15 (0.77) -1.48 - 1.01
CMS Wor   
Learning-SS 7.12 (2.29) 3 - 10 7.94 (4.58) 1 - 15 6.25 (3.24) 2 - 12
Immediate recall-SS 7.88 (2.89) 2 - 11 8.56 (5.06) 2 - 16 7.56 (3.16) 2 - 13 
Delayed recall-SS 9.41 (3.02) 3 - 15 8.88 (4.19) 3 - 17 9.25 (3.13) 3 - 15 
 Delayed 
 recognition-SS 9.94 (2.63) 3 - 11 10.44 (2.06) 3 - 12 9.06 (3.395) 1 - 11 
Visual Memory  
(domain z scores) 0.625 0.27 (0.57) -0.69 - 1.36 -0.12 (0.64) -1.45 - 0.91 -0.17 (0.78) -1.61 - 1.67
CANTAB SRM
SRate 0.83 (0.12) 0.55 - 1.00 0.75 (0.14) 0.45 - 0.95 0.80 (0.14) 0.45 - 0.95
CANTAB PAL
SRate 0.90 (0.09) 0.72 - 1.00 0.85 (0.10) 0.59 - 1 0.84 (0.08) 0.71 - 1.00
CG AREN  
 d prime (accuracy) 
NA ART
1.41 (0.78) -0.95 - 2.17 1.48 (0.55) 0.45 -2.17 1.15 (0.69) -0.45 - 2.17
CG ARE  
 SRate 0.40 (0.17) 0.22 - 0.84 0.30 (0.15) 0.00 - 0.59 0.30 ( 0.24) 0.03 - 1.00 
Spatial Navigation Abilities 
(domain z scores) 
A
















(n = 17) 
Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range 
 Invisible Trial 2  100.22 (67.51) 51.21 - 274.32 147.29 (89.71) 56.55 - 395.57 157.94 (128.26) 51.70 - 471.37 
 Invisible Trial 3  76.90 (55.71) 50.44 - 278.88 77.46 (42.40) 48.02 - 206.78 104.17 (84.71) 49.95 - 336.867 
 Invisible Trial 4  41.43 (30.63) 21.63 - 143.36 67.65 (60.28) 23.08 - 182.65 186.74 (218.77) 25.51 - 789.02 
 Invisible Trial 5  71.05 (19.03) 51.21 - 113.70 114.83 (96.83) 49.76 - 375.81 130.24 (119.05) 50.73 - 528.62 
 Invisible Trial 6  61.71 (15.59) 49.47 - 104.28 103.08 (93.99) 49.47 - 350.58 118.72 (114.29) 50.44 - 419.09 
 Invisible Trial 7  39.95 (30.19) 21.63 - 144.82 118.48 (184.710 21.14 - 591.09 92.26 (71.70) 23.57 - 258.31 
 Invisible Trial 8  56.30 (51.30) 21.34 - 176.33 50.55 (30.73) 22.80 - 112.04 113.17 (207.24) 28.13 - 744.71 
 Probe Trial  44.34 (9.85) 23.50 - 54.28 38.58 (11.09) 11.09 - 52.05 37.74 (13.92) 7.94 - 54.44 
Problem-Solving  
(domain z scores) - 0.32 (0.73) -1.34 - 1.54 -0.22 (1.29) -2.49 - 1.54 -0.12 (0.89) -1.92 - 1.54 
CANTAB SOC        
 SRate  0.74 (0.11) 0.50 - 0.92 0.66 (0.19) 0.33 - 0.92 0.68 (0.13) 0.42 - 0.92 
Inhibition  
(domain z scores) 
EPS
0.686 0.29 (0.58) -0.58 - 1.36 -0.12 (0.48) -1.26 - 0.65 -0.19 (0.47) -1.00 - 0.71 
N  Y-II        
  Naming  
 (SS)  6.88 (3.20) 2 - 12 5.31 (3.44) 1 - 13 5.19 (3.02) 2 - 10 
  Inhibition  
 (SS)  8.47 (2.96 ) 3 - 14 6.44 (2.97) 2 - 12 6.75 (2.60) 2 - 11 
  Switching  
 (SS)  8.47 (4.13) 1 - 15 5.88 (3.22) 1 - 12 5.38 (2.39) 2 - 10 
  Inhibitory  
 control (SS)  10.29 (3.24) 5 - 17 8.25 (3.87) 3 - 15 8.81 (2.46) 5 - 15 
  Cognitive  
 flexibility (SS)  8.94 (4.02) 2 - 15 6.81 (3.37) 2 - 14 6.63 (2.36) 3 - 10 
AGNG        
 Go Target  
 SRate  0.83 (0.10) 0.63 - 0.95 0.85 (0.09) 0.62 - 0.96 0.78 (0.16) 0.40 - 0.99 
  NoGO  
 SRate  0.69 (0.13) 0.46 - 0.90 0.63 (0.15) 0.28 - 0.79 0.66 (0.17) 0.46 - 0.90 
  Reaction time 
 (neutral target)  445.12 (46.19) 367.23 - 540.26 448.90 (59.12) 354.61 - 530.03 460.40 (95.76) 290.17 - 688.05 














(n = 17) 
Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Rule Acquisition and 
Attentional Set-Shift  
(domain z scores) 
0.906 0.24 (0.72) -1.26 - 0.73 -0.16 (0.82) -1.57 - 0.75 -0.09 (0.10) -2.66 - 0.79
CANTAB IED
Stages completed 8.71 (0.69) 7 - 9 8.50 (0.82) 7 - 9 8.50 (0.89) 7 - 9 
Total errors 18.94 (16.69) 9 - 59 27.94 (18.24) 8 - 61 26.50 (22.55) 8 - 74 
 Total errors 
 (Adjusted)  9.59 (9.99) 2 - 29 16.63 (11.95) 1 - 41 13.81 (11.82) 1 - 42 
 Pre-shift errors 
 (stage1-6) 1.18 (3.34) 0 - 14 0.94 (1.84) 0 - 6 2.63 (5.62) 0 - 23 
 Post-shift errors 
 (stage7-8) 8.41 (9.25) 1 - 29 15.69 (10.92) 0 - 37 11.19 (9.25) 1 - 28 
Decision 
Making/Impulisivity 
(domain z scores) 
0.524 -0.07 (0.35) -0.66 - 0.39 0.13 (0.33) -0.32 - 0.78 -0.06 (0.35) -0.69 - 0.70
CANTAB IST (fixed)
SRate 0.84(0.13) 0.50 - 1.00 0.85 (1.21) 0.60 - 1.00 0.86 (0.10) 0.7 - 1.00 












 # of boxes opened 14.94 (3.76) 7.60 - 20.70 16.03 (3.61) 9.90 - 25.00 16.22 (4.63) 9.20 - 24.80 
CANTAB IST 
(descending) 
Success rate 0.69 (0.16) 0.40 - 1.00 0.71 (0.11) 0.50 - 0.90 0.68 (0.13) 0.40 - 0.80 












 # of boxes opened 8.02 (2.90) 4.30 - 15.00 8.11 (2.90) 2.50 - 14.50 7.93 (3.84) 2.80 - 17.50 
CANTAB CGT 
(ascending) 







































(n = 17) 
Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range 
 # of times picked the 
 min colour  2.00 (2.08) 0.00 - 7.00 1.84 (1.69) 0.00 - 5.50 2.88 (1.57) 0.50 - 6.00 
CANTAB CGT 
(descending)        















1873.66 988.09 (291.58) 
543.77 - 
1602.94 
 % staked  81.42 (13.17) 54.03 - 95.00 81.34 (21.03) 15.83 - 94.43 84.15 (11.78) 60.69 - 95.00 
 # of times picked the 
 min colour  0.91 (1.56) 0.00 - 6.50 0.56 (0.70) 0.00 - 2.50 1.41 (1.36) 0.00 - 4.00 
Processing Speed  
(domain z scores) 0.545 0.04 (0.53) -0.68 - 0.93 -0.11 (0.55) -1.03 - 0.77 0.06 (0.49) -1.21 - 0.57 
CG AREN   A ORT        











CANTAB SRM        











CANTAB SOC        











CANTAB IST (fixed)        












(descending)        












(ascending)        
























(n = 17) 
Trauma 
(n = 16) 
PTSD 
(n = 16) 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
CANTAB CGT 
(descending) 












Note. Data presented are Z scores (converted Z scores based on the whole sample, N = 49) for composite domain categories, and scaled  
scores (SS) or raw scores (RS) for individual test measures, unless otherwise stated (e.g., sometimes success rate (SRate) is presented).  
The raw and scaled scores are presented with the average performance of each group’s participants and the standard deviation of their  
performance in parentheses. These raw and scales scored are provided for descriptive purposes only; the Z scores were used in the  
statistical analyses (unless otherwise stated). Cronbach’s standardized α is reported as a measure of composite domain reliability.  
The CG Arena invisible trial data presented are path lengths to the target; the probe trial data presented are the times spent in the target  
quadrant. The CANTAB SOC measures includes the number of problems the articipant solved in the minimum amount of moves  
indicated. The Processing speed measures report the average reaction time for all correct decisions for the ORT and for SRM, and the  
average reaction time for all decisions in the SOC task. The CANTAB IED total errors adjusted is the adjusted score of the raw total  
error score; if a participant failed to complete the test (i.e., did not reach the 9th stage), 25 errors were added to his/her score for each  
stage not completed (this is because each stage has 50 trails and the participant could get 50% right due to chance). All z scores were  











Using these z scores, a series of multiple hierarchical regression analyses were performed 
on the data. More specifically, a separate regression analysis was performed on each of 
the domain z scores. Multiple regression was conducted in order to determine whether 
group membership predicted performance within each domain. All assumptions for 
regression analysis (normality of data, linearity, and homoscedasticity) were met for each 
domain. 
For each regression analysis, a domain z score was the outcome variable and group 
membership, Full scale IQ scores, and sex were hierarchically entered as predictor 
variables. Full Scale IQ score and sex were entered at the first ‘block’ on Step 1 and 
group membership was entered on Step 2. Full Scale IQ and sex were entered first as they 
are predictors known to affect cognitive performance, whereas group membership is an 
unknown predictor we wanted to assess, and therefore was entered second (as suggested 
by Field, 2009). If results showed that group membership significantly predicted 
performance on a certain domain, post-hoc multiple regression analyses were performed 
on each of the individual outcome measures of the tests that made up that domain. As 
with the initial multiple regression analyses, the post-hoc analyses were also performed 
on the outcome measure z scores. 
Descriptive Statistics for Domain Scores 
The mean domain scores presented in Table 10 show that, for the majority of the 
domains, participants in the PTSD group performed the worst out of the three groups, 
with participants in the control group performing the best. These domains were: Working 
Memory, Visual Memory, Spatial Navigation, and Inhibition. In two of the other domains 
(Problem-Solving and Rule Acquisition), participants in the control group still performed 
the best, but in these cases those in the trauma group performed worst. Curiously, in the 
Verbal Memory domain, participants in the PTSD group performed the worst, but those 
in the trauma group performed the best. Lastly, in the domains of Decision-
Making/Impulsivity and Processing Speed (domains which can be seen as theoretically 











of performance were quite different. For the Impulsivity domain, the control participants 
performed the worst, meaning they were the most impulsive, and the trauma participants 
performed the best, i.e. were the least impulsive. (This pattern is however made up of two 
very different patterns for the boys and the girls when viewed separately, an effect which 
is discussed later). For the Processing Speed domain, the trauma participants were the 
slowest and the PTSD participants were the quickest. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Regression Results 
Although the overall regression models for many of the domains were significant, the 
regression analyses indicated that group membership specifically was statistically 
significantly associated with performance in only one of the neuropsychological domains: 
after controlling for Full Scale IQ and the effects of sex differences, group membership 
was significantly related to a decreased performance on tests in the Inhibition domain 
(control vs. trauma: β = -0.290, p < 0.031). The results further showed that the sex of the 
participant alone was not a significant predictor of performance in that domain, β = -
0.052, p = 0.653, but that Full Scale IQ score was a significant predictor, β = 0.576, p < 
0.0001 (i.e. participants with higher Full Scale IQ scores performed better on tests in this 
domain). These results are presented in Table 11. 
 
In this domain, Full Scale IQ score and sex of the participant together accounted for 37 % 
of the variability in performance. Group membership alone (control vs. trauma and 
control vs. PTSD) accounted for 7 % of the variability in performance in Inhibition. The 
overall regression model for Inhibition (with all three independent variables) explained 
44 % of the variability in the data, and was a statistically significant model, F(4,44) = 


















Testing Hypothesis 1: Regression Analysis Results of Significant Neuropsychological 
Domain score. 
Inhibition 
β t p value 
Step 1.
Constant  0.283 0.779
Sex -0.052 -0.436 0.665
IQ: Full Scale 0.618 5.188 0.000*** 
Step 2.
Constant  0.320 0.751 
Sex -0.052 -0.453 0.653
IQ: Full Scale 0.576 4.676 0.000*** 
Group: control vs. trauma -0.290 -2.229 0.031* 
Group: control vs. PTSD -0.191 -1.390 0.172 
Note.∆ = change; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.  
Furthermore, for Step 1: R² = 0.37; ∆ R² for Step 2. = 0.07; For Step 2. R² = 0.44 
F to enter/remove = 2.543 (p = 0.900) 
The decrements in performance associated with group membership (as seen in the step 2 
control vs. trauma factor) in the domain of Inhibition is associated with a relatively 
impaired ability to inhibit one’s automatic responses in favour of new responses, as well 
as a  relatively impaired ability to switch between different response types (i.e. a 
relatively impaired ability to respond when one should and not respond when one 
shouldn’t, and to be able to switch between these response types). 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Overall Regression Models 
The overall regression models (with all three variables: Full Scale IQ, sex, and group 
membership) were statistically significant for the domains of: Working Memory, F(4,44) 











Memory, F(4,44) = 7.471, p < 0.0001 (Full Scale IQ was a significant predictor); Visual 
Memory, F(4,44) = 15.659, p < 0.0001 (Full Scale IQ and sex were significant 
predictors); Spatial Navigation, F(4,44) = 14.402, p < 0.0001 (Full Scale IQ and sex were 
significant predictors); Rule Acquisition , F(4,44) = 5.530, p < 0.0001 (Full Scale IQ was 
a significant predictor); and Inhibition, F(4,44) = 8.549, p < 0.0001 (Full ScaleIQ and 
group membership were significant predictors, as discussed). 
Only the domains of Problem-Solving, Processing Speed, and Decision-
Making/Impulsivity did not have statistically significant models (i.e., none of the 
independent variables significantly predicted the scores in these domains). 











Table 11  


















ß: control vs.trauma. -0.162 0.142 -0.183 -0.154 0.158 -0.290 -0.228 -0.104 0.254 
ß: control vs. PTSD -0.017 0.131 -0.035 -0.147 0.039 -0.191 -0.126 0.128 -0.034 
Model F(4,44) 15.096 7.461 15.659 14.402 5.530 8.549 2.158 1.227 1.388 
Model p-level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.313 0.254 
Step 1 R² 0.555 0.386 0.559 0.545 0.303 0.372 0.125 0.063 0.039 
∆ R² 0.024 0.018 0.028 0.022 0.032 0.065 0.039 0.037 0.073 
Step 2 R² 0.578 0.404 0.587 0.567 0.335 0.437 0.164 0.100 0.112 
F to ent/rem 1.242 0.674 1.514 1.121 1.049 2.543 1.033 0.920 1.819 












The change in R² at step 2 (group membership) is of particular interest, as these values 
speak to practical significance. The increases in multiple R² values range from 0.018 
(Verbal memory), to 0.065 (Inhibition), to 0.073 (Impulsivity, although group 
membership as a predictor was not significant in this domain).  
Furthermore, the beta values (which are standardized correlation coefficients), show that 
when Full Scale IQ scores and sex are held constant, the trauma and PTSD groups both 
perform worse than the control group on five of the domains.  
Testing Hypothesis 1: Post-hoc Regression Results for Individual Test Outcome 
Measures in Inhibition 
Post-hoc multiple regression analysis was performed on the individual test outcome 
measures (specifically, the z-scores) that made up the domain of Inhibition (the only 
domain in the primary regression analyses in which group membership was a statistically 
significant predictor). The individual outcome measures that comprised the Inhibition 
domain were from the Nepsy-II and the AGNG task. The individual outcome measures 
from the Nepsy-II Inhibition subtest were: naming, inhibition, switching, inhibitory 
control, and cognitive flexibility (all scaled score). The dependent measures from the 
AGNG were: Go Target success rate, No-Go success rate, reaction time (for neutral 
targets), and d’ scores).  
Although the overall regression models for many of the outcome measures were 
significant, the regression analyses indicated that, group membership was statistically 
significantly associated with only one of the outcome measures: the measure of switching 
on the NEPSY-II Inhibition subtest. After controlling for Full Scale IQ and the effects of
sex, group membership was significantly related to a decreased performance in switching 
ability (control vs. trauma: β = -0.282, p < 0.038). These results are shown in Table 12. 
The results showed that the sex of the participant alone was not a significant predictor, β
= -0.019, p = 0.872, but that the Full Scale IQ score was a significant predictor,  β = 
0.555, p < 0.0001 (i.e. participants with higher Full Scale IQ scores performed better on 











On the measure of switching in the NEPSY-II Inhibition subtest, Full Scale IQ score and 
the sex of the participant together accounted for 36% of the variability in performance. 
Group membership alone (control vs. trauma and control vs. PTSD) accounted for 6% of 
the variability in performance in the Inhibition domain. The overall regression model for 
switching (with all three independent variables) explained 42% of the variability in the 
data, and was a statistically significant model, F(4,44) = 7.927, p < 0.0001. These results 
are reported in full in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Post-hoc Regression Analysis Results for Significant Individual 
Outcome Measure. 
Switching 
β t p value 
Step 1
Constant  -3.613 0.0009***
Sex -0.019 -0.162 0.872
IQ: Full Scale 0.555 4.434 0.000*** 
Step 2
Constant  0.320 0.751
Sex -0.052 -0.453 0.653
IQ: Full Scale 0.576 4.676 0.000*** 
Group: control vs. trauma -0.282 -2.135 0.038* 
Group: control vs. PTSD -0.198 -1.415 0.164 
Note.∆ = change; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.  
Furthermore, for Step 1: R² = 0.36; ∆ R² for Step 2. = 0.06; For Step 2. R² = 0.42 











Testing Hypothesis 1: Regression Models for Outcome Measures in Inhibition 
The overall regression models (with all three variables: Full Scale IQ, sex, and group 
membership) were significant for the outcome measures: naming, F(4,44) = 3.009, p < 
0.028 (Full Scale IQ was a significant predictor); inhibition, F(4,44) = 4.479, p < 0.004 
(Full Scale IQ was a significant predictor); switching, F(4,44) = 7.927, p < 0.0001 (Full 
Scale IQ and group membership was a significant predictor, as discussed); cognitive 
flexibility, F(4,44) = 4.475, p < 0.004 (Full Scale IQ was a significant predictor); AGNG 
go target success rate, F(4,44) = 3.042, p < 0.027 (Full Scale IQ was a significant 
predictor); and lastly, AGNG go neutral ave RT, F(4,44) = 4.446, p < 0.004 (Full Scale 
IQ and sex were significant predictors). 
The outcome measures of inhibitory control, AGNG NoGo success rate, and AGNG d 
prime did not have statistically significant models (i.e. none of the independent variables 
significantly predicted the scores in these measures). This information is seen in table
form in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Post hoc Regression Model Results for each Outcome Measure in 
Inhibition
Outcome Measure F(4, 44) p Step 1 
R² 
∆ R² Step 2 
R² 
NEPSY-II naming 3.009 0.028 0.190 0.025 0.215 
NEPSY-II inhibition 4.479 0.004 0.227 0.062 0.289 
NEPSY-II switching* 7.927 0.000 0.356 0.063 0.419 
NEPSY-II inhibitory control 2.057 0.103 0.100 0.057 0.158 
NEPSY-II cognitive flexibility 4.475 0.004 0.496 0.043 0.289 
AGNG Go target success rate 3.042 0.027 0.196 0.021 0.217 
AGNG NoGo success rate 1.849 0.137 0.106 0.037 0.144 
AGNG Go neutral ave RT 4.446 0.004 0.290 0.002 0.293 
AGNG d prime 1.007 0.414 0.078 0.006 0.084 











The change in R² at step 2 (group membership) is, once again, of interest. The increases 
in multiple R² values range from as little at 0.002 (AGNG Go neutral ave RT), to 0.063 
(switching). These results suggest that the real world significance of these effects are in 
fact quite small. 
Lastly, a regression equation was constructed using sex of the participant, Full Scale IQ
score, and switching scores as the predictor variables, to predict group membership. The 
final equation was as follows: Group = 0.126 – 0.024 (gender) + 0.005 (Full Scale IQ 
score) – 0.192 switching score (on the Nepsy-II Inhibition subtest). (In this equation 
female: 1, male: 2; trauma exposed: 1, non-trauma control: 0.) 
Hypothesis 1: Summary and Conclusion 
The analyses done in order to test hypothesis 1, showed that trauma was indeed a 
significant factor on performance in at least one cognitive domain, namely Inhibition. 
This confirms hypothesis 1a (adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will, 
regardless of whether they are carrying a PTSD diagnosis or not, perform more poorly 
than non-trauma controls). The patterns of performance suggest that with great a sample 
size this hypothesis could have been confirmed on many more domains (such as 
Processing speed). Hypothesis 1b (of those adolescents who have experienced childhood 
trauma, those with a PTSD diagnosis will perform more poorly) could not be confirmed, 
although the patterns of performance suggest that with greater sample sizes this 
hypothesis could have been confirmed in many of the domains (such as on Working 
memory, Visual memory. Verbal memory and Spatial navigation). 
Testing Hypothesis 2  
The following analyses tested hypothesis 2, namely: on the specific test of Spatial 
navigation: (2a) adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will, regardless of 
whether they are carrying a PTSD diagnosis or not, perform more poorly than non-
trauma controls on hippocampal-dependent cognitive tasks, and (2b) of those 
adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, those with a PTSD diagnosis will 












In order to test this hypothesis, a set of repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried on the 
CG Arena visible and invisible trail data. Following this, a factorial ANOVA was carried 
out on the CG Arena probe trail data. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena, Visible Target Trials 
Data from the visible target trials were analyzed by examining the path length each 
participant took from starting position to the visible target in the virtual room. An 
examination of those data, conducted prior to the inferential statistical analysis, showed 
that the assumption of sphericity (homogeneity of variances) of the data was violated. 
Some of the participants data was therefore dropped by random selection in order to have 
equal cell sizes in each group for both girls and boys (the final sample for this analysis 
was N = 36). This step ensured that the repeated-measures analysis could be conducted 
effectively, even without the assumption of sphericity being met. The descriptive 




























Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena Data for Visible Target Trials for Each Group. 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 
Control group 35.08 (11.70) 33.43 (14.22) 35.98 (14.61) 63.66 (13.33) 60.10 (11.69) 
Girls (n = 6) 42.77 (11.13) 43.05 (14.62) 45.39 (14.35) 73.44 (12.01) 66.89 (13.36) 
Boys (n = 6) 27.40 (5.98) 23.81 (2.99) 26.57 (7.16) 53.88 (4.11) 53.30 (3.36) 
Trauma group 28.97 (17.51) 34.21 (22.87) 36.53 (33.27) 63.40 (22.36) 64.91 (26.44) 
Girls (n = 6) 33.79 (24.57) 42.93 (30.99) 45.07 (46.78) 72.32 (29.94) 74.44 (36.09) 
Boys (n = 6) 24.15 (3.84) 25.50 (2.82) 27.99 (8.47) 55.48 (3.52) 55.38 (4.23) 
PTSD group 32.58 (11.62) 38.27 (14.41) 36.83 (14.54) 66.60 (11.99) 66.96 (16.83) 
Girls (n = 6) 41.73 (9.06) 43.80 (16.55) 47.76 (12.87) 75.89 (9.17) 78.64 (17.03) 
Boys (n = 6) 23.44 (2.00) 32.74 (10.46) 25.90 (3.54) 57.31 (5.01) 55.28 (2.36) 
All participants 32.21 (13.72) 35.30 (17.26) 36.45 (21.94) 64.55 (16.13) 63.99 (18.98) 
Girls (n = 18) 39.43 (16.07) 43.26 (20.64) 46.07 (27.47) 73.88 (18.25) 73.32 (23.36) 
Boys (n = 18) 25.00 (4.38) 27.35 (7.28) 26.82 (6.38) 55.22 (4.29) 54.66 (3.35) 
Note. The data presented here are average length of the path taken from the start position 
in the room to the visible target, with standard deviations in parentheses.  
This task is designed to train participants for the next stage of the CG Arena (i.e., for the 
task presented by the eight invisible target trials), so that previous computer game-
playing and joystick experience is not a factor on those subsequent trials. One would 
expect a large variation in the first trials due to this prior experience, with the variance 
becoming smaller towards the last trials. This pattern of data is expected because one 
would assume that, across trials, all participants would become better at navigating 
through the room to the target, but that no participant would ever find the target in fewer 
than the path length representing the most direct straight-line route from start position to 
target; therefore, there should be a steadily decreasing decrease in variance from the first 
to the last visible target trial.
However, as one can see from the table above, the variation fluctuates greatly, and shows 
no pattern in reduction from the first to the last trial. This could be due to the simple fact 
that the target was in a different location in each trial, and in some later trials, the target 











In order to analyze the data ANOVA with repeated measures was performed. This 
analysis included two between-subjects factors (group membership and sex) and one 
within-subjects factor (trials, which had five levels). Although the assumptions of 
normality of data distribution and independence of observations were upheld, sphericity 
(the assumption of homogenous variances) was violated, as indicated by Mauchly’s test, 
χ2(9) = 19.62, p < 0.02. Greenhouse-Geisser estimates for sphericity were therefore used 
to correct degrees of freedom (є = 0.80). 
 
In terms of the within-subjects effects, there was a significant main effect of trials on the 
dependent variable, length to target, F(4, 120) = 170.69, p < 0.0001. This means that the 
length it took for the participants to find the target depended, in a statistically significant 
manner, on the trial they were completing. None of the within-subjects interaction effects 
were significant: trials x group, F(8, 120) = 1.10, p = 0.369; trials x sex, F(4, 120) = 0.71, 
p = 0.587; trials x group x sex, F(8, 120) = 0.817, p = 0.589. 
 
In terms of the between-subjects effects, there was a significant main effect of sex, F(1, 
30)  = 12.03, p < 0.002. As indicated in Figure 16, this analysis suggests that the girls 
took significantly longer, on average, to find the visible target. Furthermore, the variance 
for the girls’ data is far greater than the variance for the boys’ data. This difference in 
variance was found to be significant using Mauchly’s test of sphericity, Wilks lambda = 

































Figure 16. Visible trials: length to target. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Most importantly, the main effect of group membership (which is graphically presented 
in Figure 17) was not statistically significant, F(2, 30) = 0.122, p = 0.886. The between-
subjects interaction (group x sex) effect was also not statistically significant, F(2, 30) = 
0.020, p = 0.981. As success of this task if not hippocampus-dependent, this non-

































Figure 17. Length to visible target: main effect of group membership. 
Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena, Invisible Target Trials 
Data from the set of CG Arena invisible trials were also analyzed by examining the 
length of each participant’s path, on each trial, from start position to the invisible target in 
the virtual room. Table 15 shows descriptive statistics for performance of participants in 






















Table 15  
Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena Data for Invisible Target Trials for Each Group. 













































































































































































































Note. The Invisible Target trial data presented are average length of the path taken from 
the start position in the room to the visible target, with standard deviations in parentheses.  
This task is designed to test the spatial abilities of the participants as it requires them to 
build a cognitive map of the virtual environment in order to re-locate the invisible target 
(which, recall, is always in the same location) on trials 2 through 8. On trial 1, the 
participants obviously do not know where the target is, and have to find it by searching 
the environment. 
In order to analyze the data, repeated-measures ANOVA was performed. This analysis 
included two between-subjects factors (group membership and sex) and one within-
subjects factor (trials, which had eight levels). The assumptions of normality of data 
distribution and independence of observations were upheld, as was the assumption of 












In terms of the within-subjects effects, there was a significant main effect of trials on the 
dependent variable, path length to target, F(7, 301) = 7.86, p < 0.0001). This statistic 
indicates that the length of the participants’ path from starting position to target varied 
systematically depending on the trial they were completing. In other words, the number 
of steps it took for the participants’ to find the target significantly depended on the trial 
they were on. This result was expected because, as noted above, on the first invisible-
target trial the participants had to find the target by simply walking around the 
environment until they happened upon it. On subsequent trials, because they had been 
told that the target would be in the same place on all trials, they therefore had gained 
information on where to look, and thus were expected to take significantly shorter path 
lengths to the target. Post-hoc comparisons (using Tukey;s HSD test) showed that the 
statistically significant F-value reported above was indeed a product of first-trial 
performance compared to subsequent trials performance. Specifically, trial 1 compared to 
subsequent trials resulted in all significant p values; trial 2: p < 0.025; trial 3: p < 0.0001; 
trial 4: p < 0.0001; trial 5: p < 0.00015; trial 6: p < 0.0001, trial 7: p < 0.0001, trial 8: p < 
0.0001. No other significant differences were seen across any other trials. All the results 
of this post-hoc analysis can be seen in Appendix J. 
 
None of the within-subjects interaction effects were significant: trials x sex, F(7, 301) = 
0.346, p = 0.932); trials x group, F(14, 301) = 1.194, p = 0.279; trials x group x sex, F(14, 
301) = 1.167, p = 0.300. 
 
In terms of the between-subjects effects, there was a significant main effect of sex, F(1, 
43) = 7.74, p < 0.008: Girls took significantly longer, overall, to find the target; means = 
129.783 (standard deviation: 141.343, standard error: 11.228) vs. 78.167 (standard 
deviation: 101.388, standard error: 14.147). 
Of primary importance here is the main effect of group membership, which the analysis 
showed to be statistically significant, F(2, 43) = 3.579, p < 0.036.  Post-hoc analyses 











control and the PTSD group, with participants in the latter group taking significantly 
longer paths to reach the target than those in the former; means = 137.45 (standard 
deviation: 162.275, standard error: 15.879) vs. 74.69 (standard deviation: 68.045, 
standard error: 15.154), p < 0.015. This effect, across all 8 trials, is presented graphically 
in Figure 18.  
 


























Figure 18. Length to invisible target: main effect of group membership. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Although the interaction effect of group x sex was not statistically significant, F(2, 43) = 
1.042, p = 0.362, this interaction is also presented in Figure 19 in order to show the group 
effect when broken down by sex. This figure illustrates that the main group effect is due 




































Figure 19. Length to invisible target: interaction effect between group membership and 
sex. 
Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena, Probe Trial 
As in previous CG Arena studies (Thomas, Laurance, Nadel, and Jacobs, 2010), this trial 
was used to measure the participant’s persistence of search. In other words, through the 
set of invisible-target trials the participant was told the target was always in the same 
place. On this trial (which immediately followed the set of invisible-target trials and was 
formally identical to them), the target was, unbeknownst to the participant, removed from
the room. The participant should therefore spend most of his/her time searching for the 
target in the quadrant of the room where the target was formerly located (i.e., the ‘target 
quadrant’). The dependent variable for this analysis, therefore, is time spent in the 
northwest quadrant (i.e., dwell time). One of the hypotheses that is being tested here is 
that there will be marked sex differences in performance (where a group membership 











controls, and the PTSD participants performing most poorly out of the three groups.) 
Table 16 shows descriptive statistics for performance of participants in the three groups 
for the probe trial. Figure 20 shows the average performance per group across all 
quadrants. 
Table 16 
Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena Data for the Probe Trial for each Group. 
The Probe Trial  
(Average time spent in the 
northwest quadrant) 
Control group 44.34 (9.85) 
Girls (n = 10) 46.52 (9.07) 
Boys (n = 7) 41.22 (10.76) 
Trauma group 38.58 (11.09) 
Girls (n = 10) 37.59 (10.73) 
Boys (n = 6) 40.23 (12.51) 
PTSD group 37.74 (13.92) 
Girls (n = 10) 31.96 (13.42) 
Boys (n = 6) 47.37 (8.91) 
All participants 40.30 (11.84) 
Girls (n = 30) 38.69 (12.42) 
Boys (n = 19) 42.85 (10.69) 
Note. The Probe trial data presented are average time spent in the target quadrant, with 





































Figure 20. Probe Trial: time spent in each quadrant. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Figure 20 shows that, on average, participants in all three groups spent the most time in 
the northwest (target) quadrant. Further, it appears that participants in the control group 
spent the most time in this quadrant, followed by those in the trauma group and then 
those in the PTSD group. 
 
To confirm these impressions statistically, I performed a two-way factorial ANOVA on 
the time spent in the northwest quadrant data. This analysis included two between-
subjects factors (group membership and sex). The assumption of homogeneity of 
variances was not violated, Levene’s test F(5, 43) = 0.69, p = 0.63. 
 
The main effect of group membership was not statistically significant, F(2, 43) = 0.93, p 
= 0.403). The main effect of sex was also not statistically significant, F(1, 43) = 1.71, p = 











significant, F(2, 43) = 3.47, p < 0.040, Adjusted R² = 0.021. The exploration of this 
interaction effect is particularly interesting, and is presented visually in Figure 21. 
 





















Figure 21. Time spent in the northwest quadrant: interaction effect between group 
membership and sex. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
In breaking down the data by group and sex, I found particularly interesting results. The 
girls’ average performance across the three groups followed the same pattern seen in the 
main effect of group membership, however the boys’ average performance across the 
three groups is quite different. As the figure shows, boys in the control and trauma groups 
spent relatively similar amounts of time in the target quadrant, whereas those in the 
PTSD group spent more time in the target quadrant; this result was not expected, but (as 
post-hoc analyses showed) the between-groups comparison was also not statistically 
significant. 
 
Post-hoc analysis (using Tukey’s HSD test) of the interaction effect indicated that there 
was a between-group difference approaching significance when comparing male and 
female PTSD participants, with the former spending substantially longer times in the 











were also a difference approaching significance between the female control group and the 
female PTSD group; means 46.52 (9.07) vs. 31.86 (13.42), p < 0.055. All the results of 
this post-hoc analysis can be seen in Appendix K. 
 
Adjusted R² suggests that 13% of the variability in this data is explained by group x sex 
(multiple R² = 22%). Furthermore 2% of the variability in this data is explained by just 
group membership. These results show that the real world effect of group membership is 
quite small. These results show that the girls in the sample were affect by PTSD, whereas 
the boys were not. This confirms our predictions on the sex differences that would be 
presented in Spatial Navigation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Summary and Conclusion 
The analyses done in order to test hypothesis 2, showed that having a diagnosis of PTSD 
was indeed a significant factor on performance Spatial navigation. The analyses tended 
to support hypothesis 2b (those adolescents with a PTSD diagnosis will perform most 
poorly). Hypothesis 2a (adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will, 
regardless of whether they are carrying a PTSD diagnosis or not, perform more poorly 
than non-trauma controls) could not be confirmed, as the trauma group’s performance 
was not statistically different from the control group. Interestingly, the predictions on 
sex differences in this cognitive domain proved correct (i.e. an group effect was seen in 
the girls performance, whereas it was not seen in the boys performance.) 
 
Testing Hypothesis 3 
The following analyses tested hypothesis 3, namely, on the specific test of information-
processing bias, adolescents with a diagnosis of PTSD will show a bias toward threat-
related stimuli (i.e., they will show faster reaction times on tasks where such stimuli are 
targets, but will show slower reaction times on tasks where such stimuli are distracters); 
participants in the control group, in contrast, will show a bias toward positive-valence 
stimuli (i.e., they will show faster reaction times on tasks where such stimuli are targets, 
but will show slower reaction times on tasks where such stimuli are distracters). It is 











group. The performance of this group is included in order to get a picture of their 
performance compared to the PTSD and the control group, not to test a specific 
hypothesis. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, a set of repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried on the 
Affective Go/No-Go task data, specifically the NoGo data and GoTarget data. Following 
this, a factorial ANOVA was carried out on the AGNG response bias (β) data. 
 
Affective Go/No-Go Task: Emotional Information-Processing Biases 
This task is designed to assess inhibition as well as possible biases that participants 
exhibit for processing information for different emotions. The analysis that follows looks 
specifically at the data related to information-processing biases (the inhibition data were 
analyzed as part of regression analyses described earlier).  
 
The information-processing biases data from the AGNG were analyzed by looking six 
outcome measures: the average No-Go error rates for each of the three emotional 
conditions; the average reaction times for each of the two target emotions; and the Beta 
coefficients (which, as noted earlier, assess possible response bias; that is, they measure 
the tendency to either hit a target key too often or not often enough). Due to incomplete 
data sets and corrections made to maintain statistical assumptions, some of the 
participants’ data had to be removed before the analyses described below could be 
completed. This strategy resulted in different sample sizes for each analysis, and 
therefore the descriptive statistics for analysis are presented in separate tables.  
 
Testing Hypothesis 3: Affective Go/NoGo Task, No-Go Data 
Table 17 shows the No-Go performance of participants in the three groups (N = 47), 
separated by sex. The three No-Go conditions were: Fear (fearful distractors with neutral 
targets); Happy (happy distractors with fearful targets); and Neutral (neutral distractors 















Testing Hypothesis 3: AGNG NoGo Data  
 Fear Happy Neutral 
Control 0.34 (0.13) 0.31 (0.16) 0.29 (0.18) 
Girls (n=10) 0.36 (0.12) 0.29 (0.13) 0.25 (0.18) 
Boys (n=7) 0.31 (0.14) 0.34 (0.21) 0.35 (0.19) 
Trauma 0.32 (0.14) 0.36 (0.10) 0.32 (0.21) 
Girls (n=9) 0.31 (0.13) 0.38 (0.10) 0.28 (0.23) 
Boys (n=5) 0.34 (0.18) 0.34 (0.11) 0.39 (0.17) 
PTSD 0.32 (0.19) 0.39 (0.20) 0.30 (0.23) 
Girls (n=10) 0.29 (0.22) 0.33 (0.18) 0.23 (0.20) 
Boys (n=6) 0.38 (0.13) 0.51 (0.17) 0.44 (0.23) 
All 0.33 (0.15) 0.35 (0.16) 0.30 (0.20) 
Girls (n=29) 0.32 (0.16) 0.33 (0.14) 0.25 (0.20) 
Boys (n=18) 0.34 (0.14) 0.39 (0.18) 0.39 (0.19) 
Note. Data presented are average error rates for each emotional condition, with standard 
deviations in parentheses.  
 
To analyze these data, repeated-measures ANOVA was performed. This analysis 
included two between-subjects factors (group membership and sex) and one within-
subjects factor (emotional condition, which had three levels). The assumptions of 
normality and independence of observations were upheld, as was that of sphericity (the 

































Figure 22. Average NoGo error rates across groups for each emotional condition. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 22 shows average No-Go performance broken down by group and by emotional 
condition. Although it appears that participants in the three groups performed in quite a 
different pattern across the three emotional conditions, the statistical analysis showed that 
none of the main effects or the interaction effects were significant: emotional condition, 
F(2, 41) = 1.19, p = 0.31; sex, F(1, 41) = 3.36, p = 0.07; group, F(2, 41) = 0.40, p = 0.67; 
sex x group, F(2,41) = 1.05, p = 0.36; emotional condition x sex, F(2,41) = 2.28, p = 0.11; 
emotional condition x group, F(4, 41) = 0.73, p = 0.58; emotional condition x group x sex, 
F(4, 41) = 0.44, p = 0.78. There were, therefore, no statistically significant differences in 
the patterns of performances across groups for the No-Go conditions. This means that the 
three groups responded in much the same way no matter what emotion the distractor 
faces were. There was no significant response biases across the different emotions. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 3: Affective Go/NoGo Task, Go Data 
An examination of the data, conducted prior to the analysis, showed that, for these data, 











therefore dropped by random selection, in order to have equal cell sizes in each group for 
both girls and boys. This step ensured that the repeated-measures analysis could be 
conducted effectively, even without the assumption sphericity being met.  
 
Table 18 shows the Go performance of participants in the three groups (N = 36), 
separated by sex. The two Go-Target conditions were: Fear (fearful targets with both 
neutral and happy distractors); and Neutral (neutral targets with fearful distractors). 
 
Table 18 
Testing Hypothesis 3: AGNG Go-Target Data 
 Fear Neutral 
Control 436.51 (53.66) 438.90 (45.64) 
Girls (n=6) 451.91 (71.10) 456.62 (50.27) 
Boys (n=6) 421.12 (26.67) 421.18 (36.08) 
Trauma 433.06 (47.57) 450.08 (63.48) 
Girls (n=6) 453.73 (52.80) 479.49 (59.19) 
Boys (n=6) 412.40 (34.16) 420.66 (57.32) 
PTSD 440.34 (73.75) 436.05 (92.40) 
Girls (n=6) 471.10 (91.05) 477.01 (109.51) 
Boys (n=6) 409.58 (37.47) 395.09 (52.59) 
All 436.64 (57.75) 441.68 (68.13) 
Girls (n=18) 458.91 (69.45) 471.04 (73.57) 
Boys (n=18) 414.36 (31.48) 412.31 (48.16) 
Note. Data presented are average reaction time for each target emotion, with standard 












































Figure 23. Average reaction time for each target emotion across the three groups. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 23 shows average Go-Target performance broken down by group, sex, and 
emotional condition. In order to analyze this data set, repeated-measures ANOVA 
performed. This analysis included two between-subjects factors (group membership and 
sex) and one within-subjects factor (Go-Target emotional condition, which had two 
levels, fear and neutral). The assumptions of normality and independence of observations 
were upheld, but, as discussed earlier, the assumption of sphericity was not upheld for 
this data set. 
 
As Figure 23 shows, on average, participants in all of the sub-groups (except for the 
control boys sub-group) performed slightly differently on each Go-Target condition. 
However, the statistical analysis showed that only sex had a significant effect on reaction 
time, F(1,30) = 7.05, p < 0.013, with the boys performing particularly faster than the 
girls, regardless of emotional condition). All the other effects were not statistically 











0.98; sex x group, F(2,30) = 0.33, p = 0.72; emotional condition x sex, F(1,30) = 1.39, p 
= 0.25; emotional condition x group, F(2, 30) = 1.09, p = 0.35; emotional condition x 
group x sex, F(2, 30) = 0.16, p = 0.85. . This means that the three groups responded in 
much the same way no matter what emotion the target faces were. There was no 
significant response biases, in terms of response time for the different target emotions. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 3: Affective Go/NoGo Task, Beta 
The last set of AGNG data that were analyzed involved the Beta coefficient, which, as 
described above, measures response bias.  Table 19 shows the average Beta coefficient  
(β) for the entire sample (N = 49) and for each group, separated by sex.  
 
Table 19 
Testing Hypothesis 3: AGNG Response Bias Data  
 Beta (β) 
Control -0.38 (0.45) 
    Girls (n=10) -0.42 (0.45) 
    Boys (n=7) -0.32 (0.48) 
Trauma -0.50 (0.37) 
    Girls (n=10) -0.53 (0.43) 
    Boys (n=6) -0.45 (0.26) 
PTSD -0.33 (0.77) 
    Girls (n=10) 0.04 (0.50) 
     Boys (n=6) -0.95 (0.77) 
All -0.40 (0.55) 
    Girls (n=30) -0.30 (0.51) 
    Boys (n=19) -0.56 (0.58) 
Note. Data presented are average Beta coefficients, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
 
To investigate the presence of between-group differences and interaction effects, these 
data were analyzed by means of a two-way factorial ANOVA. This analysis included two 
between-subjects factors (group membership and sex). The assumptions of normality and 
of homogeneity of variances were not violated for this data set (Levene’s test,  F(5,43) = 












The analysis showed that there were no statistically significant main effects (group, F(2, 
43) = 0.25, p = 0.78; sex, F(1, 43) = 3.51, p = 0.07). There was, however, a statistically
significant group x sex interaction effect, F(2, 43) = 6.00, p < 0.005. This interaction is
presented graphically in Figure 24.




















Figure 24. AGNG Beta: interaction between group membership and sex. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.
Post-hoc analysis of the interaction effect indicated significant differences between 
participants in the boy girl PTSD groups (p < 0.005), with boys being far more biased 
toward hitting the target key often (β = -0.95); girls showed a smaller bias, which was 
interestingly in the opposite direction (β =  0.04). This means that the boys in the PTSD 
group were most biases in their responses, as they tended to just hit the response hit as 
much as possible. Conversely, the girls in the PTSD group were least biased, as they did 












There were no other statistically significant between-group difference, i.e. there were no 
sex differences across the groups (control, trauma, and PTSD).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Summary and Conclusion 
The analyses done in order to test hypothesis 3 (on the specific test of information-
processing bias, adolescents with a diagnosis of PTSD will show a bias toward threat-
related stimuli, whereas participants in the control group, in contrast, will show a bias 
toward positive-valenced stimuli), showed that having a diagnosis of PTSD did not 
affect information-processing biases. The analyses therefore did not support the 
hypothesis. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 4 
The analyses that follow tested hypothesis 4, namely: in the group of adolescents who 
have experienced childhood trauma, poorer performance on the general 
neuropsychological test battery will be positively correlated with (a) a longer time since 
the traumatic experience; (b) a greater number of post-traumatic symptoms (e.g., more 
avoidance, more numbing, more hyperarousal, more hypervigilance); (c) a higher level of 
symptom severity; and (d) a greater level of overall functional impairment. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, a set multiple hierarchical regression analyses were 
carried out on the trauma and PTSD participants data from the MINI KID 5.0 and the 
PDS. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 4: Multiple Regression of Trauma and PTSD Data 
A set of hierarchical multiple regression analyses was performed using the 
neuropsychological domain z score data from the trauma and the PTSD participants (n = 
32) as outcome variables, and characteristics of the trauma and participant’s response to 
the trauma (as measured by the MINI KID 5.0 and the PDS) as predictor variables. These 
analyses were conducted, therefore, in order to assess the possible effects of the 











whether the perpetrator was a stranger, if applicable), and the participant’s response to 
the trauma (such as the number of symptoms experienced and the severity of the 
symptoms) on the participants’ neuropsychological test performance. This analysis did 
not include group membership as a predictor variable, as it is the data from the 
participant’s response to the trauma that directly determined group membership. Once 
again, Full Scale IQ and the sex of the participant were entered at the first step of the 
regression; all the other variables were entered at the second step. This strategy was used 
in order to ascertain the effects of these variables after controlling for the effects of 
participant Full Scale IQ score and sex. 
 
The independent variable of perpetrator (i.e., whether the perpetrator was a stranger or 
was known to the participant as the time of the trauma) was only applicable to twenty of 
the participants. Therefore, a separate set of regression analyses were performed to 
investigate whether this factor was statistically significantly associated with fluctuations 
in neuropsychological test performance. The results showed that this variable was not a 
significant predictor for performance any of the domains (p values ranged from 0.41 to 
0.92, multiple R² ranged from 0.0002% to 0.02%, and β scores ranged from -0.0169 to 
0.161.). The full set of results can be seen in Appendix L. 
 
The final independent variables in the primary analysis on trauma characteristics and 
repsonses were: 
Step 1: participant sex and Full Scale IQ score;  
Step 2: Number of months since trauma; avoidance and numbing symptom score (derived 
from score on MINI KID 5.0, PTSD section, question 4); hyperarousal/ hypervigilance 
symptom score (derived from score on MINI KID 5.0, PTSD section, question 5); level 
of impairment, number of symptoms, and symptom severity (all as measured by the 
PDS). 
 
The results showed that after controlling for the effects of sex and Full Scale IQ, two 
domains were significantly affected by at least one of the other factors (i.e., those added 











Testing Hypothesis 4: Two Domains Significantly Affected by one of the Step 2 Variables 
In the domain of Decision-making/impulsivity, MINI KID Question 5 scores were 
significantly associated with performance, β = 1.009, p < 0.013. All the step 2 variables 
together (separate from Full Scale IQ score and sex) accounted for 31 % of the variability 
of performance in Decision-making/impulsivity. The overall regression model (with all 
independent variables) was not statistically significant fit, F(8, 23) = 1.521, p = 0.204. 
 
In the domain of Processing speed, MINI KID question 5 scores were significantly 
associated with performance, β = -1.320, p < 0.003. All the step 2 variables together 
(separate from Full Sclae IQ score and sex) accounted for 32 % of the variability of 
performance in Processing speed. The overall regression model (with all independent 
variables) was however, not a statistically significant fit, F(8, 23) = 1.921, p = 0.105. 
 
Seven of the domains were not significantly associated with any one of the  factors 
entered at step 2 of the analysis (i.e., with any one of the trauma characteristics/response 
to trauma variables): 
(1) In the domain of Visual memory, only Full Scale IQ score was a significant factor; 
however, 12 % of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained 
by trauma characteristics/response to trauma variables factors alone. The overall 
model for Visual memory was statistically significant, F(8, 23) = 5.740, p < 
0.0001. 
(2) In the domain of Working memory, only Full Scale IQ score was a significant 
factor, and only 4% of the variability in test performance in this domain was 
explained by trauma characteristics/response to trauma variables factors alone. 
The overall model for Working memory was statistically significant, F(8,23) = 
4.418, p < 0.003. 
(3) In the domain of Verbal memory, only Full Scale IQ score was a significant 
factor, although 14% of the variability in test performance in this domain was 
explained by trauma characteristics/response to trauma variables factors alone. 
The overall model for Verbal memory was statistically significant, F(8,23) = 











(4) In the domain of Spatial navigation, only Full Scale IQ score was a significant 
factor, although 11% of the variability in test performance in this domain was 
explained by trauma characteristics/response to trauma variables factors alone. 
The overall model for Spatial navigation was statistically significant, F(8,23) = 
6.984, p < 0.0001. 
(5) In the domain of Inhibition, only Full Scale IQ score was a significant factor, 
although 15% of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained 
by trauma characteristics/response to trauma variables factors alone. The overall 
model for Inhibition was statistically significant, F(8,23) = 2.557, p < 0.037. 
(6) In the domain of Rule acquisition, only Full Scale  
(7) Full Scale IQ score was a significant factor, although 13% of the variability in test 
performance in this domain was explained by trauma characteristics/response to 
trauma variables factors alone. The overall model for Rule acquisition approached 
statistical significance, F(8,23) = 2.327, p < 0.054. 
(8) In the domain of Problem-solving, there were no significant factors, and only 7% 
of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained by trauma 
characteristics/response to trauma variables factors alone. The overall model for 
problem-solving was not statistically significant, F(8,23) = 0.801, p < 0.608. 
 




























Testing Hypothesis 4: Trauma and PTSD Regression R² Results for each Neurocognitive 
Domain. 
Step 1 R² ∆ R² Step 2 R² F to enter/remove p-level
Working memory 0.549 0.042 0.591 0.392 0.876 
Verbal memory 0.458 0.141 0.600 1.354 0.274 
Visual memory 0.545 0122 0.666 1.396 0.258 
Spatial navigation 0.603 0.105 0.708 1.383 0.263 
Rule acquisition 0.319 0.129 0.447 0.891 0.517 
Inhibition 0.319 0.152 0.471 1.097 0.394
Problem-solving 0.144 0.074 0.218 0.363 0.895
Processing speed 0.079 0.321 0.400 2.055 0.099 
Decision-making/Impulsivity 0.039 0.307 0.346 1.799 0.144 
Lastly, it must be noted that although “months since trauma” was not a significant factor 
in any of the domains, the β coefficients of this factor in most of the domains suggested 
that the length of time since trauma was negatively correlated with performance, 
Working memory: β = -0.108, p = 0.560, Verbal memory: β = -0.235, p = 0.206, Spatial 
navigation: β = -0.065, p = 0.676; Rule acquisition: β = -0.023, p = 0.916; Inhibition: β = 
-0.031, p = 0.576; Problem-solving: β = -0.202, p = 0.433; Processing speed: β = -0.074, 
p = 0.740; Impulsivity: β = -0.131, p = 0.576. This suggests that the more time that had 
passed since the trauma the poorer performance in these domains. (Only Visual memory 
resulted in a positive correlation, β = 0.106, p = 0.526.) 
Hypothesis 4: Summary and Conclusion 
The analyses done in order to test hypothesis 4 (namely, that poorer performance on the 
general neuropsychological test battery would be positively correlated with increased 
severity and number of symptoms as well as level of impairment and length since 
trauma), confirmed that specifically, number of symptoms were significant predictors on 
two domains (Processing speed and Decision-making/impulsivity). Moreover, the effect 
sizes indicate that all the factors assessed accounted for a good portion of the variability 













Testing Effects of Personal Characteristics and Traumatic Events  
A last set of hierarchical multiple regression analyses was performed in order to assess 
the possible associations between the participants’ personal characteristics and traits, as 
well as the effects of traumatic events, as reported by CTQ-SF, on the 
neuropsychological test performance. The personal characteristics and traits measured 
here were: general anxiety (as measured by the STAI Trait), perceived everyday stress (as 
measured by the LEQ), approach avoidance/withdrawal tendencies (as measures by the 
PANAS), and resiliency (as measured by the CD-RISC). As these variables are 
significantly correlated with group membership, both theoretically and statistically 
(correlations ranged from -0.01 to 0.52), these regression analyses did not include group 
membership as a factor.  
 
The independent variables in this analysis, in the order in which they were entered into 
the regression equation, were: 
Step 1: participant sex and Full Scale IQ score;  
Step 2: LEQ score (past 6 months) and LEQ score (more than 6 months ago); 
Step 3: CTQ-SF Emotional Abuse, Physical Abuse, Sexual Abuse, Emotional Neglect, 
and Physical Neglect index scores 
Step 4: PANAS positive score, PANAS negative score 
Step 5: STAI Trait score 
Step 6: CD-RISC score 
 
In the analyses, Full Scale IQ and sex of the participant were entered on the first step of 
the regression, and the other independent variables (personal characteristics and traits) 
were entered on the next steps. This strategy was adopted in order to ascertain the effects 
of these latter variables after controlling for the effects of Full Scale IQ and sex. The 
personal characteristics and trait variables were grouped together and ordered in the 












The regression results showed that after controlling for the effects of sex of the 
participant and Full Scale IQ scores, three domains were significantly affected by at least 
one of the other factors (i.e., the personality characteristics and trait variables included at 
steps 2, 3, 4, 5 and/or 6 of the analysis). 
 
The Three Domains Significantly Affected by One of the Step 2 to 6 Variables 
In the domain of Spatial navigation, STAI Trait scores were significantly associated with 
test performance, β = 0.490, p < 0.037. All of the personal characteristics and trait 
variables together (steps 2 to 6), separate from Full Scale IQ and sex, accounted for 12% 
of the variability in performance on Spatial navigation tasks. The overall regression 
model (i.e., that including all independent variables) was a statistically significant fit, 
F(13, 35) = 5.3203, p < 0.0004. (It is worth noting here that Full Scale IQ score was, by 
itself, also a significant predictor). 
 
In the domain of Problem-solving, PANAS negative scores (avoidance/withdrawal 
tendencies) were significantly associated with test performance, β = -0.147, p < 0.016. 
All of the personal characteristics and trait variables together (steps 2 to 6), separate from 
Full Scale IQ and sex, accounted for 37% of the variability in performance on Problem-
solving tasks. The overall regression model (i.e., that including all independent variables) 
was a statistically significant fit, F(13, 35) = 2.626, p < 0.012. (Again, it is worth noting 
here that the sex of the participant was, by itself, also a significant predictor). 
 
In the domain of Rule acquisition, PANAS positive scores (approach tendencies) were 
significantly associated with test performance, β =0.411, p < 0.032. All of the personal 
characteristics and trait variables together (steps 2 to 6), separate from Full Scale IQ and 
sex, accounted for 18% of the variability in performance on Rule-acquisition tasks. The 
overall regression model (i.e., that including all independent variables) was a statistically 
significant fit, F(13, 35) = 2.516, p < 0.015. (Once again, it is worth noting here that Full 












Six of the domains were not significantly associated with any one of the personal 
characteristics and trait factors: 
(1) Working memory was only significantly predicted by Full Scale IQ scores and the sex 
of the participant, and only 4% of the variability in test performance in this domain was 
explained by the personal characteristics and trait factors together (separate from Full 
Sclae IQ and sex). The overall model for Working memory was statistically significant, 
F(13,35) = 3.886, p < 0.0007. 
(2) Verbal memory was only significantly predicted by Full Scale IQ scores, although 
18% of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained by the personal 
characteristics and trait factors together (separate from Full Scale IQ and sex). The 
overall model for Verbal memory was statistically significant, F(13,35) = 3.444, p < 
0.002. 
(3) Visual memory was only significantly predicted by Full Scale IQ scores, although 12 
% of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained by the personal 
characteristics and trait factors together (separate from Full Scale IQ and sex). The 
overall model for Visual memory was statistically significant, F(13,35) =5.610, p < 
0.00002. 
(4) Inhibition was only significantly predicted by Full Scale IQ scores, although 12% of 
the variability in test performance in this domain was explained by the personal 
characteristics and trait factors together (separate from Full Scale IQ and sex). The 
overall model for Inhibition was significant, F(13,35) = 2.602, p < 0.012). 
(5) Processing speed was not significantly predicted by any of the factors, and only 6% 
of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained by the personal 
characteristics and trait factors together (separate from Full Scale IQ and sex). The 
overall model for Processing speed was not statistically significant, F(13,35) = 0.359. p = 
0.974. 
(6) Decision-making/impulsivity was not significantly predicted by any of the factors, 
although 15% of the variability in test performance in this domain was explained by the 
personal characteristics and trait factors together (separate from Full Scale IQ and sex). 
The overall model for Decision-making/impulsivity was not statistically significant, 












The effect sizes associated with the statistics reported in these analyses are presented in 
Table 21. The change in R² at each step (and the corresponding F to enter/remove and p 
values) in the regression analyses is reported in Table 22. 
 
Table 21 
Testing Effects of Personal Characteristics and Traumatic Events: Regression R² Results 
for each Domain 
 Step 1 R² 
(IQ and sex) 
Overall ∆ R² 
(Steps 2 to 6) 
Final R² 
Working memory 0.555 0.036 0.591 
Verbal memory 0.386 0.176 0.561 
Visual memory 0.559 0.117 0.676 
Spatial navigation 0.545 0.119 0.664 
Rule acquisition 0.303 0.180 0.483 
Inhibition 0.372 0.119 0.491 
Problem-solving 0.125 0.369 0.494 
Processing speed 0.063 0.055 0.118 






























Step 2 ∆ R² 0.004 0.033 0.041 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.090 0.014 0.089 
F to enter/ 
remove 0.175 1.249 2.274 1.656 1.022 0.830 2.532 0.330 2.236 
p-level 0.840 0.297 0.115 0.203 0.368 0.443 0.091 0.721 0.119 
Step 3 ∆ R² 0.016 0.069 0.034 0.035 0.042 0.045 0.098 0.035 0.037 
F to enter/ 
remove 0.286 1.056 0.725 0.714 0.530 0.633 1.108 0.306 0.342 
p-level 0.918 0.399 0.609 0.617 0.752 0.676 0.372 0.907 0.884 
Step 4 ∆ R² 0.010 0.045 0.012 0.007 0.060 0.012 0.104 0.002 0.022 
F to enter/ 
remove 0.434 1.782 0.642 0.317 1.973 0.414 3.286 0.041 0.499 
p-level 0.651 l.183 0.532 0.731 0.153 0.664 0.049* 0.960 0.611 
Step 5  R² 0.004 0.006 0.028 0.040 0.041 0.004 0.020 0.004 <0.001 
F to enter/ 
remove 
0.338 0.465 3.143 4.227 2.791 0.250 1.295 0.178 0.001 
p-level 0.565 0.500 0.085 0.047* 0.103 0.620 0.263 0.676 0.982 
Step 6∆ R² 0.003 0.022 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.035 0.057 <0.001 0.004 
F to enter/ 
remove 
0.277 1.743 0.083 0.536 0.426 2.409 3.953 0.0002 0.174 
p-level 0.602 0.195 0.775 0.469 0.518 0.130 0.055 0.990 0.679 
Note. Step 2: LEQ scores; Step 3: CTQ-SF scores; Step 4: PANAS scores; Step 5: STAI Trait scores, and Step 6: CD-RISC scores. 











As shown in Table 22, only two of the steps (from step 2 to 6) in two domains added 
statistically significantly to the fit of the model. These significant steps were in the 
domains of: 
(1) Problem-solving: Step 4 (PANAS scores) was a statistically significant step:
change in R²= 0.104, F to enter/remove = 3.286, p < 0.049; and
(2) Spatial navigation: Step 5 (STAI Trait scores) was a statistically significant step:
change in R²= 0.040, F to enter/remove = 4.227, p < 0.047.
Other Analyses: Summary and Conclusion 
The analyses done in order to test the effects of personal characteristics and traumatic 
events (as assessed by the CTQ-SF), showed that higher general anxiety was associated 
with poorer performance on Spatial navigation tasks, higher withdrawal tendencies was 
associated with poorer Problem-solving abilities, and lastly that higher approach 













This study aimed to explore the effects that childhood trauma has on adolescents’ 
neuropsychological functioning, and to explore whether the diagnosis of PTSD allows 
for unique predictions about that domain of functioning, over and above predictions 
made on the basis of trauma exposure alone. In so doing, the research explored the 
effects that the characteristics of the trauma, the individual’s response to the trauma, and 
the personal characteristics of the individual, have on neuropsychological functioning in 
adolescents. Additionally, this study sought to provide a profile of test performance that 
can be used to distinguish victims of trauma. The neuropsychological profile of trauma 
victims will be discussed by exploring the performance exhibited by participants in the 
three groups, with the eventual aim of identifying a subset of tests that can be used to 
distinguish those exposed to trauma from those with no such exposure. The statistical 
analyses provided some important information which will be discussed in terms of these 
aims. Furthermore, the discussion of data obtained in the current study will attempt to 
provide some clarity with regard to the discrepancies and gaps seen in the previously 
published literature.  
 
There were four specific hypotheses that were investigated in the current study: 
Hypothesis 1: on the general neuropsychological test battery: adolescents who have 
experienced childhood trauma will perform more poorly than non-trauma controls, and 
of those adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, those with a PTSD 
diagnosis will perform more poorly: Hypothesis 2: on the specific test of Spatial 
navigation: adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma will perform more 
poorly than non-trauma controls, and of those adolescents who have experienced 
childhood trauma, those with a PTSD diagnosis will perform more poorly: Hypothesis 3: 
On the specific test of information-processing bias, adolescents with a diagnosis of 
PTSD will show a bias toward threat-related stimuli whereas participants in the control 
group will show a bias toward positive-valence stimuli: Hypothesis 4: In the group of 
adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma, poorer performance on the general 
neuropsychological test battery will be positively correlated with increased severity and 











Furthermore, it is predicted than on many of the tests, there will be marked sex 
differences in the effects that trauma exposure and PTSD has on performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Effects of Trauma and PTSD on Performance in the Test 
Battery 
The various statistical analyses conducted here showed that group membership had a 
significant effect on performance in only one of the composite cognitive domains: 
Inhibition (a prefrontal cortex-dependent task). 
 
Cognitive Domains Affected 
Regression analyses demonstrated that group membership was associated with poorer 
performance on the tests in Inhibition. In neuropsychological terms, inhibition is a 
cognitive ability that is generally included under the rubric of executive functioning; in 
neural terms, the cognitive processes that describe inhibition are subserved by the 
prefrontal cortex. 
 
Within the group of tests included in the domain of Inhibition, there were particularly 
strong between-group differences on the switching task in the Inhibition subtest of the 
NEPSY-II. Specifically, participants in both the PTSD group and in the trauma group 
performed considerably more poorly than those in the control group. However, in both 
the overall domain of Inhibition and the individual test of switching, this significant 
effect was specifically seen in the performance of the trauma group (the control vs. 
trauma factor). 
 
 (As one of the aims of this study was to provide a profile to distinguish victims of trauma 
from people who had not experienced trauma based on neuropsychological test 
performance, it is important to note that these results suggest that the test of switching 
would provide the most reliable prediction. The equation for this prediction is seen in the 
in the testing of Hypothesis 2: post-hoc regression analysis of individual outcome 












The results of our analyses on Inhibition, namely a significant group membership factor 
for the trauma participants, confirmed the a priori hypothesis that participants in the 
trauma group would perform more poorly than those in the control group on tasks 
dependent on prefrontal cortex function. The data did not confirm the hypotheses stating 
that participants in the PTSD group would perform significantly more poorly than those 
in the trauma group, or more poorly than all other participants. 
 
The association between trauma exposure and poorer performance on tests of Inhibition, 
in previously published literature is not clear; the few studies in this research area that 
have examined performance on tests of Inhibition have reported some conflicting results. 
For example, Braunstein-Bercovitz, Dimentman-Ashkenazi, and Lubow (2001) found 
significant differences in response inhibition performance of people experiencing stress 
versus that of controls, whereas Kanagaratnam and Abjorsen (2007) found no such 
differences. Both of those studies, however, were conducted with adult participants. 
 
The results of the overall primary regression models suggested that the trauma group did 
worse than the PTSD group (as seen in the standardized β coefficients, and in the fact that 
the performance of PTSD participants was not significantly different to that of control 
participants, as seen in the non-significant PTSD group factor). However the overall 
regression models controlled for Full Scale IQ scores and sex of the participant and 
consequently the final results suggest a different pattern of performance compared to the 
raw data.  
 
If one looks solely at the average Inhibition domain scores (as well as the average 
switching scores), as seen in Table 9, the PTSD group did in fact perform worse than the 
trauma group. This pattern of performance lends support for the a priori hypothesis 
which predicted that participants with PTSD participants would perform worse than all 
other participants, and suggests that with a larger sample this hypothesis would be 
confirmed. This discussion applies to both the overall domain of Inhibition as well as to 












Of most importance in assessing the effects of group membership on performance, are the 
effect sizes of group membership in the analyses, which provides a measure of practical 
significance. Group membership (both group membership factors together) accounted for 
6.5% of the variability in Inhibition; a relatively modest proportion of the variance is thus 
explained by group membership. Similarly, group membership accounted for 6.3% of the 
variability in switching task. 
It is important to note, that although not many domains in the analyses returned 
significant group membership results, Inhibition, and specifically cognitive flexibility (an 
ability which the Nepsy-II Inhibition subtest measures), is considered by some 
researchers to be the core feature of intact executive function (Goldstein, 1990). 
Furthermore, is important to note that response inhibition is subserved by the ventral 
region of the PFC. These results of this study therefore suggest that it is this region in the 
PFC that is most affected by trauma. 
This association between a history of trauma exposure and poorer performance on tests of 
executive functioning (such as the test of Inhibition) is consistent with previous research 
on neuropsychological deficits in adults with a history of trauma exposure (e.g., 
Roozendaal, Jayme, & McGaugh, 2004; Weber and Reynolds, 2004), and provides 
supports for the theoretical framework built upon data from neuroimaging studies 
examining the effects of stress on the PFC (Roozendaal, Jayme, & McGaugh, 2004). 
Furthermore, the current data in this regard are consistent with those from similar 
research done on adolescent samples: Beers and De Bellis (2002) found deficits in 
executive functioning (although the deficits found were specifically in Attention, 
Semantic organization, and Problem-solving). The current study could not, however, 
replicate the exact findings of Beers and De Bellis (2002). 
Cognitive Domains Not Affected 
Although Semantic organization was not assessed in this study, Problem-solving was 
assessed in this study. In the domain of Problem-solving the control participants did 











Problem-solving success rates and domain scores, as well as the Beta standardized 
coefficients for the group membership factors in the regression results). These results 
suggest that a larger sample size would lead to significant findings in this domain, 
however the PTSD group did not perform the worst, as was the case in the Beer and De 
Bellis (2002) study. These data provides support for the a priori hypothesis stating that 
the PTSD group would perform most poorly. 
 
Attention was also assessed in this study, in the pre-shift errors (errors made in the pre-
shift stages of the CANTAB Intra-Extra Dimensional Set Shift task) in the domain of rule 
acquisition and attentional set shift. For this individual outcome measure the PTSD 
participants performed the most poorly (making the most errors) which again suggests 
that a larger sample size would lead to confirmation of the a priori hypothesis, and is 
consistent with the PTSD literature, Notably, the trauma participants performed the best 
in this task, which is directly contradicting the a priori hypothesis which stated that the 
trauma participants would perform significantly worse than the controls. 
 
Similarly, this study could not replicate the findings of Moradi et al. (1999) of overall 
memory deficits associated with PTSD in adolescents. In fact, this study did not find 
significant differences for any of the measures of memory assessed in the test battery. 
The pattern of performance however, showed that the PTSD group performed the worst 
out of the three groups, on all three measures of memory that were assessed, namely: 
Working memory, Verbal memory, and Visual memory. This leads to the conclusion that 
a larger sample size may had lead to significant findings, similar to those found by 
Moradi, Neshat-Doost et al. (1999), and tends to support the a prior hypothesis regarding 
the PTSD participant’s performance 
 
The trauma group performed worse than the controls on measures of Working and Visual 
memory, but better than controls on measures of Verbal memory. This finding, as well as 
the results of the attention task (and seen in the domain of Decision-making/impulsivity), 












Hypothesis 1, based on the theory of the effects of traumatic stress on the prefrontal 
cortex and the hippocampus, and based on adult research on the neuropsychological 
effects of PTSD and trauma, proposed that group membership would affect all measures 
of prefrontal cortex and hippocampus functioning. However, as can be seen in the 
preceding discussion, this was not found in this study (only Inhibition was statistically 
significantly affected). Along with the domains already discussed, the analyses of the 
domains of Rule acquision, Processing-speed, and Decision-making/impulsivity also 
reflected that group membership was not a significant factor in these domains. The 
analysis in the domain of Spatial navigation also reflected that, group membership was 
not a significant factor in this domain. This composite domain was made up of only the 
CG Arena invisible trails and the probe trail data, therefore a significant group 
membership result was expected, as seen in Hypothesis 2. Indeed the effect of group 
membership was evident, however the effect was too small for significant findings. These 
significant findings of group membership are however seen in a more thorough 
exploration of the CG Arena data, which is explored later in the discussion of the testing 
of Hypothesis 2. 
 
The fact that group membership was not significantly associated with poorer performance 
on most of the composite cognitive domains is further reinforced by the particularly small 
effect sizes of group membership in the regression analysis testing Hypothesis 1. 
 
The Role of IQ in PTSD and Trauma Exposure 
In this study the role of IQ was particularly important. In the regression analysis, Full 
Scale IQ score was a significant factor in the majority of the cognitive domain assessed 
(all except Problem-solving, Processing speed and Decision-making/impulsivity.) In 
these significant domains, Full Scale IQ score, along with sex of the participant, produced 
particularly large effect sizes (ranging from 30% to 56%). These findings show the 
magnitude of the role of Full Scale IQ in neuropsychological test performance. 
 
In the testing of Hypothesis 1, in the regression analysis, Full Scale IQ scores were 











domain of Inhibition remained significant, however, group membership in the domain of 
Spatial navigation was not significant. As will be discussed shortly in the discussion of 
the testing of Hypothesis 2, group membership did in fact have a significant effect in 
many of the outcome measures in the ANOVA analyses of Spatial navigation (where 
participants in the PTSD group performed most poorly compared to controls). These 
analyses did not control for Full Scale IQ scores. This implies that a primary reason why 
the participants in PTSD group did most poorly is due to the fact that their Full Scale IQ 
scores were lower than the control group. However, as discussed in the introduction, 
research assessing the relationship between IQ and PTSD has found that lower IQ may in 
fact be a symptom of PTSD (Jenkins et al., 2000; Saigh et al., 2006). Furthermore lower 
IQ may be a preceding risk factor for PTSD (Koenen et al., 2006; McNally, 2003; 
Saltzman, Weems, and Carrion, 2006). These studies suggest that the confounding results 
of IQ may be misleading. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The Effects of Trauma and PTSD on Performance of Spatial 
Navigation Tasks 
The seminal study in the field of the effects of trauma (specifically PTSD) on 
adolescents, conducted by Beers and De Bellis (2002) found deficits in adolescents’ 
visual-spatial abilities. Notably, this was assessed by considerably different tests to the 
ones employed in the current study (e.g., they used the Judgment of Line Orientation test; 
Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Their results were, however, not significant after corrections 
were applied for multiple comparisons. Although these previous results were not 
significant (also seen in the testing of hypothesis 1), the following analyses measured 
Spatial navigation in a far more detailed way, taking into account many complexities 
which were not done in the previous study, and in so doing discovered some important 
results. 
 
Although not all the results from the ANOVA analyses of the CG Arena data were 
statistically significant, a thorough discussion is necessary to understand the overall 












Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena, Visible Target Trials 
Analyses of the visible-target trials data analysis showed that there was no group 
membership effect on these data (i.e. participants in the control group, the trauma group, 
and the PTSD group all performed in a statistically similar manner). These data 
confirmed a priori predictions: The visible-target trials task does not require any kind of 
cognitive mapping ability for successful completion, and therefore those participants with 
putative hippocampal dysfunction should perform just as well as those with intact 
hippocampal functioning (i.e., there should be no effect of group membership on the 
ability to complete visible-target trials successfully). These findings are consistent with 
previous research conducted on Spatial navigation in the CG Arena (e.g., Thomas et al., 
2010). 
Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena, Invisible Target Trials 
Analyses of the invisible-target data showed that there was a significant group 
membership effect on this task. On these trials, participants in the PTSD group performed 
significantly more poorly than did those in the control group (i.e., they took a much 
longer path length to reach the target). The performance of participants in the trauma
group was not statistically significantly different from that of participants in either of the 
other two groups, although they did perform slightly better than those in the PTSD group 
and slightly worse than those in the control group). These data, then, confirmed the a 
priori hypothesis that participants in the PTSD group would perform most poorly on the 
invisible-target trials due to the cognitive mapping demands of the task and their putative 
hippocampal dysfunction. The data did not confirm the hypotheses stating that 
participants in the PTSD group would perform significantly more poorly than those in the 
trauma group, and that those in the trauma group would perform significantly more 
poorly than those in the control group. Nonetheless, the pattern of performance suggested 
confirmation of this hypotheses might be possible with a larger sample. The finding of a 
statistically significant group membership effect on a cognitive map-based spatial 
navigation task, at least with respect to the comparison of PTSD with control participants, 
is consistent with previous research (e.g., Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 2003; 












Testing Hypothesis 2: CG Arena, Probe Trial 
Analyses of the probe trial data showed that group membership did not have a 
statistically significant effect on this measure of persistence of search and robustness of 
cognitive mapping. The trend in performance (the controls spent the most time in the 
target quadrant and the PTSD group spent the least time in the target quadrant, out of the 
three groups) is in the correct direction, following the a prior hypotheses. It is possible, 
therefore thay with more power (i.e., a larger sample this finding would reach statistical 
significance) .Although the findings were not significant, the trend exhibited here, 
suggesting a group membership effect on a cognitive map-based spatial navigation task, 
at least with respect to the comparison of PTSD with control participants, is consistent 
previous research (e.g., Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 2003; Schwabe et al., 2007; 
Thomas et al., 2010). 
 
Hypothesis 3: The Effects of Trauma and PTSD on Information-Processing Bias 
The various statistical analyses conducted here showed that group membership did not 
have a significant effect on biases for emotional information-processing. 
 
Analyses of the AGNG task showed that there was no significant group membership 
effect on the NoGo error rates, the Go reaction times or the Response bias data (as 
measured by the ß statistic). These findings therefore did not support the a priori 
hypothesis that individuals with PTSD will present a significantly different set biases 
than control participants (where the individuals with PTSD will be biased towards threat-
related stimuli, in this case angry faces, and that controls will be biased towards 
positively-valenced stimuli, in this case happy faces). Analyses of the data obtained on 
these measures, showed that the patterns of performance were in fact opposite to the a 
priori predictions made based on the literature (Ladouceur et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 














Hypothesis 4: The Effects of Trauma Characteristics and Trauma Responses on 
Performance 
The various statistical analyses conducted here on the trauma and PTSD data showed that 
PTSD symptom clusters (specifically avoidance and numbing), was significantly 
associated with poorer performance on two domains, namely: Decision-
making/impulsivity and Processing speed. 
In Decision-making/impulsivity, higher avoidance/numbing symptoms were significantly 
associated with higher scores on this domain. This means that participants with higher 
symptom scores were in fact less impulsive, and made less risky decisions. In Processing 
speed, avoidance/numbing symptom scores were significantly associated with lower 
scores on this domain. This means that participants with higher symptom scores were in 
fact slower in processing information.  
The factor of ‘months since trauma’ was not significantly associated with performance in 
any of the domains. However, as mentioned in the results, the regression results 
suggested that the length of time since trauma was negatively associated with 
performance of eight of the domains (all but Visual Memory). This means that the longer 
time that passed since the trauma, the more poorly individuals did in these domains. This 
provides support for the a priori hypothesis. 
The effect sizes in this analysis go further to suggest the role that PTSD symptoms have 
on performance, ranging from 4% for Working memory to 32% for Processing speed. 
These effect sizes must be read with caution, however, as they include the effect of the 
trauma characteristic, ‘months since trauma.’ 
Other Analyses of Interest: The Role of Other Factors in Test Performance 
The secondary regression analyses, which assessed whether perceived everyday stress (as 
assessed by the LEQ) and general anxiety (as assessed by the STAI 2 trait questionnaire) 
had an impact on functioning, showed that Spatial navigation was associated with higher 











participants had significantly higher general anxiety levels than the all the other 
participants, and therefore it could have the presence of PTSD that led to both the 
increased anxiety levels as well as the decreased performance on this domain. The results 
of the analyses suggested that perceived everyday stress and stress felt on the day of 
testing had no impact on test performance 
 
These analyses also assessed whether personal characteristics and attributes such as 
approach avoidance/withdrawal tendencies (as assessed by the PANAS) and resiliency 
(as assessed by the CD resiliency questionnaire) had an effect on performance. The 
results showed that more avoidance/withdrawal tendencies were significantly associated 
with poorer performance on the domain of Problem-solving, and that less approach 
tendencies were significantly associated with poorer performance n the domain of Rule 
Acquisition. Once again, these findings could be due to the fact that the PTSD 
participants had significantly higher avoidance/withdrawal tendencies and also lower 
approach tendencies (although these differences were not significant), and therefore it 
was the presence of PTSD that led to both the tendencies, as well as the decreased 
performance on these domain. The results suggested that resiliency had no impact on test 
performance.  
 
Sex Differences in the Effects of Trauma Exposure and PTSD on Test Performance 
The role that the sex of the participant plays in test performance, looking particularly at 
the interaction between sex and group membership is of interest in this study. This is 
looked at generally under the prediction that suggests that in many domains there will be 
marked sex differences in the effects that trauma exposure and PTSD has on 
performance. 
 
Although sex of the participant was a significant predictor in many of the domain results 
in the primary regression (specifically: Working memory, Visual memory, and Spatial 
navigation), it is the interaction between a significant group membership factor and sex 
that is of importance in this study. As discussed, only Inhibition showed a significant 











domain. This means that on the general test battery there were no significant interactions 
between group membership and sex of the participant. 
 
This however, is quite different in terms of the analyses done in order to test hypothesis 
2. The analyses indicated some important sex differences, each of which is detailed 
below. 
 
Analysis of the visible trial data showed that there was a significant sex difference on this 
task (with girls performing significantly more poorly than boys). This is however not a 
hippocampus-dependent task and therefore the sex differences exhibited are not discussed 
further.  
 
Analysis of the invisible-target trial data showed that, as with the visible trials, there were 
significant sex differences (with girls performing far slower than boys). More 
importantly, these results showed that, although there were no interaction effects between 
the sex of the participant and group membership, the average performances of each group 
when broken down by sex, showed that the girls’ performance was the reason for the 
initial significant group effect; the males’ performance showed quite a different pattern, 
with the trauma group performing the worst. Due to the non-significant interaction 
effects, these results do not statistically confirm the hypotheses relating to sex differences 
in Spatial navigation, namely that the trauma exposed girls (and particularly the girls in 
the PTSD group) will perform more poorly than controls, however these results do 
suggest support for these hypotheses. These results, as well as the pattern of the boys’ 
performance do, however, confirm the hypothesis that the group membership effect is not 
seen in boys, as suggested by research conducted by Thomas et al. (2010). 
 
The data from Probe trial showed that there was a significant interaction effect between 
sex of the participant and group membership. Of interest here is that girls in the PTSD 
group performed more poorly than all of the other participants. Additionally boys in the 
PTSD group actually performed better than all other participants. Although these results 











hypotheses regarding sex differences in the effect of group membership on cognitive 
map-based spatial navigation tasks. Moreover, these results are consistent with the 
previous results reported by members of our laboratory (e.g., Thomas, 2010), most 
notably Attwood (2008), who reported that males who were stressed (using the TSST) 
performed better than all other participants, compared to non-stressed males and both 
stressed and non-stressed females 
 
The results of the sex differences presented raise an important point of discussion. The 
research conducted on Spatial navigation, has shown that this ability is significantly 
affected by stress. This research includes studies done on war-veterans with PTSD, the 
majority of which are male. However, the research done on the effects of stress using the 
CG Arena specifically, has shown that stress may not have a detrimental effect on males’ 
Spatial navigation abilities (Thomas et al., 2007) and may even increase performance 
(Attwood, 2008). The discrepancies within the research could be due to the fact that the 
one involves long-term traumatic stress, and the other involves current stress (which is 
obviously not traumatic). On the other hand the discrepancies could be due to 
measurement issues. Our results however tend to support the CG Arena research on 
current stress, which lends support to the latter reasoning. 
 
Lastly, the analyses done in order to test hypothesis 3, indicated that there was a 
significant interaction between group membership and sex of the participant on response 
bias (ß) exhibited in the sample (as suggested by Waters & Valvoi, 2009). Our findings 
were, however, not consistent with their findings. Specifically, whereas Waters and 
Valvoi (2009) suggest that females in the clinical group are most affected on tasks of 
response bias, and males in the clinical group are not affected, the results in the current 
study showed that the PTSD boys were most biased in responding (compared to all other 
groups), and statistically significantly different to only the PTSD girls, who were least 














Possible Reasons for Inconsistent Findings 
The possible reasons for a lack of many significant findings in this study is vital in 
understanding the real relationship between trauma, PTSD and cognitive performance. 
Based on the results, it could be assumed that trauma exposure and PTSD do not affect 
many areas of cognition, however, as discussed previously, the study of executive 
functioning in PTSD and trauma exposure is particularly known for producing elusive 
results (Danckwerts & Leathem, 2003). These deficits may be too subtle and therefore 
hard to detect in neuropsychological testing, but as Leskin and White (2007) point out, 
the effects of possible deficits may still be disruptive to the adolescent victims in their 
daily lives. 
In the test battery, the PTSD participants did not perform the best ut of the three groups 
on any of the cognitive abilities, except for Processing speed. However, as discussed, the 
trauma group performed the best in many of the cognitive abilities (namely, Verbal 
memory, and Decision-making/impulsivity). This finding is inconsistent with the 
research done both in adolescent and adult trauma research.
One possible reason for these results is that the trauma group experienced vastly different 
traumatic events, and although all these events met the criteria for a traumatic event 
(discussed in the methods section), many of the participants in this group did not feel any 
lasting effects from the trauma (i.e., they were not traumatized). On the other hand, some
of these participants were very close to having a diagnosis of PTSD (however did not 
meet the exact criteria). Therefore, although many of these participants would have 
exhibited neuropsychological deficits, due to the trauma they experienced, there were 
many that would not have been affected in the same way, and thus remain high 
functioning in terms of the abilities assessed in this study. (This theory is reinforced by 
the fact that the victims of traumatic events which would seem more severe (such as 
rape), exhibited more deficits in more domains than other participants). 
The possible reasons for the smaller amount of significant results on fewer domains 











unclear, however it may be attributed to two possible reasons. These are: firstly, the 
current study used notably different neuropsychological tests to assess cognitive 
performance, and secondly, the sample in the current study was from a markedly 
different population, and therefore culture may be playing an important role in mediating 
the effects of traumatic stress, trauma in general and PTSD specifically. 
With regard to the use of notably different neuropsychological tests, the current study 
attempted to use tests which were not only of high reliability and validity, but also 
attempted to use tests which could detect subtle deficits and were well suited for cross-
cultural administration (such as those tests in the CANTAB battery; Cambridge 
Cognition, 2006). Furthermore, as the current study was so strongly based on the theory 
of the various brain regions affected, it was also important to use tests which had concrete 
research to elucidate which regions subserved performance on each test, such as the CG
Arena (Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 2003; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), and the 
CANTAB test battery (Cambridge Cognition, 2006). For these reasons it was necessary 
to use quite different tests to those used in the seminal study. 
With regard to the effect culture may have played in the current study, it is vital to 
highlight that the sample in the current study were all from poor black and coloured 
communities in the Western Cape, all of a low socio-economic status, and many of whom
had received less than optimal education. This is quite different to the American sample 
assessed in Beers and De Bellis (2002). Indeed research has suggested that culture can 
play an important role in the experience and appraisal of traumatic events (Aranda & 
Knight, 1997) and in the functional impairments associated with psychiatric disorders 
such as PTSD (Canino, Costello, & Angold, 1999). Similarly, researchers have found that 
culture plays a significant role in manifestation of PTSD symptoms (Norris, Perilla, 
Ibanez, & Murphy, 2004). Another possible reason for the conflicting results is that Beers 
and De Bellis (2002) studied maltreatment-related PTSD, whereas the current research 
studied various types of PTSD. A final possible reason for the conflicting results is seen 











Age differences in the Research 
The average age of the sample in Beers and De Bellis (2002) was PTSD: 11.38 years old 
and control: 12.17 years old, whereas the average age of the sample in this study was 
PTSD: 15.79, trauma: 15.31, and control: 15.40. As discussed Beers and De Bellis (2002) 
only found significant group differences on measures of prefrontal cortex functioning 
(attention, abstract reasoning and problem solving). They did not find significant group 
differences on measures of hippocampal functioning This is consistent with the literature 
that suggests there is no reduction in the size of the hippocampus in children and 
adolescents with PTSD (Carrion et al., 2001; De Bellis, 1999, 2002), a reduction which is 
seen in adult samples with PTSD (Bremner, 2005; Smith, 2005). It therefore follows that 
the present study, which had a notably older sample, found deficits in hippocampus-
dependent tasks whereas Beers and De Bellis did not. 
 
Conversely, the research on executive functioning on adult PTSD samples (such as 
Beckham, Crawford, & Feldman, 1998; Gilbertsen, Gurvits, Lasko, Orr, & Pitman, 2001) 
implies that, based on the age of our sample, we should have found significantly more 
deficits in prefrontal-cortex dependent tasks as well, and this was not the case;  
neurological research has shown that the prefrontal cortex is not fully developed in 
adolescence (Lewis, 1997; McGlashan & Hoffman, 2000), therefore it is possible that 
most adolescents struggle with prefrontal cortex dependent tasks, and therefore only in 
adult samples are statistically significant differences found. 
 
Important Findings 
One of the most important aims of the current study was to explore whether the diagnosis 
of PTSD allows for unique predictions about certain domains in cognitive functioning, 
over and above predictions made based on trauma exposure alone. By including three 
groups in the study, the effects of experiencing trauma alone, separate to having a PTSD 
diagnosis are thus clearly differentiated. 
  
Both Beers and De Bellis (2002) and Moradi, Neshat-Doost, et al. (1999) only had a 











differences surround their research (i.e. were group differences due to experiencing a 
traumatic event, or was it due to having the disorder of PTSD?) Our study provided some 
important information in this regard. 
 
In the testing of Hypothesis 1, analyses showed that (specifically, in the domain of 
Inhibition), it was the trauma participants who were significantly different to the controls 
(the PTSD group were not significantly different to the controls). This implicates 
experiencing trauma alone as a factor for neuropsychological deficits. 
 
Furthermore, in the testing of Hypothesis 2, assessing Spatial navigation, it was the PTSD 
participants who were significantly difference to the controls (the trauma group were not 
significantly different to the controls). This implicates the diagnosis of PTSD alone as a 
factor for neuropsychological deficits. 
 
These findings show that, like the research done with adults in this field, both PTSD and 
the experiencing of trauma are significant factors in adolescents neuropsychological 
functioning.  
 
Other Interesting Findings 
Clinical Characteristics of the Trauma and PTSD Adolescents 
Analyses on the clinical characteristics of the sample, as assessed by the MINI KID 5.0, 
showed that, as expected, the prevalence of having a disorder is contingent on group 
membership. This effect was specifically seen in Depressive disorders; Anxiety 
disorders, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Mood disorders. A point of interest here 
is the association with OCD, as intrusive thoughts are symptoms of both disorders. 
 
Other Characteristics of the Whole Sample 
The effects of group membership on other characteristics, namely: general anxiety, 
perceived everyday stress, approach avoidance/withdrawal tendencies, and resiliency 
provided some interesting results. The PTSD group scored significantly higher on 











control and trauma participants), and on measures of avoidance/withdrawal tendencies 
(compared to trauma participants). Lastly, the PTSD group had significantly higher 
physical and emotional abuse scores (compared to trauma participants). Whether or not 
the increased general anxiety reported and the increased avoidance/withdrawal 
tendencies exhibited in the PTSD group is a predicting factor for PTSD or a result of 
PTSD was not determined in this study. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The current study had a number of limitations, all of which should be addressed in future 
research. Firstly, a potential problem for the interpretation of the current data is that the 
traumatic events experienced by participants in the sample, although all meeting the 
criteria for a DSM-IV traumatic event, were of ranging severity. It is possible, therefore, 
that many of these participants (particularly those in the trauma non-PTSD group) were 
not significantly affected by the event. Along with using standard definitions of 
exposure to trauma, one way to address this concern in future research would be to 
assess the level of severity of the traumatic events experienced and only include 
participants where the traumatic events experienced are of similar severity. 
 
A second potential limitation of the current study relates to sample size. Although the 
sample size used here was larger than that in many of the previously published studies in 
this field (and, significantly, was larger than both Beers and De Bellis (2002), and 
Moradi, Neshat-Doost, et al. (1999)), many of the trends in the data suggest that with a 
larger sample many more statistically significant results would have been found. Future 
studies should attempt to use larger samples so as to clarify, for instance, whether the 
patterns of test performance seen in the current study were due to chance or to actual 
between-group differences.  
 
A third potential limitation of the current study is that, due to resource constraints and 
despite the fact that the study was conducted in a multicultural context, I could not recruit 
a sample large enough to address questions about cross-cultural differences and SES 











literature has established that neuropsychological test performance is heavily affected by 
culture and SES (such as in Aranda & Knight, 1997). The question of whether culture 
and/or SES has an influence on the individual’s response to trauma, and whether that in 
turn leads to differing neuropsychological outcomes, is an interesting question that future 
research ought to address.  
 
A fourth potential limitation of the current study is that, due to resource constraints, the 
current study examined a cross-sectional view of individuals with PTSD and trauma 
exposure, and therefore questions about vulnerabilities to PTSD in adolescents could not 
be answered. Future studies should attempt to explore longitudinally, possible premorbid 
factors that are associated with PTSD (such as IQ, anxiety levels, withdrawal tendencies), 
in order to assess whether or not these factors are a result of a PTSD diagnosis or indicate 
a predisposition or vulnerability to developing a PTSD diagnosis. 
 
A fifth limitation of the current study is that the current study did not differentiate 
between a single trauma and recurrent/chronic trauma and thus did not explore the 
possible differences in effect. Future studies should make this differentiation and include 
this factor in their analyses in order to fully understand how multiple/chronic trauma 
impacts on the individual as opposed to a single traumatic experience. 
 
A final potential limitation of the current study is that, due to resource constraints, the 
current study did not administer functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) as a 
technique to explore neurological abnormalities associated with trauma and PTSD, but 
rather relied on previous neurological research for these correlates. Future studies should 
attempt to include studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) in order 
to examine the neural activation in the brain regions of adolescent trauma victims and 
adolescents with PTSD. This would provide a clear indication of how these adolescents 
differ in neural activation compared to healthy controls that have not experienced trauma. 
 
Conclusion and Implications for Treatment 











campal functioning are impaired in adolescents with a history of childhood trauma. 
Moreover, the data suggest that the response to trauma significantly affects later 
neuropsychological functioning. Taken together, the data therefore imply that although 
there is a biological basis for the neuropsychological deficits exhibited in victims of 
trauma and PTSD, the way in which the individual responds to that trauma plays an 
important role in subsequent cognitive outcome. This suggests that treatment with 
children and adolescents should focus on helping the individual cope with and manage 
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Telephone: Home: (        ) 
Cell: 
How would you 
describe your ethnicity 
/ race? 
1. Black 2. Coloured 3. White 4. Asian
5. Other(specify):
Home Language: 
Full name (Child): 
Gender: M             F 
Date of Birth: 
Grade:
Address: area of 
residence: 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME: (Please circle appropriate number) 
Household income per 
year: 
1. R0
2. R1 – R5 000 
3. R5001 – R25 000 
4. R25 001 – R100 000 
5. R100 001+






Highest level of education reached? 
Mark one response for each person as follows: 
1. No formal education (never went to school)
2. Grades 1-6 / Sub A-Std 4 - didn’t complete
primary school
3. Grade 7 / Std 5 - completed primary school
4. Grades 8-11 / Stds 6-9 -didn’t complete high
school
5. Grade 12 / Std 10 - completed senior school


































MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES (ASSET INDEX): (Please circle 
appropriate number) 
Which of the following items, in working order, does your household have? 
Items Yes No
1. A refrigerator or freezer
2. A vacuum cleaner or polisher
3. A television
4. A hi-fi or music center (radio excluded)
5. A microwave oven
6. A washing machine















Which of the following do you have in your home? 
Items Yes No
1. Running water
2. A domestic servant
3. At least one car
4. A flush toilet
5. A built-in kitchen sink
6. An electric stove or hotplate
















1. Do you have a computer at home

















We’re talking with teenagers from the Western Cape to gather information about 
their daily lives, how they have been feeling recently. We also want to see how 
those teenagers perform on certain tests of memory and thinking. The 
information gathered will be used to create a thesis to be given to the University 
of Cape Town as part of a Masters degree.  
Some people will be asked to continue with this study by participating in 2 more 
sessions. However, filling out this questionnaire does not mean you have to 
continue.
In this questionnaire, you will be asked personal questions. I would really 
appreciate it if you would answer the questions honestly and openly. Your 
answers are very important to us.  
All the answers you give in this questionnaire will be kept confidential. That 
means they will be private between you and me. No one else will see your name 
or your answers to this questionnaire. 
Thank you for your time and honesty with this questionnaire. 
Please indicate that you understand and would like to participate in this research 

















Full name:  
How would you 
describe your ethnicity/ 
race? 
1. Black         2. Coloured          3. White            
4. Other(specify):                                           
Home Language:  
Gender: Male             Female 
Date of Birth:  
Grade:  






















3.1. Has anything really awful happened to you? Like being in a          NO     YES 
really bad accident, a fire, or a natural disaster? Like seeing  
someone get killed or hurt really bad? Like being attacked by  
someone? Or has something else really awful happened to you?  
IF YOU CIRCLED YES TO THIS QUESTION CONTINUE WITH THIS SECTION 
IF YOU CIRCLED NO TO THIS QUESTION YOU CAN SKIP TO THE END. 
3.2. Did you respond with intense fear, feel helpless or horrified? NO      YES 
3.3 In the past month, has this awful thing come back to you in  
some way? Like dreaming about it or having a strong  
memory of it or feeling it in your body? NO      YES 
3.4. In the past month: 
a Have you tried not to think about this awful thing? NO      YES 
b Have you tried to stay away from things that might  
remind you of it? NO      YES 
c Have you had trouble remembering some important  
part of what happened? NO      YES 
d Have you been much less interested in your hobbies  
or your friends? NO      YES 
e Have you felt cut off from other people? NO      YES 
f Have you noticed that you don't have strong feelings  
about things? NO      YES 
g Have you felt that your life will be shortened or that NO      YES 
you will die sooner than other people? 
3.5. In the past month: 
a Have you had trouble sleeping? NO      YES 
b Have you been moody or angry for no reason? NO      YES 
c Have you had trouble paying attention? NO      YES 
d Were you nervous or "jumpy"? NO      YES 
e Would you jump when you heard noises?  NO      YES 
f. Would you jump when you saw something out of the NO      YES 
 corner of your eye?   
3.6. In the past month: 
a. Have these problems upset you a lot?
b. Have these problems caused you to have problems at
school, at home, or with your friends?
IF YES TO ANY, CIRLCLE YES NO      YES 
Thank you again for completing this questionnaire. 












Screening Questionnaire: Rationale and Results 
Further Rationale 
One very important reason for wanting to recruit a select number of participants for each 
group from the start stemmed from the legal obligations set in place to report first time
confessions of suspected abuse (now further enforced by the Sexual Offences Act 2008). 
This legal obligation was spelt out in the assent forms (APPENDIX #). The screening
questionnaire was thus initially implemented so there would not be too many people in 
the trauma and PTSD groups, thereby controlling for a possible situation where there 
were unmanageable numbers of legal issues. However, while conducting the interviews, 
it came to light that there were no traumatic events that went unreported, as all of the 
traumatic events that took place, and were discussed in the interviews, had been reported 
to the police where necessary.
Findings 
Interestingly, the screening process itself provided some important results. Out of the 126 
adolescents who completed the screening questionnaires, only 57 self-reported having not 
experienced a traumatic event (i.e., 69 self-report having experienced a traumatic event). 
Of these 69 adolescents, 39 met the criteria for PTSD (as assessed by the MINIkid 5.0). 












Life Events Questionnaire 
INITIALS _____________________ STUDY #_____________  DATE _________________________ 
Have any of the following life events or problems happened to you during the last 6 months?  How about more than 6 months ago?  If so, please also 
rate the impact on you.
Did this occur 




(circle correct answer) 
Did this occur 






You broke off a steady relationship. Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
You had a serious problem with a close friend, neighbor or 
relative. 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
You were fired from your job. Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
You moved to a new school. Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
Your began to see your mother less Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
Your began to see your father less Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
There has been a change (up or down) in the family’s 
financial status
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
You have a new brother or sister in the family Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi











You began a relationship 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
One of your close frinds moved away 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
A sibling of yours moved away 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
A pet of yours died 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
Your parents began to argue or fight more 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
Your parents separated or divorced 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
You began to argue more with your parents 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
One of your parents has lost their job 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
A parent had  problems with the police and received a jail 
sentence 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
The family was forced to move from where you were staying 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
A sibling has become involved in drugs 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
One of your parents has been seriously ill and had to be 
Hospitalized 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
A brother or sister has been ill and had to be hospitalized 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
You got a new stepparent 
 
Yes / No None/Some/Significant Yes / No None/Some/Signi
A sibling has become involved in drugs 
 












Parent/Guardian’s Informed Consent Document 
 (for Participants from Treatment Centers and the Boys School) 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
Informed Consent to Allow Participation in Research and 
Permission for Collection, Use, and Disclosure 
of Cognitive Performance and Other Personal Data
You are being asked to allow your child to take part in a research study. This form
provides you with information about the study and seeks your permission for the 
collection, use and disclosure of your child’s test performance data, as well as other 
information necessary for the study. The Principal Investigator (the person in charge of 
this research) will also describe this study to your child and answer all of their questions. 
Your child’s participation is entirely voluntary. Before you decide whether or not they 
can take part, read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand. By allowing participation in this study you and your child will not be 
penalized or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled.  
1. Name of Participant ("Study Subject")
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2. Title of Research Study
Neuropsychological Profiles of Adolescents with a History of Childhood Trauma
3. Principal Investigator and Telephone Number(s)
Kevin G. F. Thomas, Ph.D. Michaela Ashley-Cooper 
Senior Lecturer Masters student 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town University of Cape Town 
021-650-4608 0832473954 
4. What is the purpose of this research study?
The main purpose of this research is to describe how adolescents, from a South
African population, with a history of childhood trauma, perform on the particular
battery of neuropsychological tests. Specifically, we plan to compare the performance
of adolescents with a history of trauma, with the performance of adolescents with no
such history. Furthermore we plan to assess the effect of a posttraumatic stress











5. What will be done if your child takes part in this research study?
In this study, a series of questionnaires and cognitive tests will be administered. The
questionnaires assess your child’s current psychological functioning, and ask about
the trauma they have experienced. These questions are not detailed questions, your
child simply answers yes or no to the questions; they do not need to give any details.
The cognitive tests measure certain aspects of your child’s memory and thinking
skills.
6. If you choose to allow your child to participate in this study, how long will they 
be expected to participate in the research?
The experiment consists of two sessions. The first should not last longer than 120 
minutes. The second session will also take approximately 120 minutes. If at any time 
during the sessions your child finds any of the procedures uncomfortable, they will be 
free to stop participating without penalty. 
7. How many people are expected to participate in the research? 
100 
8. What are the possible discomforts and risks?
There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. A possible 
discomfort your child may experience is slight fatigue. If they become tired during 
any of the tests, or questionnaires, they can take a break. They will be allowed to take 
breaks whenever they want to. During the questionnaire session, sensitive questions 
may be asked; however, your child will be assured that he/she only needs to answer 
what they feel comfortable with. Furthermore, all participants will be informed that a 
registered clinical psychologist will available to them if they are in any way 
distressed by the study procedures. At the conclusion of the study procedures, all 
participants will be fully debriefed and provided with a list of trauma counselling 
centres and trauma counsellors. 
If you wish to discuss the information above or any discomforts you may experience, 
you may ask questions now or call the Principal Investigator listed on the front page of 
this form. 
9. What are the possible benefits to your child?  Will you or your child receive
compensation for taking part in this research study?
Your child will receive monetary compensation for their involvement in this study.
This will include R50 for the first session, and R50 for the second session.
10. What are the possible benefits to others?
Information from this study will improve our understanding of how trauma affects
functioning in later life. The research may help to identify people who have
experienced various forms of trauma.












Allowing your child to participate in this study will not cost you anything. The 
research will be conducted at the centre your child is currently attending, and all 
travelling costs will be reimbursed.   
 
12. Can your child withdraw from this research study? 
You are free to withdraw your consent and to stop you child participating in this 
research study at any time. If you do withdraw your consent, there will be no penalty. 
 
If you have any questions about your child's rights or welfare as a research 
participant, you may contact Professor Marc Blockman on 021 4066496. 
 
13. If your child withdraws, can information about your child still be used and/or 
collected? 
Information already collected may be used. 
 
14. Once personal and performance information is collected, how will it be kept 
secret (confidential) in order to protect you and your child’s privacy?  
Information collected will be stored in locked filing cabinets or in computers with 
security passwords. Only certain people have the right to review these research 
records. These people include the researchers for this study and certain University of 
Cape Town officials. Your child’s research records will not be released without your 
permission unless required by law or a court order. 
 
15. What information about your child may be collected, used and shared with 
others? 
This information gathered will be records of your child’s performance on cognitive 
tests, as well as information on their history and current psychological functioning. 
However their name does not appear on any of the data. 
 
16. How will the researcher(s) benefit from your child being in the study? 
In general, presenting research results helps the career of a scientist. Therefore, the 
Principal Investigator and others attached to this research project may benefit if the 
results of this study are presented at scientific meetings or in scientific journals. 
 
17. Signatures  
As a representative of this study, I have explained to the participant the purpose, the 
procedures, the possible benefits, and the risks of this research study; and how the 
participant’s performance and other data will be collected, used, and shared with 
others: 
 
___________________________________________               _______________ 
  












You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits, 
and risks; and how your performance and other data will be collected, used and 
shared with others. You have received a copy of this form. You have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions before you sign, and you have been told that you can ask 
other questions at any time. 
You agree to allow participation in this study. You hereby give permission for the 
collection, use and sharing of your child’s performance and other data. By signing 
this form, you are not waiving any of your legal rights. 
____________________________________________   ___________________  
Signature of Person Consenting and Giving Permission  Date  
___________________________________________   _____________________  
Name of Child Age 
Please indicate below if you would like to be notified of future research projects 
conducted by our research group:  
______________ (initial) Yes, I would like to be added to your research participation 
pool and be notified of research projects in which I might participate in the future.  
Method of contact:  
Phone number:  __________________________  
E-mail address:  __________________________  
Mailing address:  ________________________________  
  ________________________________ 













Assent Form for Participants at the Treatment Centers 
 
Assent Form for Participation in Study 
 
Hello! My name is Michaela Ashley-Cooper. I’m here for a study on behalf of the 
University of Cape Town. 
 
We’re talking with adolescents from the Western Cape to gather information 
about their daily lives, how they have been feeling recently, and performance on 
certain tests. The information gathered will be used to create a thesis to be given 
to the University of Cape Town, as part of a Masters degree.  
 
Firstly, we would like to ask you some questions in an interview that will take a 
little less than 2 hours. This interview will discuss experiences you had in your 
childhood and will look at how you are feeling currently. You will then do 1 more 
session, also lasting less than 2 hours, involving tests that assess certain things. 
Most of the tests will be like computer games. The interview and tests will be 
done just with me. I would really appreciate it if you would answer the questions 
honestly and openly, so that we can find out how you really feel, and what you 
really think. Your answers are very important to us. You will be given R50 for the 
first session, and R50 for the last session. Whoever brings you to the centre will 
be reimbursed for travel costs.  
 
Some of these questions may talk about things that people can find quite 
personal, or may be difficult to answer. If any of the questions make you feel 
uncomfortable or you don’t want to answer them, you do not have to. If any of the 
questions upset you, or if you would like to talk to someone about the feelings 
you experienced during the interview, please let me know and I, or another 
responsible adult, will be happy to take that time with you. 
 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will have the chance to provide 
important information to this research. Even though this isn’t a quick process, 
your thoughts and opinions are very valuable.  
 
Remember, you do not have to talk about anything you don’t want to.  
 
If you agree to take part in this study, the things you tell me will be confidential. 
That means they will be private between you and me. I want to let you know, 
though, that it is my responsibility to make sure that you are safe. That means if 
you tell me you are being hurt by another person, you are hurting yourself, or you 











know so that, depending on your situation, the right actions can be taken to make 
sure that you are safe. 
If you have any questions about what you have read or if you think of any 
questions in the future, you can reach me, Michaela, at 083 247 3954. 
Would you like to participate in the research? Please indicate here with your 















Parent/Guardian’s Informed Consent Document 
 (for Participants from the Co-ed School) 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
You are being asked to allow your child to take part in a research study. This form 
provides you with information about the study and seeks your permission for the 
collection, use and disclosure of your child’s test performance data, as well as other 
information necessary for the study. The Principal Investigator (the person in charge of 
this research) will also describe this study to your child and answer all of their questions. 
Your child’s participation is entirely voluntary. Before you decide whether or not they 
can take part, read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand. By allowing participation in this study you and your child will not be 
penalized or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled.  
18. Name of Child
_____________________________________________________________________ 
19. Title of Research Study
Neuropsychological Profiles of Adolescents with a History of Childhood Trauma
20. Principal Investigator and Telephone Number(s)
Kevin G. F. Thomas, Ph.D. Michaela Ashley-Cooper 
Senior Lecturer Masters student 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town University of Cape Town 
021-650-4608 0832473954 
21. What is the purpose of this research study?
The main purpose of this research is to describe how South African adolescents with
a history of childhood trauma perform on a set of tests of learning, memory, attention,
and problem-solving. Specifically, we plan to compare the performance of
adolescents with a history of trauma, with the performance of adolescents with no
such history.
22. What will be done if your child takes part in this research study?
Firstly, your child will fill out some questionnaires. After this, your child will take
some cognitive tests will be administered. The questionnaires assess your child’s
current psychological functioning, and ask about the trauma they have experienced.











23. If you choose to allow your child to participate in this study, how long will they
be expected to participate in the research?
The experiment consists of two sessions. Both sessions should not last longer than 90
minutes. If at any time during the sessions your child finds any of the procedures
uncomfortable, he or she will be free to stop participating without penalty. Both of
these sessions will be done during school time.
24. What are the possible discomforts and risks?
There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. A possible 
discomfort your child may experience is slight fatigue. If your child becomes tired at 
any point during the study, he or she will be allowed to take a break. Your child will 
be allowed to take as breaks many breaks as he/she needs. During the questionnaire 
session, sensitive questions may be asked; however, your child will be assured that 
he/she only needs to answer questions he/she feels comfortable with. Furthermore, a 
registered clinical psychologist will available to your child if he/she is in any way 
distressed by the study procedures. At the conclusion of the study procedures, your 
child will be fully debriefed and provided with a list of trauma counselling centres 
and trauma counsellors if needed. If you wish to discuss the information above or any 
discomforts you may experience, you may ask questions now or call the Principal 
Investigator listed above. It is important to note that if any child reveals abuse or any 
traumatic events they have experienced that is not known by parents and/or the relative
authorities, our legal obligation is to report this information. 
25. What are the benefits of this research? 
Information from this study will improve our understanding of how childhood trauma 
affects memory and thinking in later life.
26. If you choose to allow your child to take part in this research study, will it cost you 
anything?
Allowing your child to participate in this study will not cost you anything.  
27. Can your child withdraw from this research study?
You are free to withdraw your consent and to stop you child participating in this 
research study at any time. If you do withdraw your consent, there will be no penalty. 
If you have any questions about your child's rights or welfare as a research 
participant, you may contact Professor Marc Blockman, the head of the UCT Faculty 
of Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee, on 021-406-6496. 
28. If your child withdraws, can information about your child still be used and/or
collected?
Information already collected may be used.
29. Once personal and performance information is collected, how will it be kept











Information collected will be stored in locked filing cabinets or in computers with 
security passwords. Only certain people have the right to review these research 
records. These people include the researchers for this study and certain University of 
Cape Town officials. Your child’s research records will not be released without your 
permission unless required by law or a court order. 
30. What information about your child may be collected, used and shared with
others?
This information gathered will be records of your child’s performance on cognitive
tests, as well as information on their history and current psychological functioning.
31. How will the researcher(s) benefit from your child being in the study?
In general, presenting research results helps the career of a scientist. Therefore, the 
Principal Investigator and others attached to this research project may benefit if the 
results of this study are presented at scientific meetings or in scientific journals. 
32. Signatures
You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits, 
and risks; and how your child’s performance and other data will be collected, used 
and shared with others. You have received a copy of this form. You have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions before you sign, and you have been told that you can 
ask other questions at any time. You agree to allow participation in this study. You 
hereby give permission for the collection, use and sharing of your child’s 
performance and other data. By signing this form, you are not waiving any of your 
legal rights.
____________________________________________    ________________  
Signature of Person Consenting and Giving Permission  Date  
As a representative of this study, I have explained to the participant the purpose, the 
procedures, the possible benefits, and the risks of this research study; and how the 
participant’s performance and other data will be collected, used, and shared with 
others: 
_______________________________________________________
 Signature of Researcher (Person Obtaining Consent and Permission) 
THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND FOR CONSIDERING THIS 
RESEARCH 













Example of Assessment Report 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
Department of Psychology
14 June 2009  
RE: Tandi Surname 
Dear Parent/Guardian: 
Thank you very much for consenting to Tandi’s participation in our research study. She 
was selected as a participant and assented to participate. During the two testing sessions I 
administered various cognitive tests to Tandi. She completed all of them, including tests 
of memory, attention, learning, spatial navigation, planning, decision-making, judgment, 
and problem-solving. Because this is a research study and not an individual clinical 
assessment, the feedback I can give you about results of these tests can only be stated in 
terms of the range in which your child performed. 
These ranges are determined by the population in which the test was developed (and most 
of the tests we used were developed in the United States or United Kingdom). Therefore, 
if the table below indicates that the child performed in the “average” range, then what we 
are saying is that, on the test in question, the child’s performance was the same as that of 












Results for test battery: 
 
Test of: Range of Performance 
Verbal memory - Immediate recall Below Average 
Verbal memory - Delayed recall Low Average 
Verbal memory - Delayed recognition Average 
Visual working memory capacity-forward High Average to Superior 
Visual working memory capacity-backward High Average to Superior 
Visual episodic memory High Average 
Visual-Spatial recognition memory Low Average 
Planning Low Average 
Rule acquisition Average 
Inhibition Average 
Inhibitory Control & Cognitive Flexibility Below Average 
Verbal learning Below Average 
Visual learning High Average 
Attention Average 
 
Overall, Tandi showed a varied performance in the test battery, with some areas of 
significant strength (e.g., on tests of visual working memory where pictures where 
presented to her and she had to remember the order they were presented in), and some 
areas of weakness (e.g., on tests of verbal working memory and verbal learning, where a 
list of words are to be remembered and recalled). It is notable that in terms of both 
memory and learning, Tandi appeared to learn better when information was presented 
visually (e.g., in the form of pictures) as opposed to orally (i.e., when it was read out to 
her).  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study or about our findings, you may 
contact us at the numbers below. Also, if you would like a copy of the final research 
report we are creating, please e-mail Ms. Ashley-Cooper. 
 
Michaela Ashley-Cooper    Kevin G. F. Thomas, Ph.D. 
M.Soc.Sci Candidate      Senior Lecturer and Supervisor 
Department of Psychology    Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town    University of Cape Town 
0832473954      021-650-4608 














ART Scoring Sheet 
        Subject no.: __________ 
1) Correct layout of the room (i.e. 1, 3, 1, 3 picture layout) (2)  _______ 
2) Target situated in the corner between Items 8 & 1 (2)   _______ 
3) Item 1 alone on a wall (2)       _______ 
4) Item 1 east of target (2)       _______ 
5) Item 8 north of target (2)       _______ 
6) Item 8 north of target in correct position (2)    _______ 
7) Item 7 north of target (2)       _______ 
8) Item 7 north of target in correct position (2)    _______ 
9) Item 6 north of target (2)       _______ 
10) Item 6 north of target in correct position (2)    _______ 
11) Items 6,7,8 on the same wall (2)      _______ 
12) Items 6,7,8 on the same wall north of target (2)    _______ 
13) Item 4 alone on a wall (1)       _______ 
14) Item 4 west of target (1)       _______ 
15) Item 5 south of target (1)       _______ 
16) Item 5 south of target in correct position (1)    _______ 
17) Item 2 south of target (1)       _______ 
18) Item 2 south of target in the correct position (1)    _______ 
19) Item 3 south of target (1)       _______ 
20) Item 3 south of target in the correct position (1)    _______ 
21) Items 5,2,3 on the same wall (1)      _______ 
22) Items 5,2,3 on the same wall south of the target (1)   _______ 
23) Entire reconstruction correct (1)      _______ 
 
 
        TOTAL ______________ 













Post-hoc Results from the CG Arena: Invisible Trials 
 
Invisible Trials: Main Effect of ‘Trials” 
 
Table A1 
Post-hoc analysis results using Tukey’s HSD test: main effect of ‘trials’ on invisible trials 
data in the CG Arena. 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8 
Trial 1  0.025 0.0001 0.0001 0.00015 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Trial 2 0.025  0.371 0.716 0.887 0.608 0.284 0.096 
Trial 3 0.0001 0.371  1.000 0.991 1.0000 1.000 0.999 
Trial 4 0.0001 0.716 1.000  1.000 1.000 0.998 0.948 
Trial 5 0.00015 0.887 0.991 1.000  1.000 0.977 0.826 
Trial 6 0.0001 0.608 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 0.977 
Trial 7 0.0001 0.284 1.000 0.998 0.977 1.000  1.000 
Trial 8 0.0001 0.096 0.999 0.948 0.826 0.977 1.000  
Note. The data presented are p values for comparing differ nces across trials on average 
















Post-hoc Results from the CG Arena: Probe Trial 
 
Probe Trial: Interaction Effect of Sex x Group 
 
Table A2 
Post-hoc analysis results using Tukey’s HSD test: interaction effect of sex x group 













Control Girls  0.055 0.474 0.924 1.000 0.879 
PTSD Girls 0.055  0.863 0.541 0.097 0.699 
Trauma Girls 0.474 0.863  0.985 0.533 0.997 
Control Boys 0.924 0.541 0.985  0.916 1.000 
PTSD Boys 1.000 0.097 0.533 0.916  0.872 
Trauma Boys 0.879 0.699 0.997 1.000 0.872  
Note. The data presented are p values for comparing differences across the three groups 














Separate Regression Results for the Factor: Perpetrator 
 
Table A3 
Separate Regression Results of Factor: Perpetrator 
 Model 









Working memory 0.414 0.527 0.020 0.142 0.644 0.527 
Verbal memory 0.164 0.690 0.008 -0.090 -0.405 0.690 
Visual memory 0.064 0.803 0.003 -0.057 -0.253 0.803 
Spatial navigation 0.006 0.940 0.0003 -0.017 -0.076 0.940 
Rule acquisition 0.074 0.788 0.004 0.061 0.273 0.788 
Inhibition 0.050 0.826 0.003 -0.050 -0.222 0.826 
Problem solving 0.707 0.410 0.034 0.184 0.841 0.410 
Processing speed 0.493 0.491 0.024 -0.155 -0.702 0.491 
Decision-
making/Impulsivity 
0.529 0.475 0.026 0.161 0.727 0.475 
Note. In this regression the factor of perpetrator is measured as either known or stranger; 
known was inputted at 101, and stranger was inputted at 102. 
 
 
